Darfur Peace and Development » DPDO Selected Reports

Rethinking Darfur by Marc Gustafson

admin — Tue, 01 Jun 2010 13:07:34 +0000

Rethinking Darfur

by Marc Gustafson

Marc Gustafson is a Marshall Scholar and doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford. He is currently writing his dissertation on political trends in Sudan.

The war in Darfur has been devastating to the Darfuri people, and its aftermath has been a tragic story of suffering, displacement and sorrow. At the same time, the war has become one of the most misunderstood conflicts in recent history. Analysts and activists have oversimplified the causes of the war, slighting its historical and systemic causes. For years, public commentators ignored important changes in the scale and nature of the violence in Darfur, causing important misperceptions among the public and in the policy community.

Analysts misrepresented the scale of the conflict by selecting high-end estimates from local casualty surveys and then extrapolating them over the entire region. They also largely ignored the fact that the majority of the deaths from violence occurred before the end of 2004. Similarly, many commentators failed to mention that disease and malnutrition (as a consequence of war) caused over 80 percent of the casualties in Darfur, far more than violence itself. The total number of people who have died from violence in Darfur is approximately 60,000, which is considerably smaller than the 400,000 casualties often cited by activists.

This policy briefing draws on historical analysis, explores mortality surveys, and dissects six years of American budgetary allocations in Sudan to demonstrate that the conflict in Darfur has been misunderstood by both policymakers and the general public, leading to problems in crafting policy toward that troubled land.

June 1, 2010

Executive Summary

Introduction

In the summer of 2004, one of the largest American activist movements in recent history emerged in response to the plight of a population located in Darfur, one of the most remote regions of the world. In this mostly desert province along Sudan’s western border with Chad, a civil war between the government of Sudan and two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army, or SLA, and the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, had killed thousands of civilians and displaced millions from their homes. The Khartoum government perpetrated war crimes against civilians in Darfur, and the rebel groups showed a similar disregard for the most basic human rights of the civilian population in the region.

The causes of the civil war in Darfur include a troubled history of sub-state political and economic disputes, land rights, geopolitical interference and the rapid diminution of water resources and arable land due to desertification. 1 This decades-long story of Darfur’s development, however, is a complicated one to convey to a large public audience. Instead, by the summer of 2004, stories of unidirectional murder, rape, and genocide started to appear in American newspapers. In the absence of historical context, these stories came to define the public’s perception of Darfur and ultimately moved millions of Americans to join a campaign intended to stop the violence.

By 2005, the Darfur activist movement had ballooned into a multimillion-dollar, highly commercialized awareness campaign. In its first year, the Save Darfur Coalition, which acted as an umbrella organization for most of the activist campaigns, raised more than $15 million.2 By 2006, the organization had more than tripled its income, raising almost $50 million in donations and spending 95.1 percent of its funds on advertising and mobilization.3 Mostly through direct advertising and public events, the campaign

shaped the public discussion on Darfur and ultimately influenced American foreign policy. Since the same mischaracterizations that fueled interest in the conflict came to influence American policy, it is worth examining the nature of the war and how activists portrayed it over the last six years.

How Activists Mischaracterized the Darfur Conflict

As an awareness campaign, the SDC was very effective, but it failed to portray the story

of Darfur accurately. Activists began by inflating casualty rates, often claiming that hundreds of thousands of Darfuris had been “killed,” when in reality, the majority of the

casualties to which they refer occurred as a result of disease and malnutrition (as a consequence of war).4Differentiating between those who “died” and those who were “killed” may seem callous in the shadow of the horrific acts of war crimes and injustice in Darfur, but ignoring these distinctions has been central to how the activist movement has gone astray. Since many activists assume that hundreds of thousands of Darfuris have been “killed,” they have pressured the U.S. government to fund violence prevention plans and international peace-keeping troops, as opposed to different, potentially more effective, policy changes.

In 2006 the SDC hired lobbyists in Washington to draft legislation and pressure politicians to focus their efforts and funds toward violence prevention and United Nations troop deployment. After hiring lobbyists, the SDC launched a public pressure campaign with the central purpose of “urging the immediate deployment of international peacekeepers to protect the people of Darfur.”5

At more than 150 nationwide events, activists learned how to pressure government officials by mail and telephone. By the end of 2006, according to the Save Darfur website, supporters had sent a million postcards and 764,570 emails to President Bush and Congress and called the White House 12,545 times.6 The central message of the calls and mailings was that “time is running out” and that the violence must be stopped.7 The SDC held rallies in New York City and Washington, D.C., where advocates such as George Clooney spoke about how the situation in Darfur was “quickly worsening.” After the rallies, Clooney, who had recently returned from a trip to Darfur where he was advised and escorted by the SDC, addressed the United Nations Security Council on September

14, 2006. He stated in his address that the situation in Darfur was “getting much, much

worse,” and that “in the time that we’re here today, more women and children will die violently in the Darfur region than in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Israel, or Lebanon.”8

Before the lobbyists, public pressure campaigns, and activists emphasized the need for

troop deployment in 2006, the United States Congress had approved more than $1 billion in assistance funds to Sudan. Less than 1 percent of those funds were allocated to support the peacekeeping efforts of the African Union, which began deploying troops in

2004.9 These numbers indicate that the U.S. government was initially more focused on

providing humanitarian aid and development support than it was on funding peacekeeping activities.

From 2006 until 2008, when the SDC and many other groups began to directly pressure

the U.S. government, the allocation of U.S. funds to peacekeeping activities increased

dramatically (see Figure 1) to approximately 50 percent of the total budget allocated to

Sudan.10 Overall emphasis on deploying military forces increased dramatically. By 2007, the United Nations announced that it would begin deploying the world’s largest peacekeeping mission in Darfur and the United States promised to fund one quarter of the

UN peacekeeping effort.11

Meanwhile, during 2007 a numberof American political figures proposed that the United States should attempt to fix things by attacking Sudan. In February then-senator Hillary Clinton suggested to Defense Secretary Robert Gates during congressional testimony that the United States should consider “directing punitive strikes against Sudanese planes known to have taken part in illegal bombing missions in Darfur.”12 In October, Susan E. Rice, who would later become President Obama’s ambassador to the United Nations, proposed that Congress should immediately “authorize the use of force in order to end the genocide.”13Most boldly, Sen. Joe Biden, during his campaign for the presidency,

stated flatly that “I would use American force now,” asserting a “moral imperative” to

“to put force on the table and use it.”14

In retrospect, the emphasis on military means and peacekeeping seem misguide because, as many casualty surveys now show, the violent death rate (those who were

“killed”) in Darfur declined significantly after a ceasefire was signed in April 2004, while the rate of those who were dying of disease and malnutrition remained high. According to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in Brussels, which has produced three of the most comprehensive casualty studies to date, the number of violent deaths dropped to approximately 150 per month by the end of 2004.15 In an interview conducted in 2005, UN official Jan Pronk also confirmed that “about 100 persons” were being killed per month by violence and that most of the violence in Darfur consisted of “banditry, looting and crime.”16

In 2005 the United Nations conducted another, more comprehensive survey, which

concluded that the decline in violent deaths since its previous report in 2004 has been

“substantial.”17 By the middle of 2005, the CRED conducted another casualty survey in

Darfur; the U.S. Government Accountability Office called it the most reliable study of casualties in Darfur to date.18 In addition to criticizing other mortality reports for improperly extrapolating the limited surveys conducted to the entire Darfur region, the 2005 CRED report examined more than 20 surveys conducted throughout the region and concluded that the total number of violent deaths from 2003–2005 was approximately 30,000. A later report from CRED published in the Lancet in 2010 estimated the total number of violent deaths in the conflict from 2003 to 2010 at

62,305.19 Figure 2 outlines estimated deaths from violence from 2004 to 2009.

Despite the decline in violent deaths, activists, journalists, and academics continued

to sensationalize the problems in Darfur. In fall 2006, the SDC, ignoring the recent CRED

report and UN statements about the rapid diminution of violence, began to run ads in

the United States and the United Kingdom reading “SLAUGHTER IS HAPPENING IN

DARFUR. YOU CAN HELP END IT. In 2003 Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir moved to

crush opposition by unleashing vicious armed militias to slaughter entire villages of his own citizens. After three years, 400,000 innocent men, women and children have been killed.”

Shortly after the ads were released, the British Advertising Standards Authority

found that Save Darfur’s ad campaign violated codes of objectivity, and it ordered the

group to amend its ads to present the high death toll as opinion, not fact.20 But by that

point, the Save Darfur Coalition had already convinced millions of Americans that the situation in Darfur deserved immediate military intervention.

Activists have also mischaracterized the nature of the violence in Darfur, highlighting almost exclusively the crimes of the government of Sudan and rogue Arab tribes. Save Darfur advertisements, newsletters, and websites continue to use the term “ongoing genocide” to describe the conflict, even though the nature and scale of the violence has changed significantly since the height of the conflict in 2003–2004. The repeated use of the word “genocide” distorted the balance of culpability and innocence. Using the term “genocide” implies that there is a unidirectional crime taking place, one in which there are victims (i.e., the people of Darfur) and a culprit (i.e., the government of Sudan).

In reality, however, there are victims and villains on both sides of the civil war in Darfur. The government of Sudan has killed many people and is responsible for war crimes in Darfur, but the rebel insurgents are also guilty. When the United Nations conducted its International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, it found that in addition to Khartoum’s “crimes against humanity,” many of the rebel groups had also engaged in “serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.”21

The international community has largely misunderstood the role of the rebel groups, believing that they emerged to protect the people of Darfur from the government’s genocidal onslaught. In reality, however, the rebel groups initiated the war by launching an insurgency in 2003, winning the first 32 out of 34 battles against the government.22 Unable to control the insurgency, the government armed ad hoc militia groups in Darfur to suppress the rebel movement. These militiamen, often alongside Sudanese government soldiers, killed, raped and tortured tens of thousands of innocent Darfuris. After 2005 and the introduction of international observers, government-led attacks declined rapidly and the rebel groups began to fissure. Rebel infighting became the primary cause of violent deaths and other atrocities in Darfur by 2006. The government and its ad hoc militia groups were likely responsible for the majority of casualties from violence before 2005, and the majority of casualties from violence overall, but by 2006, fractured rebel groups and individual defectors were wreaking havoc in Darfur, becoming the chief perpetrators of violence against civilians and attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian workers.23

The Activist Impact in Darfur

Most of the rebels’ actions have gone unnoticed in the international community because

of how the conflict has been framed by activists and American government officials.

Use of the term “genocide” has allowed rebel groups in Darfur to slip under the radar and

commit crimes without the rest of the world taking notice. Had “genocide” not been the

focus, activist campaigns might have also challenged the rebel groups. For example, Eritrea, Chad, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM, were the principal funders of the rebel groups in Darfur. They were (and some still are) also allies and aid recipients of the U.S. government, which means they could have easily been pressured to cut their lifelines to the rebel groups.24

Additionally, a disproportionate emphasis on “genocide” and military violence has hindered the peace process. The primary peace process, which led to the Darfur Peace Agreement, lasted almost two years, but was hastily concluded in May of 2006 after seven rounds of negotiations. UN official Jan Pronk stated a month earlier that the peace talks were being given a one-month deadline. One of the reasons for the deadline, according to the chief African Union mediator, Salim Ahmed Salim, was that the process was “severely underfunded.” 25 The other reason for the deadline, according to Alex de Waal, a Darfur expert and program director at the Social Science Research Council, was that the international community, particularly the United States, was putting pressure on the AU mediation team to expedite the agreement.

If U.S. political leaders and activists had been more focused on peacemaking, perhaps more funding and time could have been allocated to the talks. Instead, the U.S. government spent over $1 billion on peacekeeping and rushed the peacemaking process to an end. “With more time,” argues Alex de Waal, “the AU team and [British international development secretary Hilary] Benn could probably have found a formula to satisfy” all parties. 26

The abrupt end of the peace talks caused a number of problems. First, one of the most

important provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement was the incorporation of the rebel

groups into both the armed forces and the local police force. This police force could have

addressed the issues of banditry and the safety of the aid workers, which would later become significant problems in Darfur. It also could have provided jobs for many of the rebels who eventually turned to banditry in desperation after their rebel groups broke apart. The creation of the police force was one of the provisions that was being negotiated in the final days of the peace talks and was cut short before all parties came to an agreement.27 Second, more time may have prevented the rebel groups from splitting

into different factions. After the peace agreement ended, fighting between rebel groups

became one of the most significant causes of violent deaths in the region. Alex de Waal argues that the peace agreement’s abrupt end is one of the reasons why the rebel groups split into so many different factions.28

Before the peace talks had come to an end, activists had already decided that the deployment of international troops was the best solution to the problems of Darfur. The very existence of peace talks was rarely mentioned in American media. A survey of Save Darfur newsletters since 2004 shows that the peace process was scarcely mentioned to the SDC community. Other activist groups and individuals dismissed the process as irrelevant. For example, only one week after the peace agreement was signed, Eric Reeves, one of the most prominent Darfur activists and chroniclers of Darfur events, declared that the agreement was “a meaningless piece of paper signed under genocidal duress” and that more effort should be focused on stopping the violence.29

In defense of SDC’s strategy to focus primarily on violence prevention and claims of

genocide, rather than on the peace agreement or development, Alex Meixner, SDC’s policy director, argues that violence in Darfur was preventing humanitarian aid from reaching those who needed it. Peacekeeping was therefore “necessary to complement humanitarian assistance.”30

An analysis of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s monthly reports partially

supports Meixner’s point. In 2005 and 2006 USAID reports document attacks on aid

workers and note that some locations were too dangerous for aid workers to provide assistance. The humanitarian groups, however, still had access to approximately 90 percent of the affected population in 2005, which is remarkable given the landscape and size of Darfur and the short time they were given to reach such a dispersed population.31 Insecurity was part of the reason why the humanitarian groups could not reach the remaining 10 percent, but according to the newest CRED report, released in January 2010, the primary problem by 2006 was that the humanitarian aid budget had been significantly cut.32 The World Food Programme, the primary supplier of food to

Darfur, experienced a 50 percent bugget cut, while UNICEF was only able to raise 11 percent of its yearly budget. The number of aid workers was reduced by 18 percent, meaning that the number of affected populations without assistance increased.33 At the same time that the humanitarian budget was cut, the budget for peacekeeping soared into the billions, meaning that donors were more interested in funding the peacekeeping mission than providing humanitarian assistance.34

Insecurity, however, was still a problem and was preventing access to some regions of

Darfur, particularly in West Darfur. USAID reports indicate that the primary causes of

insecurity in the inaccessible camps came from bandits and car thieves, two problems

that peacekeepers are not traditionally deployed to address. These issues require a local

police force, a developed penal code and further civic development, all important elements of the failed peace agreement. As the rate of violent deaths in Darfur dipped below emergency levels, attacks against peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers began to rise.

Richard Gowan, an expert on peacekeeping at the Center on International Cooperation,

says that this trend is indicative of the current “crisis in peacekeeping” worldwide. Part of the problem, says Gowan, is that the traditional role of peacekeepers has changed significantly since the Cold War, when peacekeepers were meant to perform military tasks and monitor the implementation of peace agreements.35 Today, the mission of peacekeepers is often unclear, as “there is no strategic formula for determining when peacekeepers should be deployed, or more importantly, when they should leave.”36

In Darfur, peacekeepers were originally sent in to monitor the April 8, 2004, ceasefire

and to act as a deterrent to warring Sudanese parties. Over time, civic infrastructure broke down in the absence of a viable peace agreement, and the peacekeepers were suddenly responsible for local development and civic duties for which they were not trained.37 Therefore, the SDC and the international community’s demand for more peacekeeping troops not only precipitated a harmful reallocation of funds away from humanitarian aid in 2006, but it was also ill-conceived, signaling a belief that peacekeepers, instead of the local citizenry (via the peace process), could repair Darfur’s infrastructure and perform the necessary law enforcement duties.

Not surprisingly, then, the increase of international troops in Darfur did not reduce the

problem of banditry or improve access to the affected population. In fact, humanitarian

access to affected areas worsened after the United Nations began to deploy troops (see

Figure 3). In 2008 the United Nations published a report indicating that during the

months following the April 2004 ceasefire, the accessibility to affected populations was relatively high, averaging roughly 90 percent. However, once the international peacekeepers began to be deployed in 2006, the accessibility decreased. (It is important to note that only one third of the authorized peacekeepers had been deployed by summer 2008.38)

Had the Abuja peace talks been properly funded and the two sides given adequate time to come to an agreement, a more robust local police force could have been established

to control the banditry that impeded humanitarian assistance. Also, rebel groups may not have fractured into as many splinter groups, causing rebel defectors and rebel infighting to become a significant threat to aid workers.

Darfur and Activists Today

Today the situation in Darfur continues to be mischaracterized. Most of the ongoing violence can be attributed to banditry, lawlessness, and fighting between rebel groups, with one notable exception being the recent government attacks in Jebel Marra.39According to UNAMID reports, the average monthly casualty rate for the last five months of 2009 was 51.40 Very few of these are linked to the conflict between Sudanese government forces and the rebel groups. Since last year, the conflict in Darfur has not met the 1,000 casualties per year threshold that many political scientists

consider necessary for a conflict to be categorized as a “civil war.”41 In January Lt. Gen.

Patrick Nyamvumba, the commander of the peacekeeping force in Darfur, described the

situation as “calm, very calm at the moment, but it remains unpredictable.”4 Additionally, Sudan’s elections in April—which were expected to reignite violence in many areas of Darfur—were surprisingly peaceful.

Despite these changes, there still seems to be no consensus over what to call the situation in Darfur. On the one hand, many government officials and activists have not changed the way they talk about the conflict. President Obama used the word “genocide” in the present tense when addressing the issues of Darfur in speeches in Germany and Ghana in 2009.43 U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice also continues to use the term “genocide.”44 Activist groups such as the SDC and the Genocide Intervention Network still frequently use the terms “ongoing genocide” and “war in Darfur” in their literature and advertisements.

On the other hand, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration argues that the genocide

in Darfur had ended.45 The Obama administration’s Sudan policy, released last October, referred to the genocide in Darfur as if it were still happening, but substantively centered on a more conciliatory approach to Khartoum, offering both incentives and pressure.

46 Additionally, former top commander of UNAMID, General Martin Agwai, has stated

that the war in Darfur has come to an end. Most of the remaining violence, he says, is

due to “low-level disputes and banditry.”47 Even Eric Reeves, a promoter of erroneous

casualty figures early in the conflict, concedes that “there is no doubt that violence

has diminished significantly in the past two or three years—and many, including myself,

have been slow to recognize how significant this reduction has been.”48

SDC has learned many lessons from its mistakes and has made efforts to improve the way it provides information. It has decreased the Darfur casualty rate on its website, from

400,000 to 300,000, and provided a section explaining the “myths” of the Darfur conflict. It has shifted its central focus away from violence and toward the upcoming referendum in the south, the peace process in Doha, Qatar, and pressuring the U.S. Government to not recognize the results of Sudan’s recent elections. Other groups, such as the Genocide Intervention Network have also adjusted the casualty rates, and have made efforts to encourage support for the peacemaking process. Additionally, Special Envoy Gration has shifted the U.S. government’s primary focus to the peace process in Doha, and to the peace agreement between the north and the south.

Regardless of these changes, however, members of the current administration do not agree with Gration’s response to the Darfur conflict and many activist groups regularly

criticize Gration’s efforts to support peace over punishment and engage diplomatically

with the current government of Sudan. There is still disproportionate emphasis on

the government of Sudan’s role in the conflict and undue attention paid to the issue of

genocide over the root causes of the conflict.

While activists have contributed to these conditions, it must be said that the current landscape of Darfur activism is vastly mixed, with different groups pursuing different policy objectives.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that American activists were able to bring attention to the conflict in Darfur. In fact, their efforts may be the reason why Darfur is host to the largest humanitarian assistance effort in the world. Even so, their efforts have had negative consequences. One likely unintended consequence was the diversion of public attention from other wars of greater scale and longevity. For example, in the nearby Democratic Republic of the Congo, the annual casualty rate since 2003 has been approximately four times higher than it was in Darfur. A decade-long civil war in that country has led to the deaths of almost one million people, many more deaths than in Darfur.49 But there is no American activist movement for the Congolese and the level of international humanitarian aid and peacekeeping assistance is still smaller than what it is in Darfur.

One possible explanation for why the public came to pay attention to Darfur and not to

the DRC is rooted in the nature of the Darfur activists’ campaign. Stories of race-based rampage and warfare—like the one activists promoted in Darfur—attract more attention than do more mundane but materially more devastating events involving complicated political processes, famine, or other causes of death. Some activists are aware of this phenomenon. 50 Accordingly, one could see how the stories of genocide and rapine in Darfur not only mischaracterized the conflict, but turned attention from other, more devastating environments like the one in the DRC.

It is easy to understand why activists do not want the U.S. government or the international community to shift their focus away from the difficulties that many Darfuris still face, especially since violent conflict could easily return in the absence of an effective peace agreement. However, ignoring the changes in the scale and nature of the Darfur conflict has already hindered understanding of and response to the conflict. Today, Darfur’s peacekeeping and humanitarian missions continue to grow, yet

the level of violence has remained below emergency levels since the end of 2004. Banditry, intra-tribal fighting, and, most importantly, he absence of a peace agreement still pose serious problems, but these are problems that demand the development of local infrastructure and participation, not the type of intervention advocated by activists and even some political leaders.

In the case of Darfur, activists created a number of negative consequences. They promoted an inaccurate perception among the public and policy elites about the nature and extent of violence in the region; they helped shift U.S. diplomatic emphasis away from the peacemaking process and from atrocities committed by rebel groups; and they diverted attention from more devastating problems elsewhere. Despite activists’ good intentions, these costs are real, and should be added to the ledger we use when measuring the impact of political activism on the Darfur issue.

Sudan survivors answer your questions

admin — Fri, 02 Nov 2007 16:28:48 +0000

The BBC’s Amber Henshaw has been in a camp for displaced people in north Darfur, where she put your questions to some of its residents.

Four-and-a-half years of fighting between Sudan’s government, pro-government Arab militias and rebel groups in the western Sudanese region of Darfur has driven more than 2m people from their homes.

The government denies links to the Janjaweed militia, which is accused of trying to “cleanse” black Africans from large swathes of territory.

Question from Tiffany Martinbrough, New York

Q: To me, rape is the most violent and mentally destructive act that can happen to a woman. I constantly hear about all the rapes that happen to women in the camps. How in the world do so many women, especially the ones you know, survive being raped multiple times and find the strength to smile in photos?

Hawa : Me, myself I am trying to work at a workshop with people who have been raped. I try to offer them moral support. Naturally, people are changing their minds over the rape issue but it is still painful. Women are ostracised less now. And the women have the courage to talk about it, not like before.

Khadija : Before it was a very big problem and the father or brothers of the girl would kill the person responsible. But now rape has become common because of the fighting. Previously, the girls would be cast out of society and no young man would marry them. She would be ostracised. But now that rape is common the victims are not being ostracised. Society is changing our ideas and they are supporting these women more by letting them live a normal life. But it is still difficult. I smile because I strongly believe that everything that happens to us is God’s will. And this is what our father taught us. Even death is by God’s will. And we are all going to die.

Mohammed : The face cannot reflect all the time what is inside the heart. We have a saying: a laugh or smile can cover your tears.

Question from Susannah Gachoka, Nairobi to Khadija

Q: What was life like before you were displaced? I’d also like to know how a year was like – the yearly rhythm of life.

Khadija : We would get up before sunset to pray. Then I would drink a cup of tea and take my food with me to the farm and work until it got too hot. After lunch I would work again until the sun set. Then I would take my donkey back home. I used to cook for my husband and my sons and then we would have dinner. We would go to sleep between 2000 and 2100 local time after we had sat around talking. I was happy with my life then.

My house was one room and I had a small shop on the corner. There was a green tree outside. We used to work very hard in the rainy season. We would harvest between July and September – okra, watermelons, different kinds of seeds and tomatoes. I would sell the surplus. In the summer time we used to harvest tobacco because it does not need much water. We used to have folklore parties when there was a wedding or any kind of celebration – girls and boys would dance together and old women would sing.

Question from Dale Lanan, Longmont, Colorado, US to Khaled and the others

Q: In your opinion what would be the best outcome from the meeting in Libya and does it really matter if all factions involved in the conflict attend?

Khaled : We are not expecting big results from the negotiations because it is not well-organised and because of the place and the time – some movements are not participating, especially the main and important ones. The lack of guarantees from the government is another problem. They are not serious about the demands of the rebels.

Hawa : The Libya talks are going to be useless. We need security on the ground first. We need the hybrid force on the ground. The talks shouldn’t be held in Libya because it is not neutral. We also want compensation and we want development all over Darfur. Abdul Wahid [leader of one of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army factions] understands our ideas – we are not against the talks but they have to be serious. We need all the movements to be at the negotiating table. There is a theory here amongst us that the rebel splinter groups are being paid by the government and the international community.

Mohammed : The talks in Libya are not going to succeed for a number of reasons, including the place – Libya is assisting the Janjaweed as it is part of the Arab agenda- and the time – [UN chief] Ban Ki Moon only spoke to the government, not the rebels. And now the rebels are not taking part. Thirdly, the mediator is not neutral – Colonel Gaddafi thinks the problem of Darfur is just an internal problem of camels.

Wodi : We don’t trust Arab countries because we can’t speak openly in Arab countries and so we can’t give all the details because we are too scared.

Question from Daniele to Khaled

Q: From my understanding, there appears to be two views from political experts on how to approach the current situation. One view is to send in UN troops to bring a halt to the violence thus saving civilian lives and the other view is to continue support and funding of the African Union. What do you think is needed to be done to reduce and hopefully stop the fighting and killing completely?

Khaled : To stop the killings we there needs to be a neutral force on the ground like the planned hybrid one. People have to work harder together to know the causes of the problems and to give the right medicine to eradicate this sickness. I am not worried about the international community. I have sat with the African Union soldiers many times and they tell us their mandate is to monitor and report only, and they are not responsible for even protecting themselves – this is not enough for Darfur. We need protection. They have very few mandates and I feel sorry for them. We need people who can stop the shooting, not just monitor.

Question from Shannon Smith, Gainesville, US

Q: What do you think could most change your situation right now?

Wodi : It is very important to have the hybrid [African Union/European Union peacekeeping] force. We think they will learn from the mistakes of the African Union and the rebel movements. And they can come in with new ideas to help and protect us. I hope they can be here before tomorrow. Because the government is still terrifying us inside the camps – people wearing uniforms.

Khadija : I would like to ask the international community to protect us so we can live our lives again.

Omda : If the government stopped marginalising us. Everyone needs respect.

Hawa : The hybrid force has to be on the ground as soon as possible because we need protection.

Question from Charlsey Bickett, Pittsburgh, US

Q: I am currently doing a research project in which I looking at the security (or lack thereof) in internally displaced people camps. Could you tell me if there were any protection forces in the camp? Was there any method of screening individuals entering the camp?

Omda : There is less violence in the camp than before. When the government heard that the international force were coming they reduced their presence and so there is less than before but it is still very violent. Everyday after 1900 local time you can hear gunshots.

Question from Tim Grout-Smith, Lane End, Bucks, UK to Wodi

Q: What is your attitude to the European people who have been working in the refugee camps? What more should Europe do?

Wodi : The Europeans who are staying with us are reporting everything that is happening. The Europeans can get information and tell the world our demands. Me, myself I work with the Europeans as a translator. I know they are assisting us but I know that the government doesn’t want them to.

Question from Isobel Anderson, Calgary, Canada to Hawa

Q: This question is for Hawa. I was wondering where you got the inner strength to attend university with all the horror around you. It must be hard to study – so how do you do it? What are your dreams for your future.

Hawa : Some people used to stop us when we were coming and going to the university which is in El Fasher town. Especially the police at checkpoints. They would call us names. It was very difficult and it is still very hard. We want to move outside the camps but it is dangerous.

Question from Steven Laredo, Nantucket, Massachusetts to Hawa

Q: I’m wondering where someone like Hawa finds the funds to afford fees for University.

Hawa : The situation is really hard for me and my mum is trying to help me. She is working as a private trader selling onions. Sometimes I work as a volunteer for the non-governmental organisations (NGOs). My university fees are $250 each semester. There are two a year. And I have to pay at the beginning of each semester.

Question from Jared Simmons, Brooklyn, US to Hawa

Q: Hawa, with so many siblings, what does your family do for health care? Do NGOs provide enough care within the camp or do you have to pay at clinics in the surrounding area? Good luck to you and your family.

Hawa : It is not easy to get medicine. If you have someone who is sick it is hard to get the money needed to pay to take them to the doctor. But if it is a small thing you can go to the NGOs who provide basic healthcare.

Question from Krisztina Eles, Budapest, Hungary to Wodi

Q: What kinds of possibilities you have to start a new life? Have you ever thought of coming to Europe with your family?

Wodi : I want to go abroad and do a masters degree, maybe in English. Then I want to come back to Darfur but not necessarily to my own village then I want to get a job, like one in government so I can help my people. I want to help people re-build their lives.

Question from Penelope Bissett, Pittsburgh, US

Q: With more and more people coming to the camp seeking protection, is there enough housing, materials, food and water to sustain everyone? Has the camp been attacked?

Hawa : Women and children are suffering from lack of security in different ways. We are being terrorised by the government. The government drive cars very fast through the camp and it makes the children very afraid. Further education is still difficult and we struggle from poor nutrition. We are suffering, especially the women and the children.

Khadija : There is a shortage of water. We have to buy one can a day for 25c, so unless you work you don’t get any money or water. Sometimes there is food, but not all the time. We get food rations once a month from the United Nations World Food Programme but it is not enough unless you add something. They provide for a max of four people in a family but in mine there are 10 of us. There’s an NGO hospital that can get you a doctor and a prescription but we can’t get medicine because it is expensive. So we share with other people. We have an NGO elementary school for which you pay two Sudanese pounds ($1) a month. It goes to the teachers who are from the camp. There is no high school.

Omda : We don’t think that the camps are safe. Every day we listen to shootings by the government – they want us to be afraid. The government security used to check the camps because they thought the people in the camps were part of the rebel groups. They still do check us, even now.

Question from Susan Morgan, Wellesley, US

Q: Some world leaders have said that the root cause of the crisis in Darfur is global warming and the ensuing competition for scare resources in the region. Others have described the situation as a civil war due to long-standing tribal tensions. Do you feel that either of these analyses accurately explain the reasons behind the conflict in Darfur?

Khaled : The main cause of this problem is the government and the marginalisation of the people of Darfur. And the lack of services and development. The Darfuris have no voice in the government. I think the government had an idea to help the people close to them – the Arab tribes – but I am not sure if they want to completely eradicate all the African tribes.

Khadija : If you want to know and to look at the cause of the problem, go to Khartoum airport and then go to El Fasher airport and you will see the difference. That’s what has caused the problem. People in Khartoum are living in a good situation but here we are very neglected.

Mohammed : Before, the people were living peacefully as one tribe but unfortunately the government had its own agenda – they wanted to create these problems because they believe that they have to make space for all the Arab communities in the north of Africa to help them take over Darfur. Then all the Arab nomads from other countries can come to live in Darfur. It all started in 1916, when they started to remove Darfuris from power.

Question from Goolam Dawood, Johannesburg, South Africa

Q: Do you know what the major differences are between the rebels and the government? Why are Muslims fighting each other?

Mohammed : There’s a struggle between Arab and African tribes. The government used to assist the Arab tribes with guns and weapons and at the same time there was no assistance for non-Arabs or protection for all of Sudan, not just Darfur. When they came they wanted to change the land from belonging to African tribes over to Arab ones. They would like to eradicate black skins and only have Arab skins. It is a kind of genocide. And why are they doing this? It is because we have asked for power sharing. But they want to be in government forever so they need to secure their power. Some Arab countries are assisting them like Iraq, Libya, Syria and Malaysia.

Wodi : I am a supporter of Abdul Wahid and I think the rebel movements know the concerns and the problems and the needs of the nation but the government is preventing them helping us. Some people are killing each other not because of religion but because of the money – they are just bandits some of them. It’s nothing to do with religion.

Question from Achieng Akena, Kampala, Uganda

Q: What would you like to see happen after the war that will make you feel that justice has been done? Would you like to see anything happen to the perpetrators of these crimes, would you like the government to do something for you and your family specifically or would you like the government to do something big for the whole community?

Mohammed : I don’t think there will be any justice or equality unless the people who committed these crimes against us are sent to court. This is not going to happen unless there is some involvement from the international community. Because when we see the people who committed these crimes, they are still in power. This means we have no future. We didn’t force anybody to take our wealth – the government decided to send us to camps and even inside the camps they are trying to get rid of us. We are insisting on compensation, both individually and in groups – we need the government to be convinced that they committed crimes and they should pay.

Khaled : Justice in Sudan is not neutral and the people who committed these crimes are ministers like Ahmed Haroun [The International Criminal Court has issued a warrant for the Sudanese Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmed Haroun for committing war crimes]. We believe that people are good inside. But it is not easy to forgive those people who have caused us pain. If there is no justice then we might have to think about bringing it ourselves. People have lost their cattle and wealth – it was looted and taken from them and we need to get it back.

Question from Barbara Kits, Utrecht, Netherlands to Omda

After having been through so much, what is the most important thing that still gives you hope?

Omda : My dream is to sleep and to wake up and find the Darfuris are living in peace and good situations. I hope all the people around the world feel what we are going through.

Question from Stacey, Baltimore, US

Q: After living through the horrors that you have lived through, do you still believe in the goodness of humanity? Do you still believe that there is hope for the people of the world to overcome the evils that occur everyday?

Hawa : Hawa: I believe that there is goodness especially in the international community. They give us their help and they report what we are going through and they give us the humanitarian assistance we need. They care about what we are going through and that’s how I can still believe in the goodness of people. I am hoping to be able to live in peace and finish university and to repay society from what I have learnt. I would like to help society by telling people their rights in life – how they can get dignity. I want to help in any way I can.

Khadija : Yes I do because when we walked from our village life was very bad and I was thinking that this was the end but thanks to God we are still alive. The NGOs have given us food and help with shelter and this has given us hope in people.

Question from Julie, Nebraska, US

Q: Are the people in the camps getting any news from the outside world about the efforts to bring this crisis to an end? How do they get such news in the camps?

Wodi : There are radios and televisions in the camp. There is a watching club and we can go there. We listen to BBC Arabic on the radio. People also call us on our mobiles and tell us about what is happening where they are.

Omda : We depend on the media to tell us what’s going on when something happens on the ground. The mobile network goes down and that means the government is attacking some places.

Question from Ameer Ali, London

Q: Islamic Relief have raised millions for Darfur. Has this charity helped you in your life?

Omda : No, Islamic Relief haven’t helped us here in this camp. They have withdrawn from here.

Question from Severine, London, UK

Q: How do you imagine the future? How do they think the conflict could be solved?

Wodi : I don’t think there will be peace in the current conditions. We are living as refugees. There are no schools – we are in camps. We lost our money and we don’t have our rights. If we get all this back then maybe peace will come.

Mohammed : My future is linked to the future of Darfur. When there’s no peace I can’t plan for my own future. I am not optimistic because the international community make different resolutions but it has not done any good on the ground. I would be optimistic if I saw the resolutions of the UN carried out.

Khadija : We hope to return back to our old lives but I don’t think that will be easy. We need people to protect us. I would like the international force to come so we can go back to farm our land and so our children can go back to school.

Khaled : I am not optimistic. I am pessimistic and depressed. And if the situation goes on like this for another year, maybe we will leave Darfur – we’ll be killed or we will die.

Question from Merrilee, Ionia, MI to Omda

Q: I would like to know why, in your personal case, you have been targeted. Is it religious, or because of your location, or exactly what? Thank you and I wish you the best and send my prayers.

Omda : We are targeted because the government wants to get rid of our tribes.

Question from Jonathan, Skokie, US

Q: Is the divestment movement having any effect on the Sudanese government? If not yet, will it?

Khaled : Yes of course it can change a lot. It is the voice of the people around the world and their demands it can be useful but it could be painful for the people getting through their daily lives. But it is better because it will hit the target. The people need the government to be removed and if you want to do something you have to pay the price.

Question from Cynthia English, Omaha, US

Q: What’s the one thing you want the world to know about what you have been through? What is the one thing I (and others like me) can do to help?

Khaled : The thing that you can do is talk to the American people about what is happening to Darfuri women at the hands of the government and the militia, especially the Janjaweed… the raping and the kidnapping. Ask them all a question: is this right? And then you must raise awareness.

Question from Chris Harvey, Copenhagen

Q: Considering that the Sudan area is seen as one of the worst-case scenarios for human rights violations in the world, is there any time or demand for fun, excitement, or play-time in the camp?

Khaled : We are trying to live our basic lives. We sometimes think of enjoying it but in the back of our minds all the time we are thinking of protection and looking for our daily bread.

Mohammed : People sometimes celebrate but not like before in their old homes. Sometimes you remember the tragedies and the sadness and then it becomes sad and not a celebration – it is very painful.

Question from Cornelius Christian, Edmonton, Canada to Khaled

Q: Khaled, what is your favourite part of economics?

Khaled : I studied both economics and politics but I prefer economics. Economic theory can help everyone but a political party can only help people in that party. Practical economics is what I liked most.

Question from Rafael Smith, Indianapolis, US

Q: I am a design student and I am currently working on developing a shelter for displaced people. My concept is a structure that will be easily assembled for immediate relief, but is amenable for later use. What conveniences, beyond a basic shelter would be most important to you – electricity, a stove or running water?

Khadija : I don’t have electricity or running water. I have to collect water every day. What I’d really like in my house is a refrigerator and electricity and an oven. My home in the camp is built of stone and is one room.

Question from the BBC’s Amber Henshaw to the camp residents

Q: Have you enjoyed participating – hearing from others around the world and giving them your views?

Hawa : Yes it is very nice to think that we can be in contact with other people all around the world.

Wodi : It is excellent to have the BBC here – our situation is all a matter of having a discussion with the world and that’s what we want.

Mohammed : It is a very good idea. It is a conversation with the world and is a way for people to know what happens to us here in the camps.

Khadija : It is very nice to talk to people and to know what questions people are asking and for them to find out what our life is like.

Khaled : I wish it could’ve been done before and I hope that it will happen again soon. We listen to the radio in the camps but I hope the BBC can improve its frequency. We trust the BBC very much.

Story from BBC NEWS:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7063331.stm

UN Security Council Resolution 1769 on Darfur Hybrid Force

admin — Wed, 01 Aug 2007 13:23:28 +0000

UN Security Council Resolution 1769

July 31, 2007 and statements

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and presidential statements concerning the situation in Sudan,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan, and to the cause of peace, and expressing its determination to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its sovereignty, to assist in tackling the various problems in Darfur, Sudan,

Recalling the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high-level consultation on the situation in Darfur of 16 November 2006 as endorsed in the communiqué of the 66th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held in Abuja on 30 November 2006 as well as the communiqué of 79th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 22 June 2007, recalling the statement of its President of 19 December 2006 endorsing the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements, welcoming the progress made so far and calling for them to be fully implemented by all parties without delay and for all parties to facilitate the immediate deployment of the United Nations Light and Heavy Support packages to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and a Hybrid operation in Darfur, for which back-stopping and command and control structures will be provided by the United Nations, and recalling that co-operation between the UN and the regional arrangements in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security is an integral part of collective security as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

Re-affirming also its previous resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict and the subsequent conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict pertaining to parties to the armed conflict in Sudan (S/2006/971), and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, as well as recalling the report of its Mission to Addis Ababa and Khartoum from 16 to 17 June 2007,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007,

Commending in this regard the agreement of Sudan that the Hybrid operation shall be deployed in Darfur, as detailed in the conclusions of the high-level AU/UN consultations with the Government of Sudan in Addis Ababa on 12 June 2007 and confirmed in full during the Council’s meeting with the President of Sudan on 17 June in Khartoum,

Recalling the Addis Ababa Agreement that the Hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries,

Commending the efforts of the African Union for the successful deployment of AMIS, as well as the efforts of member states and regional organisations that have assisted it in its deployment, stressing the need for AMIS, as supported by the United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages, to assist implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement until the end of its mandate, calling upon the Government of Sudan to assist in removing all obstacles to the proper discharge by AMIS of its mandate; and recalling the communiqué of the 79th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 22 June to extend the mandate of AMIS for an additional period not exceeding six months until 31 December 2007,

Stressing the urgent need to mobilise the financial, logistical and other support and assistance required for AMIS,

Welcoming the ongoing preparations for the Hybrid operation, including the putting in place of logistical arrangements in Darfur, at United Nations Headquarters and the African Union Commission Headquarters, force and police generation efforts and on-going joint efforts by the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union to finalise essential operational policies, and further welcoming action taken so that appropriate financial and administrative mechanisms are established to ensure the effective management of the Hybrid,

Re-iterating its belief in the basis provided by the Darfur Peace Agreement for a lasting political solution and sustained security in Darfur, deploring that the Agreement has not been fully implemented by the signatories and not signed by all parties to the conflict in Darfur, calling for an immediate ceasefire, urging all parties not to act in any way that would impede the implementation of the Agreement, and recalling the communiqué of the second international meeting on the situation in Darfur convened by the African Union and United Nations Special Envoys in Tripoli from 15-16 July 2007,

Noting with strong concern on-going attacks on the civilian population and humanitarian workers and continued and widespread sexual violence, including as outlined in the Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the report of the Secretary-General of 23 February 2007, emphasising the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of such crimes and urging the Government of Sudan to do so, and reiterating in this regard its condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur,

Reiterating its deep concern for the security of humanitarian aid workers and their access to populations in need, condemning those parties to the conflict who have failed to ensure the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need in Darfur as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees, and recognising that, with many citizens in Darfur having been displaced, humanitarian efforts remain a priority until a sustained ceasefire and inclusive political process are achieved,

Demanding that there should be no aerial bombings and the use of United Nations markings on aircraft used in such attacks,

Reaffirming its concern that the ongoing violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of Sudan as well as the region, stressing that regional security aspects must be addressed to achieve long-term peace in Darfur, and calling on the Governments of Sudan and Chad to abide by their obligations under the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006 and subsequent bilateral agreements,

“Determining that the situation in Darfur, Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. Decides, in support of the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the outcome of the negotiations foreseen in paragraph 18, to authorise and mandate the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months, of an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as set out in this resolution and pursuant to the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007, and further decides that the mandate of UNAMID shall be as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007;

2. Decides that UNAMID, which shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light Support Packages to AMIS, shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each;

3. Welcomes the appointment of the AU-UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur Rodolphe Adada and Force Commander Martin Agwai, and calls on the Secretary-General to immediately begin deployment of the command and control structures and systems necessary to ensure a seamless transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID;

4. Calls on all parties to urgently facilitate the full deployment of the UN Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS and preparations for UNAMID, and further calls on member states to finalise their contributions to UNAMID within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution and on the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to agree the final composition of the military component of UNAMID within the same time period;

5. Decides that:

(a) no later than October 2007, UNAMID shall establish an initial operational capability for the headquarters, including the necessary management and command and control structures, through which operational directives will be implemented, and shall establish financial arrangements to cover troops costs for all personnel deployed to AMIS;

(b) as of October 2007, UNAMID shall complete preparations to assume operational command authority over the Light Support Package, personnel currently deployed to AMIS, and such Heavy Support Package and hybrid personnel as may be deployed by that date, in order that it shall perform such tasks under its mandate as its resources and capabilities permit immediately upon transfer of authority consistent with sub-paragraph (c) below;

(c) as soon as possible and no later than 31 December 2007, UNAMID having completed all remaining tasks necessary to permit it to implement all elements of its mandate, will assume authority from AMIS with a view to achieving full operational capability and force strength as soon as possible thereafter;

6. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Council within 30 days of the passage of this resolution and every 30 days thereafter, on the status of UNAMID’s implementation of the steps specified in paragraph 5, including on the status of financial, logistical, and administrative arrangements for UNAMID and on the extent of UNAMID’s progress toward achieving full operational capability;

7. Decides that there will be unity of command and control which, in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping, means a single chain of command, further decides that command and control structures and backstopping will be provided by the United Nations, and, in this context, recalls the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high level consultation on the situation in Darfur of 16 November;

8. Decides that force and personnel generation and administration shall be conducted as set out in paragraphs 113-115 of the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007, and requests the Secretary-General to put in place without delay the practical arrangements for deploying UNAMID including submitting to the General Assembly recommendations on funding and effective financial management and oversight mechanisms;

9. Decides that UNAMID shall monitor whether any arms or related material are present in Darfur in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004);

10. Calls on all Member States to facilitate the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to Sudan of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive use of UNAMID in Darfur;

11. Stresses the urgent need to mobilise the financial, logistical and other support required for AMIS, and calls on member states and regional organisations to provide further assistance, in particular to permit the early deployment of two additional battalions during the transition to UNAMID;

12. Decides that the authorised strength of UNMIS shall revert to that specified in resolution 1590 (2005) upon the transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID pursuant to paragraph 5(c);

13. Calls on all the parties to the conflict in Darfur to immediately cease all hostilities and commit themselves to a sustained and permanent ceasefire;

14. Demands an immediate cessation of hostilities and attacks on AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys, and further demands that all parties to the conflict in Darfur fully co-operate with AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys, and give all necessary assistance to the deployment of the United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS, and to UNAMID;

15. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) decides that UNAMID is authorised to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to:

(i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers,

(ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan;

(b) requests that the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and the Government of Sudan conclude within 30 days a status-of-forces agreement with respect to UNAMID, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and General Assembly resolution 61/133 on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and the Protection of United Nations Personnel, and decides that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall provisionally apply with respect to UNAMID personnel operating in that country;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to achieve actual compliance in UNAMID with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, including the development of strategies and appropriate mechanisms to prevent, identify and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse, and the enhancement of training for personnel to prevent misconduct and ensure full compliance with the United Nations code of conduct, and to further take all necessary action in accordance with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of pre-deployment awareness training and, in the case of forces previously deployed under AU auspices, post-deployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

17. Calls on all concerned parties to ensure that the protection of children is addressed in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure continued monitoring and reporting of the situation of children and continued dialogue with parties to the conflict towards the preparations of time-bound action plans to end recruitment and use of child soldiers and other violations against children;

18. Emphasises there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur, welcomes the commitment expressed by the Government of Sudan and some other parties to the conflict to enter into talks and the political process under the mediation, and in line with the deadlines set out in the roadmap, of the United Nations Special Envoy for Darfur and the African Union Special Envoy for Darfur, who have its full support, looks forward to these parties doing so, calls on the other parties to the conflict to do likewise, and urges all the parties, in particular the non-signatory movements, to finalise their preparations for the talks;

19 Welcomes the signature of a Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur, and calls for it to be fully implemented and on all parties to ensure, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need and delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees;

20. Emphasises the need to focus, as appropriate, on developmental initiatives that will bring peace dividends on the ground in Darfur, including in particular, finalising preparations for reconstruction and development, return of IDPs to their villages, compensation and appropriate security arrangements;

21. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council for its consideration no later than every 90 days after the adoption of this resolution on progress being made on, and immediately as necessary on any obstacles to:

(a) the implementation of the Light and Heavy Support Packages and UNAMID,

(b) the implementation of the Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur,

(d) the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the parties’ compliance with their international obligations and their commitments under relevant agreements, and

(e) the ceasefire and the situation on the ground in Darfur;

22. Demands that the parties to the conflict in Darfur fulfil their international obligations and their commitments under relevant agreements, this resolution and other relevant Council resolutions;

23. Recalls the reports of the Secretary-General of 22 December 2006 (S/2006/1019) and 23 February 2007 (S/2007/97) which detail the need to improve the security of civilians in the regions of eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, expresses its readiness to support this endeavour, and looks forward to the Secretary-General reporting on his recent consultations with the Governments of Chad and CAR;

24. Emphasises its determination that the situation in Darfur shall significantly improve so that the Council can consider, in due course and as appropriate, and taking into consideration recommendations of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union, the drawing down and eventual termination of UNAMID;

25. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Statements

United Nations Secretary-General BAN KI-MOON said the resolution’s adoption was the culmination of serious and painstaking collaboration within the Security Council. It was the result of sincere and intensive cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. “As we open this new chapter, I pay tribute to the men and women of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), who have given their all in the service of peace -– some paying the ultimate price. We must now move forward, in all haste, to build on their work. We must put in place the complex and vital peacekeeping operation, which you have authorized today.”

He said preparations for the operation had been under way since early 2007. In order to meet the resolution’s ambitious goal and assume authority in Darfur by the end of the year, the Council must remain engaged and Member States must provide every support. Additional capable troops must be committed, support systems put in place and command structures established. While Governments knew that took time, “time is not on our side”.

The unequivocal and continuous support of the Government of the Sudan was equally fundamental, he stressed, adding that, if it was not a good-faith partner in the initiative, the operation would fail. The same expectation existed regarding the rebel movements. The Special Envoys of the United Nations and the African Union would be meeting with the parties in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, later in the week, and it was crucial that that meeting yield positive results, so as to pave the way for negotiations and, ultimately, a peace agreement. “We will build peace through negotiations for a political settlement, and sustain peace on the ground with our peacekeepers.”

EMYR JONES PARRY (United Kingdom), paying tribute to the African Union personnel, said the hybrid force must be deployed as part of a multifaceted approach on the political, security and humanitarian tracks. The political track was now a priority, and the United Kingdom pledged full support for the upcoming negotiations in Arusha.

He also called for stepped up humanitarian protection and assistance, and cooperation from all sides, stressing the need for compliance with the comprehensive resolution and that, if compliance failed, there would be consequences. The suffering in Darfur would not be ended by today’s action, but it offered the prospect of a new start for the region.

JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX ( France) said the resolution was a decisive step to end the suffering in Darfur, and it must start a course of real action. France had been integrally involved in the development and adoption of the text, working closely with the United Kingdom and in consultation with the Government of Sudan.

Stressing the crucial need for all parties to comply with and respect the ceasefire, he said the operation would require a strong commitment from the international community. AMIS also required stronger support in the period leading up to the deployment of the hybrid force. Humanitarian personnel must be protected and supported, and the political front must be strengthened. France was willing to contribute in many areas, including those of security and displacement.

VITALY CHURKIN ( Russian Federation) described the resolution as “timely”, saying it embodied the cooperation of the United Nations and the African Union. However, peace could only be achieved through a comprehensive political settlement, and it was to be hoped that the hybrid operation would help move that process forward, while also assist with protection of the vulnerable, in full recognition of Sudan’s sovereignty. For the operation to succeed, all parties must carry out their obligations, while deepening the relationship between the United Nations, the African Union and the Government of Sudan.

NASSIR ABDULAZIZ AL-NASSER ( Qatar) recalled that Sudan had initiated the request for United Nations assistance to address some internal issues. The country had taken many positive steps in partnership with the Organization and the African Union, and had given its consent to the deployment of the hybrid operation. All that was needed now was the continuation of encouragement towards Sudan and the fulfilment of the Security Council’s promise to continue respecting the country’s sovereignty and forcing the rebel movements to refrain from violence and join the peace process. Qatar encouraged the Sudanese to continue their cooperation with the United Nations.

PETER BURIAN (Slovakia) welcomed, as one of the resolution’s co-sponsors, its unanimous adoption, saying his country had been greatly concerned about the suffering of Darfur’s civilian population, in particular women and children. The unprecedented human crisis and its regional consequences should end as soon as possible. The resolution reflected the new partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, and Slovakia called on all parties to facilitate an expeditious deployment and cooperation in order to achieve a lasting solution.

JOHAN C. VERBEKE ( Belgium) said the resolution’s unanimous adoption was a decisive moment towards solving the crisis in Darfur. Mandating the first hybrid peacekeeping force was a strong sign of the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. However, the responsibility did not stop with adoption of the text. A solution to the crisis must involve recognition of the responsibility of all actors to pursue the political process.

ZALMAY KHALILZAD ( United States) said UNAMID would have a strong mandate and promised to play a critical role in ending the suffering in Darfur, which had been staggering. The brutal treatment of the region’s people was unacceptable to the United States, whose citizens had contributed much assistance to them.

Emphasizing that the resolution must be implemented without delay, he said the transition to a unified control with the African Union was imperative and must be expedited in a timely manner. At the same time, the Government of Sudan and other signatories must comply fully with the Darfur Peace Agreement and its humanitarian protections. All parties must cooperate fully with the resolution and, if Sudan’s cooperation was not forthcoming, the United States would call for both unilateral and multilateral action.

MARCELLO SPATAFORA ( Italy), praising the strong message contained in the resolution and the Secretary-General’s commitment, called on the international community to meet the challenges of such a large peacekeeping operation. The international community must heed the humanitarian, political and development tracks of the resolution in an effort to end the suffering in Darfur and to create a sustainable peace.

HASAN KLEIB ( Indonesia) said the resolution laid the necessary foundation for a successful outcome, and the Council should now continue to give strong support to the political process. Efforts should also be made to strengthen the ceasefire. It was essential that AMIS receive the international community’s support, including financial support and the deployment of the light and heavy support packages. A solution should be based on the tripartite approach between the United Nations, the African Union and the Government of Sudan.

LESLIE KOJO CHRISTIAN ( Ghana) said the resolution paved the way for deployment of the hybrid operation and the ultimate goal of the Council’s action should be to end the suffering in Darfur. Ghana called on the Government of Sudan and other parties to abide by the intent of the resolution. The adoption was the culmination of cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, and that momentum must not be lost. It was also incumbent on the African Union and the United Nations to address other conflicts in Africa.

BASO SANQU ( South Africa) said the resolution gave practical expression to the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union. Because the Darfur peace process provided the only chance for a solution to the conflict in the region, South Africa urged all parties to cooperate in the forthcoming Arusha meeting. It also encouraged the Secretary-General and the President of the African Union to provide leadership to ensure deployment of the hybrid force as soon as possible.

RICARDO ALBERTO ARIAS ( Panama), welcoming the leadership of the Secretary-General on Darfur and the action taken by the Council, said it was a proud day for the United Nations and the international community. Today, however, was just the beginning of a process, of which the culmination would be peace in Darfur, where human rights must be assured and suffering ended. Only then could the international community truly feel proud.

Council President WANG GUANGYA (China), speaking in his national capacity, said a positive momentum had been generated in the past few months, providing a rare opportunity that the international community must not miss in pushing for a gradual, appropriate and comprehensive settlement in Darfur. That issue, however, could not be resolved without the cooperation of the Sudanese Government, which had shown flexibility and taken vigorous measures. The fact that the Council had spoken with one voice was an important guarantee for the Darfur peace process.

He emphasized that the purpose of the resolution was to authorize the launch of the hybrid operation, rather than exert pressure or impose sanctions. The text had room for further improvement, and was only the first step towards full settlement of the Darfur question. The next step was faithful implementation of the resolution. In deploying the hybrid operation, all parties should abide strictly by the tripartite consensus and avoid wanton misinterpretation of the resolution. Also, the Council should now focus on urging the international community to provide financial support to AMIS and fully implement the United Nations light and heavy support packages.

Peacekeeping deployment was only one aspect of the settlement, he said, noting the importance of accelerating the political process as part of the “two-track strategy”. The fundamental prerequisite for lasting peace and stability in Darfur was to encourage all factions in the region to conclude and implement a comprehensive peace agreement. The international community should take a long-term perspective, work out a development strategy for the country and provide more input for the region’s economic and social development.

ALICE MUNGWA, Observer for the African Union, welcomed the Council’s action and thanked members for their statements of support. Today’s resolution would strengthen ties between the African Union and the United Nations. The African Union would continue to work with the international community on all aspects of creating a durable peace in Darfur, where successful operations could help create a new framework for cooperation in Africa.

Sudan’s children at a crossroads: An urgent need for protection

admin — Fri, 20 Apr 2007 11:34:13 +0000

Source: Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict

SUMMARY

The protection and well-being of children and youth in Sudan are at a crucial juncture. While children in the South are enjoying increased protection and access to services, those in Darfur and other areas of Sudan are enduring unspeakable acts of violence and abuse.

Humanitarian agencies in Darfur operate in an extremely volatile environment that poses significant operational challenges and threatens the security of civilians and humanitarian personnel. Government policies that restrict the movement of humanitarian workers and attacks and threats by armed forces and groups have stymied aid operations throughout Sudan, particularly in Darfur, in the East and around Khartoum.

Watchlist is concerned about apparent deliberate efforts by the Government to suppress information and prevent agencies from collecting and disseminating details on attacks against children and their protection needs, particularly in Darfur and the East. These efforts prevented many reliable experts working in Sudan from contributing information to this report, as they expressed concern about the safety of staff and beneficiaries of programs and potential retributive attacks or threats. As a result, some pertinent information related to the well-being of children in Sudan was not included.

Access to information on violations against children is also limited by chronic insecurity. As a result, some sections of this report may detail attacks perpetrated by only a few armed groups. This does not imply greater culpability but reflects instead the limited access to information. Many actors in Sudan have acknowledged that all parties to the conflict have violated children?s rights.

In this report, Watchlist has included information on violations against children in Sudan in each of the major categories identified by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1612 (2005) on Children and Armed Conflict. These violations include killing and maiming, rape and other forms of sexual violence, abduction, denial of humanitarian assistance, attacks on schools, and recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups. In addition, various other violations, such as forced displacement and torture, also continue to be committed against children and their families.?

The following are highlights of Watchlist’s findings:

Killing and Maiming

While most areas of the South have enjoyed improved security, extreme violence and fighting have continued in Darfur, recently escalating since mid-2006. Armed forces and groups operating in Darfur continue to kill and maim children and youth, and humanitarian agencies have documented cases of armed groups shooting, mutilating and torturing children.

Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence against Children

Prevalence rates of rape and other forms of sexual violence in Sudan are unknown and difficult to determine given fear and stigma that surrounds reporting, retributive action taken against women and girls who do report, customary and statutory laws that penalize the survivor and humanitarian agencies? limited or total inability to provide related services for survivors in many parts of Sudan, particularly in the East and Darfur. However, it is widely believed that rates of sexual violence throughout Sudan are high.

In Darfur, incidents of sexual violence are reportedly perpetrated by all armed groups in the region and are often extremely brutal. Sexual violence is used by Arab militias in Darfur and Chad as a tool to subjugate and humiliate non-Arab girls and women, and acts of sexual violence are often accompanied by racial epithets and other degrading comments.?

Denial of Access to Humanitarian Aid

While the delivery of humanitarian aid has improved in some parts of Sudan, humanitarian agencies operating in Darfur continue to face challenges in providing much-needed assistance to civilians. Bureaucratic obstacles and complicated administrative procedures imposed by the government further impede the delivery of humanitarian goods and services, while armed forces and groups in Darfur have repeatedly attacked aid agencies. Attacks have included looting property, carjacking humanitarian vehicles, stealing and/or destroying humanitarian goods, confiscating vehicles, harassing expatriates and national staff and levying illegal taxes on humanitarian goods. These attacks have forced some agencies to withdraw from some parts of Darfur or from the region altogether, leaving hundreds of thousands without access to life-saving support and assistance.

Attacks on Schools and Hospitals

While attacks on schools have waned in the South, southern Sudan continues to have the lowest school enrollment rates in the world, with an estimated 25 percent of primary school-age children enrolled in school. Attacks on schools in other areas of Sudan, particularly Darfur, have increased. Schools, students and teachers in Darfur have been attacked by various armed groups and many schools have been forced to close, contributing to the limited education opportunities for children in Darfur.

Reports of recent attacks on hospitals and healthcare facilities in the South are sparse. However, despite the relative abatement of attacks, the South still lacks an adequate health infrastructure and qualified health personnel, with only one doctor for every 100,000 people and one primary healthcare center for every 79,500 people. Attacks on hospitals, medical facilities, medical staff and humanitarian agencies are frequent in Darfur. These attacks have severely hampered access to healthcare, and aid agencies estimate that only 40 to 50 percent of people in Darfur have access to health services.

Abductions

Armed groups operating in Sudan and in border areas have abducted children to serve as combatants. The LRA is estimated to have abducted over 16,000 Ugandan and Sudanese refugee children, while refugee children in Chad have been abducted by Chadian and Sudanese armed groups and forces.

Girls in Darfur have also been specific targets of abduction by armed groups. Many girls in Darfur are abducted during attacks on their villages and once abducted, may be gang-raped, often multiple times by each perpetrator. Many girls are held in these conditions for a period of a few days and then released, often naked, to find their own way. Some abductions last for months or result in forced marriages.

Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups

Reports indicate that most armed groups in Sudan, particularly the Janjaweed, Justice and Equality (JEM), South Sudan Unity Movement (SSUM), Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Sudan People?s Liberation Army (SPLA), recruit and use children. While the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) continue to deny the presence of children in their units, SAF representatives have acknowledged that there are children in other armed groups that have recently been incorporated into their forces. Recruitment of children has declined in southern Sudan, although militias that were not party to the CPA initiated recruitment drives prior to their incorporation into the SPLA or the SAF to bolster their negotiating power. Sudanese militias have also recruited children and other civilians amongst refugee populations in Chad.

Other Violations

In addition to the six egregious violations identified by the United Nations Security Council, Sudanese children continue to face a spectrum of other violence and abuses. These include forced displacement, forced labor and trafficking for labor and sexual purposes. Sudanese girls have been trafficked within and out of Sudan to serve as commercial sexual workers while others have been trafficked to work as domestic servants. Boys as young as four or five years old have been trafficked to Arab Gulf countries to work as camel jockeys and beggars. Children and young people are further threatened by violence and insecurity due to the presence of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons throughout Sudan.

Recommendations

In this report, the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict makes urgent recommendations to the authorities of the Government of National Unity (GoNU), the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the Government of the Republic of Chad; all armed groups operating in Sudan; the UN Security Council; the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS); the humanitarian community in Sudan; and donors. Of primary importance, Watchlist calls on all armed forces and groups operating in Sudan to immediately halt violations against children. Additionally, all actors must take immediate action to protect children and young people in Sudan from further abuse and to find ways to assist and support those who have suffered the consequences of decades of armed conflict.

UN_HRC Report

admin — Mon, 12 Mar 2007 19:08:27 +0000

A
ADVANCE UNEDITED VERSION
Distr.
GENERAL

A/HRC/4/80
7 March 2007

Original: ENGLISH

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Fourth session
Item 2 of the provisional agenda
IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 60/251
OF 15 MARCH 2006 ENTITLED “HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL”

Report of the High-Level Mission on the situation of
human rights in Darfur pursuant to
Human Rights Council decision S-4/101

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Mandated by Human Rights Council decision S-4/101 to assess the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of the Sudan in this regard, members of the High-Level Mission on the situation of human rights in Darfur carried out their programme of work from 5 February 2007 to 5 March 2007 in Geneva, Addis Ababa, N’Djamena, Abeche and the refugee camps of Eastern Chad, meeting hundreds of relevant persons, reviewing thousands of pages of documents, assessing the human rights situation and corresponding needs, and preparing its report to the Human Rights Council.

2. Having determined that the effective protection of civilians in Darfur was the central issue at hand, and that the most appropriate framework for addressing this question was the framework of international human rights and humanitarian law, the Mission decided to employ an analysis drawn from the responsibility to protect. Confirming that the Sudan has accepted the responsibility to protect, the Mission proceeds to an assessment of the situation in Darfur, noting the complex historical, economic, political and other causes of the conflict. With the emergence of armed rebellion in the region, and the recruitment by the Government of proxy militias to respond to the rebellion, civilians emerged as the primary targets and victims. Government forces often acted in concert with Janjaweed/militia, including in violations of human rights. Rebel movements also engaged in human rights abuses. Armed banditry and criminal activities have increased significantly.

3. Numerous efforts by the international community have not been successful in ending the conflict. Rebel movements have become increasingly fragmented and abuses have continued. Even after the signing of the DPA, war continues and the human rights situation has further deteriorated. Today, millions are displaced, at least 200,000 are dead, and conflict and abuse are spilling over the border into Chad. Making matters worse, humanitarian space continues to shrink, and humanitarian and human rights actors are increasingly targeted. Killing of civilians remains widespread, including in large-scale attacks. Rape and sexual violence are widespread and systematic. Torture continues. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common, as is repression of political dissent, and arbitrary restrictions on political freedoms. Mechanisms of justice and accountability where they exist are under-resourced, politically compromised, and ineffective. The region is heavily armed, further undercutting the rule of law, and meaningful disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed, other militia and rebel movements is yet to occur. Darfur suffers from longstanding economic marginalization and underdevelopment, and the conflict has resulted in further impoverishment. As violations and abuses continue unabated, a climate of impunity prevails.

4. For its part, the international community, acting through the UN and the AU, has intervened with diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights and development assistance, but the vast majority of its recommendations remain unimplemented by the Government, and effective protection for civilians is yet to be secured. Critical needs for improving the situation of human rights in Darfur are numerous, and include (1) enhanced protection (2) renewed progress toward peace (3) expanded humanitarian space (4) increased accountability for perpetrators (5) programmes to address root causes (6) efforts to ensure the implementation of existing recommendations from authoritative human rights bodies; and (7) compensation for the victims of violations of human rights. To these ends, the Mission makes a number of specific recommendations for action by the Human Rights Council, the Government, rebel movements and the international community.

CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page

I. INTRODUCTION 1 – 23 x

A. The High-Level Mission 1 – 25 x

1. Mandate 2 x
2. Members and staff 2 x
3. Terms of reference and working methods 3 – 7 x
4. Cooperation of the Government of the Sudan 8 – 12 x 5. Programme of work 13 – 18 x
a- Consultations 13 – 15 x
b- Field visits in eastern Chad 16 – 17 x
c- Document review 18 x

B. The responsibility to protect 19 – 23 x

II. DARFUR: SITUATION ASSESSMENT 24 – 29 x

A. Brief history and causes of the conflict 24 – 27 x

B. Nature of the Government’s response 28 – 29 x

III. THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT, THE ENSUING
VIOLENCE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 30 – 37 x

IV. SUDAN’S ACTION REGARDING
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 38 – 43 x

A. Ongoing displacement and interference with
humanitarian assistance 44 – 45 x
B. Accountability and justice 46 – 51 x
C. The militias 52 – 53 x
D. Development, economic and social rights 54 – 56 x
E. Rebel abuses 57 x

V. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 58 – 69 x

A. Efforts by the United Nations 58 – 63 x
B. Efforts by the African Union 64 – 66 x
C. The responsibility of the international community
to protect the people of Darfur: current status 67 – 69 x

VI. NEEDS ASSESSMENT 70 – 77 x

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 78 x
A. Conclusions x
B. Recommendations
1. Recommendations to the Human Rights Council x
2. Recommendations to the Government of the Sudan x
3. Recommendations to armed rebel movements in Darfur x
4. Recommendations to the international community x
Annexes
I. Decision adopted by the Human Rights Council at its fourth special session x
II. Terms of reference x
III. Programme of work x
IV. List of key documents consulted x

I- INTRODUCTION

A- The High-level Mission

1. Mandate

1. On 13 December 2006, at its fourth special session, the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted by consensus decision S-4/101 on the situation of human rights in Darfur, in which it decided to dispatch a High-Level Mission (HLM) with the mandate “to assess the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of the Sudan in this regard . . . and to report to the Council at its fourth session to be held from 12 March to 5 April 2007.”

2. Members and Staff

2. On 26 January 2007, HRC President, Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba announced the appointment of the members of the Mission. The members, serving in their personal capacities, included Professor and Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams (Head of Mission), Professor Bertrand Ramcharan, the Honorable Mart Nutt, H.E. Ambassador Makarim Wibisono, H.E. Ambassador Patrice Tonda, as well as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Dr. Sima Samar. On 14 February 2007, H.E. Ambassador Makarim Wibisono discontinued his participation in the mission and thus did not take part in the preparation of this report. The HLM was supported and accompanied by a team of staff appointed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The members of the Mission would like to express their appreciation to the members of the OHCHR secretariat for their extreme professionalism and dedication to the successful completion of the Mission.

3. Terms of reference and working methods

3. Convening on 5 February in Geneva, the HLM adopted its terms of reference, focusing on our mandate “to assess the human rights situation in Darfur, and the needs of the Sudan in this regard, and to report to the Council at its fourth session.” We determined that assessing the situation did not require a human rights fact-finding mission, as such. Volumes of documentation of abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) in Darfur from early 2003 to today are abundant. Therefore, for our assessment, we meant to gather as much information on the current situation from as many sources as possible. Our intention was then to give our collective informed perspective on the human rights situation in Darfur.

4. We understood assessing the needs of the Sudan vis-à-vis the human rights situation in Darfur to include needs of the Government of the Sudan, civil society and affected communities and individuals that the Government, in the first instance, has the responsibility to protect. We noted that the HRC decision welcomed the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), urged its full implementation and called upon non-signatories to sign and all parties to observe the ceasefire. The DPA was negotiated in 2005, and signed on 5 May 2006. We therefore decided that our assessment of the situation would primarily focus on the period from January 2005 to March 2007.

5. We convened in Geneva from 5 to 9 February to begin our work planning and consultation. While in Geneva, we consulted a number of organizations and individuals and reviewed relevant documentation. Planning our programme, we decided that our work outside of Geneva would take place from 10 to 21 February, and that we would reconvene in Geneva from 26 February to 2 March to draft our report.

6. In considering our travel programme, we determined that priority should be given to visits to Khartoum, Darfur, Addis Ababa, and eastern Chad. In Khartoum, we hoped to meet with senior government officials, UN and AMIS personnel, and representatives of civil society. In Darfur, we intended to meet victims, witnesses and key parties. In Addis Ababa, seat of the Africa Union, we sought to meet senior AU officials, given the vital role of the AU in addressing the Darfur crisis. Finally, given that hundreds of thousands of Darfurians now reside in refugee camps and communities in eastern Chad, we thought it important for some of our members to also visit those areas to meet directly with witnesses and victims, many of whom are recent arrivals from Darfur. This was particularly advisable given the critical security situation in Darfur, and the consequent greater access to and freedom of expression of those residing in Chad.

7. We decided that our report to the Human Rights Council would include a situation assessment and a needs assessment along with specific recommendations to the Council, to the Government of the Sudan, to the rebels, and to the international community toward stopping violations of human rights and alleviating the acute suffering of the people of Darfur.

4. Cooperation of the Government of the Sudan

8. Decision S-4/101 had welcomed Sudanese cooperation with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan and called upon the government to “continue and intensify its cooperation with the Human Rights Council, its mechanisms, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.” Unfortunately, the Sudanese authorities did not issue visas for the Mission to enter the Sudan.

9. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had the opportunity to discuss the HLM with President Bashir while at the AU Summit in Addis Ababa on 29-30 January and received his personal commitment and assurance that the Sudan would fully cooperate with the Mission as constituted.

10. The HLM applied for Sudanese, Ethiopian and Chadian visas in Geneva. Problems with visas for the Sudan arose immediately. Departing as planned on 10 February for Addis Ababa to continue our programme of work, we hoped that ongoing efforts on our behalf would result in Sudanese visas being issued while we were carrying out the Addis leg of our programme.

11. On 14 February, when we had planned to begin our work in the Sudan (in accordance with our programme of work), we still had no visas. The continuing delay was creating significant logistical and planning challenges to our Mission. Nevertheless, in a spirit of cooperation, and before changing our tickets from the Sudan to Chad that afternoon, we made a final, unsuccessful attempt to secure visas.

12. All in all, more than a dozen attempts over the twenty-day period from 26 January through 14 February 2007 were made in Geneva, Addis Ababa and Khartoum to obtain our visas and secure the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan. Upon our return to Geneva, we continued to offer cooperation, seeking briefings and information from Government officials, but to no avail.

5. Programme of work

a- Consultations

13. In Geneva, we had more than thirty consultations with representatives of UN Agencies, former senior UN officials in Sudan, the International Committee of the Red Cross, international and Darfurian human rights organizations, human rights representatives from Darfur, and international humanitarian organizations, as well as with Darfur researchers. The HLM also met with the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the President of the Human Rights Council, and the Executive Director of the Commission of Inquiry for Darfur and other OHCHR staff. We held discussion as well with UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim. Members of the Mission also met three times with the Ambassador of the Sudan in Geneva, and with Ambassadors from the African Union, with the Coordinator and other representatives of the EU and with the Eastern European group.

14. In Addis Ababa, we were briefed by officials of the African Union, led by the Commissioner for Peace and Security. We also received military and police briefings from AMIS. We spoke with individuals from Darfur including a former Governor and the head of a Darfurian human rights organization. The HLM met with the ECA Acting Executive Secretary, and subsequently with representatives of the ECA’s Working Group on Darfur, and with a member of the UN Panel of Experts of the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council. The HLM was also able to consult at length with the acting Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for the Sudan.

15. Arriving in N’Djamena, members of the Mission met with the UN Country Team, as well as with representatives of rebel movements including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the secretariat of the National Redemption Front (NRF). The Mission also discussed the case of Suleiman Jamous with advocates on his behalf. In Abeche, we also had numerous discussions with UNICEF, UNHCR, and OCHA representatives, working both with Darfurian refugees and Chadians displaced by militia incursions from Darfur.

b- Field Visits in Eastern Chad

16. In Gaga Refugee Camp, UNHCR and the camp leadership provided a general briefing of the refugee situation in eastern Chad, as well as on Gaga itself. Opened in May 2005, the camp houses more than 13,000 refugees from Darfur, most of whom have arrived in the past year. Gaga receives newly arriving refugees on a daily basis. Following this introductory meeting, the Mission divided itself into three teams, the first meeting with a cross-section of the camp’s refugees, another with refugees who had undergone torture, and a third with a group of women refugees. Members of the Mission heard first hand accounts of violations suffered by residents.

17. In Breidjing Camp, which opened in May 2005, and houses more than 29,000 people, Members of the Mission held a general meeting with 70 camp leaders and residents, including both men and women. Subsequently, we again divided into three teams, the first meeting with a group of about thirty women, the second with male victims of violence, and the third with a cross-section of camp residents. Again, the Mission heard details of human rights violations committed in Darfur.

c- Document Review

18. The HLM was provided with relevant United Nations and African Union documentation, and received additional documentation from many with whom it met and corresponded, including from human rights and humanitarian relief agencies and non-governmental organizations. (For a full list of documents consulted, see annex IV).

B- The responsibility to protect

19. In a landmark decision at the World Summit in September 2005, the international community, building on the obligations of member States under the UN Charter, formally embraced the principle of the responsibility to protect. In doing so, it declared that every state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and that, where a state is unable or unwilling to do so, it is the responsibility of the international community to take action to ensure effective protection. In assessing the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of the Sudan in that regard, and in formulating our recommendations, we considered that the effective protection of civilians in Darfur was the central issue at hand.

20. The Sudan joined in the adoption of the World Summit Outcome explicitly accepting its responsibility to protect and pledging to act in accordance with it. With its ratification of various human rights and humanitarian law treaties it has also accepted specific legal obligations that underpin this responsibility. In signing other treaties while not yet ratifying them, it remains legally bound to refrain from acts that would defeat the objects and purposes of those treaties.

21. The signature by the Sudan of various political agreements also reflects its acceptance of this responsibility. In July 2004 during a visit to the Sudan by the UN Secretary-General, a Joint Communiqué was signed between the Government and the UN. The communiqué contains a number of commitments relating to the Government’s responsibility to protect its populations, their lives and welfare, in particular during internal armed conflict, by taking action to guarantee human rights. Additionally, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that the Government signed with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on 9 January 2005 contains a number of provisions relating to the protection of human rights. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 5 May 2006 contains an explicit section on human rights.

22. Sudan’s Interim National Constitution includes a Bill of Rights that guarantees most of the rights contained in the international human rights treaties, including rights contained in international instruments to which the Sudan is not a party (for example the Convention Against Torture). It also provides for a national human rights Commission, to be established under its terms.

23. With regard to national plans and policies, the Government Plan for the Restoration of Stability and Protection of Civilians in Darfur (August 2006) is based on the DPA and the timeline established for its implementation. It contains a number of human rights-related elements, with specific objectives, activities, implementation measures, timing and requirements for action by the UN and other partners. The National Action Plan to End Violence against Women in Darfur (November 2005) also contains specific time-bound actions by various Ministries.

II – DARFUR: SITUATION ASSESSMENT

A – Brief history and causes of the conflict

24. The causes of conflict in Darfur are complex. Historically, tribal groups have come into conflict over land, water or livestock, but such disputes were settled through traditional tribal mechanisms . But in the 1970s, in part in an effort to modernize, Khartoum introduced a number of administrative changes that began to erode those mechanisms. First Darfur was divided into three states, fragmenting the collective power of tribal groups. Khartoum then appointed new officials with both executive and judicial powers at the state level, and appointed leaders at the local level based upon loyalty to the central government, without regard to the traditional leadership recognized by the communities. While traditional mechanisms were still sought out, those structures were severely weakened, just as power relations between groups were being distorted.

25. In the 1970s and the 1980s, increased desertification and drought resulted in significant movements of people, with nomadic groups moving deeper into southern areas as well as “newcomers” entering from Chad, Libya Arab Jamahiriya and Mauritania. With Darfur’s own issues of scarce water and other resources, relations became increasingly contentious. The intensity of conflicts increased significantly with the formation of village defense groups and militias and the influx of small arms and light weapons into the region. By the end of the 1980s most conflict was between the Fur and nomadic tribes.

26. In addition to the struggles around land and resources, the peoples of Darfur have felt discriminated against and marginalized by the central Government. Generally excluded from social services normally provided by the State such as education and basic medical care, they have had no significant political voice in Khartoum. Attempts by the Government to mediate ongoing tribal conflicts produced no long-term results, fueling the perception that Khartoum was unwilling or unable to protect Darfurians or to address their broader needs. Quite to the contrary, as fighting intensified between 1995-1998, the Government began its recruitment of militias, further aggravating divisions.

27. Against this backdrop of conflict and marginalization, two rebel groups began to organize in 2001/02 – the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – drawing their members primarily from village defense groups. Most rebels were from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa tribes. Interestingly, they were calling for equality and justice for all Sudanese and not just redress of more narrow tribal interests. The rebel forces began attacking Government police and military targets in late 2002, and those attacks accelerated in 2003.

B- Nature of the Government’s response

28. The Government was not prepared either for the intensity or the successes of the rebel attacks. With many of its forces engaged in its long war with the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan, Khartoum was also concerned because many rank and file soldiers in the Sudanese military were from Darfur. The Government significantly picked up its recruitment of proxy militias, continuing to exploit the existing and ongoing tensions between tribal groups. Those members of Arab tribes recruited to fight in Government-backed counterinsurgency operations became known as “Janjaweed,” which is a term used in Darfur for an armed man on horse or camel.

29. Janjaweed attacks, sometimes in concert with Government land and air forces have been and continue to be primarily directed against the civilian population of Darfur, and focused especially on the tribal groups from which most of the rebels have been drawn. In both refugee camps, and in our discussions with a number of observers, we were told of such joint attacks on civilians. Women, children and men have been killed indiscriminately. Villages have been razed, livestock stolen or killed, and crops destroyed, and whole populations forcefully displaced, in part in an attempt to deprive rebel groups of support and resources. In particular, rape and sexual assault have been widespread and systematic, terrorizing women and breaking down families and communities.

III- THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT, THE ENSUING VIOLENCE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

30. Attempts to resolve the conflict began in 2003, and a ceasefire between the Government and the SLM/A was signed on 3 September of that year. A report to the AU Peace and Security Council read, “Following the September Ceasefire Agreement, fighting largely stopped between the Government and the SLM/A. However violence intensified against the civilian population. A militia group called ‘DJanjaweed’ deliberately targeted civilians viewed as providing support to the SLM/A and the JEM.”

31. As violence and violations of human rights continued, so did attempts to stop the conflict. On 8 April 2004, the Government, the SLM/A, and JEM signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement and protocols on establishing humanitarian assistance in Darfur. The ceasefire agreement called for the establishment of a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor the cessation of hostilities, supported by an AU Observer Mission. Appeals were made to the United Nations and the international community to support the CFC, to “ensure the scrupulous compliance” of warring parties to the ceasefire.

32. Subsequent efforts for peace in Darfur took place in Addis Ababa and in Abuja mediated by the African Union and with all parties to the conflict participating. But against this backdrop, violence was again on the rise in Darfur as all parties sought military gains to advantage them in the talks. At the seventh round of negotiations, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed on 5 May 2006, but only by the Government and by one faction of the SLM (that of Mini Minawi, SLM/MM). The SLA faction led by Abdul Wahid (SLM/AW) did not sign, nor did the JEM.

33. Since the signing of the DPA, the security situation in the region has deteriorated. Non-signatory rebel factions have splintered. Though hostilities have been significantly reduced between the two signatories to the DPA, fighting between signatories and those opposed to the DPA escalated in violation of the ceasefire agreements . Attempts by these factions to meet and develop common positions for renewed efforts to open the DPA to new negotiations have been attacked and bombed by Government forces. Violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have increased by all parties to the conflict since the signing of the DPA. Armed banditry and other criminal activity have also increased.

34. People began to flee the fighting that erupted in Sudan’s western region of Darfur in early 2003. By the end of 2004, some 200,000 Sudanese had fled across the border to neighboring Chad and an estimated 1.6 million were displaced within Darfur. The deteriorating security situation since the DPA has resulted in tens of thousands of newly displaced – now totaling well over two million displaced people in Darfur — and 30,000 more refugees in the camps in Chad, with new arrivals daily.

35. Cross-border attacks into Chad by Janjaweed and retaliations by rebels and Chadian forces have resulted in a dramatic increase in Chadian IDPs – from about 30,000 in June of 2006 to over 113,000 by the end of that year . Today, the conflict is also having a growing impact in the Central African Republic. If the conflict in Darfur is not meaningfully and equitably resolved, bringing peace and security to its people, it could increasingly engulf the region. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called for a peace-keeping force along both borders.

36. Humanitarian aid has, since the beginning of the conflict, consistently been restricted by the Government with delays in the issuing of visas, travel permits to go to Darfur, daily travel permits to leave the capitals in Darfur, and fuel permits to travel around Darfur. But with the spiraling of violence since the DPA, humanitarian access to populations in dire need has been increasingly strangled and in some areas it has ceased entirely. Action by rebel groups has also impacted humanitarian access in recent months .

37. Attacks on humanitarian agencies have increased dramatically over the past months. On 17 January 2007, in an unprecedented initiative, 14 UN agencies with operations in Darfur issued a Joint Statement on the urgency of the situation. They noted that: 12 aid workers have been killed in the past 6 months — more than in the previous 2 years; 30 NGO and UN compounds were directly attacked by armed groups; and more than 400 aid workers were forced to relocate 31 times from different locations throughout the 3 Darfur states in both government and rebel controlled areas There have also been three sexual assaults on relief workers in the previous five months – the first in September 2006 by Janjaweed /militia, the second in December 2006 by SLA/MM forces, and the third on 19 January 2007 by Government police and National Security agents .

IV – SUDAN’S ACTIONS REGARDING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

38. The witnesses, victims and observers with whom we spoke, and the UN and other documentation consulted underscore that the killing of civilians in Darfur remains widespread. Violence has increased since late 2005 and has continued unabated into 2007 . There were numerous large scale attacks on civilian communities during this period. Descriptions of these attacks indicate that tactics used have been very similar to those used during the height of the war in Darfur in late 2003 and 2004, characterized by (1) coordination of operations between the Sudanese armed forces and government-supported militia, (2) failure to respect the principles of distinction and proportionality, and (3) grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. While precise figures are not available, the UN estimates that 200,000 civilians have been killed as a direct result of the conflict or due to its devastating impact on access to health care, food and other life essentials.

39. Rape and sexual violence are widespread across Darfur, including cases of gang-rape. Since May 2006 sexual violence has also been reported in intra-tribal attacks. Despite the well-known patterns of rape of women around IDP camps, the authorities have done little to diminish the threat or investigate cases reported. Monitoring of the criminal justice system over the last two years has shown that very few cases of rape are investigated or prosecuted relative to the number of incidents that occur. Access to justice and prosecution of rape is further complicated both by cultural and by institutional factors, including the provisions of the criminal law combining rape and adultery in the same article. Women are also attacked in and around refugee camps in Chad.

40. Arbitrary arrest and detention in Darfur by government security forces continue. Individuals reportedly targeted include lawyers, community leaders and others who work on human rights, Sudanese who work for international organizations or who are perceived as cooperating too closely with the international community, individuals who share the predominant ethnicities of various rebel groups, and Sudanese who display opposition political views. Since May 2006 security forces have also targeted individuals who openly oppose the DPA. Sudanese who work closely with IDPs are also targeted, often on the basis of accusations that they encourage popular discontent and anti-government sentiment.

41. Since September 2006 there has been a wave of arrests of Darfurians in Khartoum. The arrests of over 30 Darfurian teachers, businessmen, journalists and university students predominately from the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa tribes have been carried out by the police and National Security, purportedly in furtherance of the investigation into the murder of Mohamed Taha, a prominent editor. Former detainees suggest that the murder investigation is being used as a pretext to arrest those with perceived links to rebel movements in Darfur. To date 13 detainees have been released due to lack of evidence, with three released as recently as 29 January 2007. Another three continue to be held without charge while 19 others have been charged with murder.

42. Arbitrary restrictions on freedom of expression, association and assembly are widespread. Human rights defenders, lawyers, local leaders and political opponents voicing concerns or expressing views that are critical, of the Government, continue to be particularly vulnerable to abuses by state security agencies. The UN has documented numerous cases of people being harassed, arrested, detained and physically abused for voicing their human rights concerns. The victims include members of NGOs, journalists, and people who file complaints with the police or other government officials.

43. The HLM has also received credible information of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment by National Security and Military Intelligence during attacks and in the treatment of detainees. The methods used include beatings with whips, sticks and gun butts, prolonged sun exposure, starvation, electrocution, and burning with hot candle wax or molten plastic. Many detainees are held incommunicado without charge or access to a lawyer.

A – Ongoing displacement and interference with humanitarian assistance

44. Ongoing attacks have resulted in massive displacement of civilians. According to the United Nations, there were 25,000 new IDPs in Darfur as of January 2007, bringing the total to over 2 million in the three regions of Darfur. We learned that there are 233,000 refugees from Darfur currently residing in Eastern Chad and receiving services from UNHCR. Many other refugees are being hosted in communities along the border. In addition to Chad, the Central African Republic has also suffered important consequences of the spill-over from Darfur .

45. Attacks on humanitarian workers, obstacles and interference with humanitarian aid by the Government and armed militia have increased during 2006-2007. The humanitarian situation in Darfur remains critical and humanitarian space and access in the three regions of Darfur has been rapidly diminishing over the past year. Access has deteriorated to a level worse than in 2004, even as there has been a huge increase in the number of people relying on humanitarian aid. In the last six months of 2006, more relief workers were killed than in the previous two years combined. Just during the month of December 2006, 29 humanitarian vehicles were hijacked and 430 humanitarian workers relocated in all three Darfur states.

B – Accountability and justice

46. Although formally, the national court system in Sudan is functional and has jurisdiction over human rights crimes perpetrated in Darfur, these courts have been unable to resolve human rights abuses there. There is an acute shortage of judges and other judicial staff. Although there have been a few exceptional cases of domestic courts charging state officials in cases involving conflict-related crimes, the justice system as a whole is unable or unwilling to pursue justice or prevent attacks, and this is compounded by a general lack of independence and resources, an ill-equipped police force and legislation that protects state officials from criminal prosecution.

47. In the face of growing international criticism over the lack of the rule of law, the fair administration of justice as well as of mechanisms to address impunity in Darfur, the Government of Sudan has announced a number of initiatives. Between 2004 and 2006, it created at least five judicial and quasi-judicial bodies with the mandate to ensure accountability for human rights crimes in the war-torn region. To date, these bodies have had limited results in dealing with the widespread and serious violations committed in Darfur.

48. The first of these bodies was the National Commission of Inquiry established in May 2004 by the President of the Sudan to investigate human rights violations committed by armed groups in Darfur. Reportedly it met over sixty-five times and listened to 28 witnesses, and made a number of visits to Darfur. But it appears that the Commission did not go beyond recommending “further investigations” into a number of specified incidents.

49. Ad Hoc Investigatory Committees were established in Darfur in response to incidents of armed attacks against civilians. Nothing significant has come from these initiatives in terms of redress for victims or accountability for perpetrators. In July, the Minister of Justice established by Special Decree the Committees against Rape to look into the issue of rape and sexual violence in Darfur. According to observers, no specific investigations or cases have been brought by the Committee to date. Another body known as the Unit for Combating Violence against Women and Children was established under the Ministry of Justice. Though initially hailed as a positive step, it has reportedly not investigated human rights crimes, and has been criticized as ineffective.

50. The most elaborate attempt by the Government of the Sudan to create an accountability mechanism with conventional judicial elements was the establishment of the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur (SCCED). Created by a decree of the Chief Justice, the Court was initially constituted as a panel of three judges, based in El Fasher but with ability to circuit to any location deemed appropriate. It was granted wide jurisdiction covering all crimes in the Sudanese Penal Code and any charges concerning investigations into the violations cited in the report of the Commission of Inquiry and any charges pursuant to any other law, as determined by the Chief Justice. On 26 November 2005, the Chief Justice established two additional Special Criminal Courts for Nyala and El Geneina with the same jurisdiction as the initial SCCED, but with the addition of international humanitarian law (IHL). The SCCED statutes also contained explicit provisions on the right of observers from the AU or other entities to attend the court hearings.

51. The effectiveness of this court has been limited at best. According to observers, only nine known cases have come before the Court. The court delivered a verdict in eight of them. A ninth case was initially heard but later dismissed. Only one of these cases dealt with the types of major violations of human rights and the laws of war that have characterized the conflict in Darfur — an October 2005 attack on Tama in South Darfur. No one was found guilty of taking part or held responsible for orchestrating the attack. The men charged in relation to the attack were found guilty only of stealing property at the site of the attack after it took place. According to informed observers, the SCCED has also not addressed the issue of criminal responsibility for senior-level officials in Darfur and Sudan. Only one high-ranking official was ever charged and he was acquitted. Ten State officials, all low-level officers, have been convicted by the SCCED.

C- The militias

52. Witnesses, victims and observers we met repeatedly confirmed joint action between Government forces and armed militia in assaulting civilian targets in Darfur. The DPA requires that the Government implement a plan for the neutralization and disarmament of the Janjaweed and other militia. A phased plan to these ends is supposed to be implemented under AU supervision. This requirement, to date, remains largely unimplemented.

53. Arms continue to flow freely, and heavily armed militia continue to operate across the territory of Darfur with impunity. Victims and witnesses with whom the Mission met frequently identified the provision of arms by the Government to the Janjaweed and other militias as one of the most significant factors in fostering tensions and violence between tribal groups and communities.

D – Development, economic and social rights

54. Gross disparities between the centre and other regions of the country, including Darfur, and unbalanced development policies have created a dual economy in the country, constituting one of the roots causes of the conflict. Disparities in the distribution of national wealth and public resources have repeatedly been identified by rebel groups and militia, (including non-signatories to the DPA) as one of their principal grievances, and an engine of conflict in the country.

55. While the centre has been the focus of economic activity, the periphery, including Darfur, has not benefited either from any substantial economic development activities, or from any re-distribution of income, including from oil exports. At the same time, local factors such as competition between communities and tribes for land and water resources, continued desertification, and environmental degradation, have contributed to increasing conflict between groups in Darfur.

56. Compounding and complicating these long-standing disparities, the consequences of the Darfur conflict have resulted in the disruption of food systems, the collapse of livelihoods and the disintegration of already limited basic services in Darfur. In addition, the widespread displacement, the massive destruction of villages, properties, and lands have resulted in increasingly precarious access to food and income. Insecurity, losses of physical infrastructure, reduced economic activity, rampant military expenditure, loss of assets and related vulnerabilities have all contributed to a critical situation of deprivation in the region. Today, the people of Darfur face a dramatic humanitarian crisis, and one which is further hampered by the obstruction of humanitarian access and a general shrinking of humanitarian space.

E. Rebel abuses

57. Rebel abuses of human rights and humanitarian law also continue. Civilians have been targeted in armed rebel attacks, and acts of rape and torture by rebel forces have also been documented. There have been reports of attacks on aid convoys by rebel forces, putting the populations in these areas in a particularly precarious situation. Many of the violations committed by rebels relate to the fragmentation of rebel groups and intra-rebel fighting that first erupted in March and April 2006 in North Darfur, and the situation has been further exacerbated by increased acts of violent banditry by armed criminal elements taking advantage of the chaos.

V – THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

A – Efforts by the United Nations

58. The UN Security Council has been continuously seized of the situation since the crisis erupted. The Council adopted resolution 1564 on 18 September 2004 calling for an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to investigate violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The Commission carried out it work in the final three months of 2004 and presented its landmark report in January 2005, establishing that the Government and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law, and that these violations were so widespread and systematic that they may constitute crimes against humanity. The Commission also found credible evidence that, while not widespread and systematic, rebel forces from the JEM and SLA were responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law which may amount to war crimes.

59. The Security Council also passed three additional key Resolutions in March 2005. While not directed to Darfur, Resolution 1590, (24 March) established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and authorized deployment of up to 10,000 military personnel, plus a civilian component, for a UN Peace Support Operation to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), by monitoring its implementation, investigating violations, observing the movement of armed groups and ensuring an adequate human rights presence. Resolution 1591, (adopted on 29 March 2005) imposed an arms embargo on all parties in Darfur and provided for travel bans and the freezing of assets of individuals who continue to violate commitments to end the conflict (to be designated by the Security Council Panel of Experts) . Resolution 1593 (adopted on 31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC), allowing the ICC to examine and act on alleged perpetrators of crimes in Darfur, including those identified by the International Commission of Inquiry.

60. On 31 August 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1706 (2006) explicitly reaffirming the elements of the responsibility to protect as contained in the 2005 World Summit outcome document, determined that the situation in the Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and decided to deploy an international peacekeeping force with a Chapter VII mandate allowing for the use of force for protection of civilians.

61. During this period, other agencies and UN bodies were also trying to assist the Government to exercise its responsibility to protect the peoples of Darfur. In March 2001, OHCHR began a programme of technical cooperation for human rights with the Government, with projects for the administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights education and capacity building in the formal and informal sectors. In April-May 2004, OHCHR sent two fact-finding missions to Chad and Darfur, and on 7 May 2004, the acting High Commissioner for Human Rights briefed the Security Council on the mission’s findings. Its report recommended the establishment of an international commission of inquiry into the ongoing situation (see above) and highlighted the urgent need to deploy UN human rights observers to Darfur. Subsequently, in response to the Darfur crisis, OHCHR deployed a team of human rights monitors to Khartoum and Darfur in August 2004 to support protection efforts in Darfur and to monitor, report and follow up on individual cases. Following the creation of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), OHCHR technical cooperation activities were integrated into the human rights component of UNMIS in June 2005.

62. The UN has also provided technical assistance for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which requires sweeping reforms to governance, the creation of new institutions, and significant capacity building at all levels of government. If followed through, these could contribute to effective decentralization and equitable resource allocation which in turn would be important elements of a long-term resolution to the existing conflict in Darfur and potential conflicts in other parts of the country.

63. Other UN efforts have included a dedicated special procedure of the Commission on Human Rights ((CHR) and its successor the Human Rights Council (HRC)) on the situation of human rights in the Sudan since 1993. The Special Rapporteur has undertaken field visits and reported to both the CHR/HRC and the General Assembly on the situation with recommendations for action to promote and protect human rights. In addition to the Sudan country mandate of the CHR/HRC, special rapporteurs and independent experts for thematic areas relevant to the crisis in Darfur have undertaken fact-finding missions to Darfur and made numerous recommendations since 2004. UN human rights treaty bodies have also made countless recommendations to the Sudan.

B – Efforts by the African Union

64. In its communiqué of 25 May 2004, the AU Peace and Security Council requested the AU Commission on the Situation in Darfur to take all steps deemed necessary to ensure an effective monitoring of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 through the deployment of an Observer Mission, with a civilian component and, if necessary, a protection element, to support the work of the Ceasefire Commission.

65. In October 2004 the AU Peace and Security Council agreed on an enhanced AMIS mission. The mission was further mandated to improve the security situation in Darfur and oversee the safe return of refugees and IDPs to their homes. Tasks included: “Protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.” Positive protection initiatives have included proactive patrolling, escort/firewood patrols, deployments to prevent attacks, mediation and conflict resolution, deployment of CIVPOL and efforts to combat the recruitment of child soldiers. Since the recent spiraling of violence, many of these measures are no longer being carried out.

66. In its communiqué of 30 November 2006, the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed a three-phased UN support package for AMIS, and extended the mandate to 1 January 2007. Phase one would provide a light support package with a small number of UN advisors and some vital material assets. The second phase represents a heavy support package with a number of critical enabling capabilities, including 2,250 military personnel and a number of civilian personnel to undertake substantive tasks related to the implementation of the DPA. The third phase would bring a fully-hybrid AU-UN operation. At the time of the writing of this report, Phase One has been completed, and Phase Two is set to begin.

C – The responsibility of the international community to protect the people of Darfur: current status

67. Important as these steps may be, they have not proven adequate in ensuring effective protection on the ground. The Government of the Sudan publicly opposed resolution 1706 and has actively resisted the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. After intensive diplomatic effort, Khartoum accepted, in Addis Ababa in November 2006, to allow the three-phased hybrid approach. But in March 2007, almost five years into the conflict, and three years after the UN Security Council first expressed concern about the crisis in Darfur, the details of the arrangement are still being discussed with the Government of Sudan. Gross violations of human rights and grave breaches of humanitarian law continue across the region.

VI – NEEDS ASSESSMENT

68. Critical needs for improving the situation of human rights in Darfur are numerous and profound. The region has long suffered from neglect and marginalization vis-à-vis the country’s political, administrative and developmental centre in Khartoum. Underdevelopment is evident across all economic and social sectors. Democratic deficits are broad and longstanding. Those public institutions that have existed have been starved for resources, and short on credibility among the region’s inhabitants. The ongoing conflict has made a bad situation worse, further weakening public institutions, and distorting vital traditional mechanisms of governance, including, importantly, traditional mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes between tribes. In Darfur today, claims are asserted and disputes settled not principally through courts, or ministries or councils, but through armed militias, banditry, and violence. The level of peace and stability necessary for development is absent. Human resource challenges are prohibitive. Millions have fled. Thousands have died. Many more are gravely wounded. In sum, war-torn Darfur, like most of the country lacks the most basic essentials for the rule of law, democratic governance, and the progressive realization of economic and social rights.

69. The long-term development challenges of the area, including those relating to addressing root causes, are daunting. A review of key documentation including the report of the Joint Assessment Mission, and that of the Commission of Inquiry, reveals low confidence in public authorities and services, significant regional disparities, much higher than average poverty rates, much lower Human Development Index ratings than other areas of the country, high disease rates, inadequate health services, high rates of child malnutrition, low numbers of families with adequate food supplies, and a general lack of access to justice.

70. The Mission has enquired and assessed the most pressing needs in Darfur. The first of these, emphasized by virtually everyone we met, and a consistent theme in the documentation we collected, is the need for effective protection. For most that we spoke to, this means a large, robust, broadly-mandated, well-resourced UN/AU peacekeeping/protection force deployed across the territory of Darfur. The force should be supplemented by the contingent of UNMIS human rights monitors currently supported by the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It should be accompanied as well by the proposed national human rights commission provided for in the interim national constitution, which should be established in accordance with the UN Paris Principles. Establishing such a commission will require facilitated broad consultations, technical advice and assistance, and material support for start-up and early operations.

71. Secondly, peace is among the most pressing needs of the people of Darfur. No one we met believed that a military solution to the conflict is possible, and all stressed the need for a negotiated solution to the crisis. But the issue of renewed peace negotiations is a sensitive one. The Government had insisted that the DPA be signed as is. Most others called for a reopening of peace negotiations to include all parties to the ongoing conflict. Representatives of the non-signatory rebel movements with whom we met (including the NRF and JEM) as well as refugees that we met in Chad were adamant that the DPA as it stands does not adequately reflect their needs and aspirations. They sought an “Abuja Plus” to address issues they viewed as unresolved, including power sharing, wealth sharing and compensation for victims. When pressed on the DPA, the NRF and JEM told us they thought they were close to peace, with the signing of the First Declaration of Principles on 5 July 2005, but, as the various rounds of talks continued they said that international mediators became frustrated with the time it was taking to address outstanding issues in the negotiations and, in the seventh round, the DPA was forced on them. They contrasted this with the long and delicate negotiations between the Government and SPLM/A that resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the South. Without renewed talks, they insist that peace will remain out of reach for the people of Darfur. We also heard that to resolve the human rights situation in Darfur, any “Abuja Plus” type negotiations must include all stakeholders, including all fighting forces, civil society, human rights defenders, prominent individuals, women and women’s groups.

72. Third, while the international community has been generous in its support for humanitarian assistance to the people of Darfur, the effective delivery of that aid has been dramatically hampered by the obstruction of humanitarian access, assaults on humanitarian workers, and a general shrinking of humanitarian space. Today, Darfur is confronted with an urgent need for expanded humanitarian access and safety, a need which requires not just aid funds, but also political will on the part of the Government and the various armed groups of Darfur to afford such access. At the same time, sustained donor support in this, one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, will be needed if the $1.2 billion price-tag for humanitarian assistance to Sudan in 2007 is to be met.

73. Fourthly, in a region where impunity prevails and feeds upon itself, there is a vital need for accountability in Darfur. Recent action by the ICC has offered new hope that the protagonists in the Darfur conflict will begin to understand that gross violations of human rights and grave breaches of humanitarian law will be subject to direct consequences for those who perpetrate them. Support for the ICC process is thus essential to an improvement of the situation on the ground. On 27 February 2007 the Prosecutor of the ICC asked pre-trial judges to issue summons for Ahmad Harun, State Minister of Interior during the height of the Darfur conflict (2003-2004), and currently the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, and militia commander Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb. This action by the ICC begins to pierce the shield of impunity, but there is much more to be done. Once an effective UN/AU peacekeeping/protection force is in place, work must begin on a comprehensive programme of transitional justice, accountability and reconciliation. Such a process must begin with a Darfur-wide consultation, through which the views and wishes of all affected communities on an appropriate course of transitional justice can be heard. Financial, technical and facilitative support from the international community will be crucial to these ends.

74. Fifth, when the UN/AU peacekeeping/protection force is in place, work should begin on addressing the root causes of conflict and human rights abuse in Darfur. Thus, dedicated international support for the building of national protection systems will be required. Equally important will be human rights-based development cooperation across all sectors. Such aid must be participatory, accountable, transparent, non-discriminatory, empowering, based on international human rights standards, and directed to building the capacity of the people of Darfur to claim and realize their rights, and of officials to deliver on their responsibilities. The justice sector and dispute resolution capacities will need priority attention. And deliberate, rapid disarmament, demobilization and reintegration will be essential.

75. Finally, the Mission has assembled and catalogued a full listing of the many recommendations for remedial action made during the period under review by the various United Nations human rights mechanisms, among them the various special rapporteurs, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the human rights treaty bodies, and the Commission of Inquiry, highlighting one-hundred and fifteen (115) of the most relevant in an indicative list. Many provide specific guidance on action to be taken to improve the situation. The vast majority of them have yet to be implemented. In the period following the deployment of the UN/AU peacekeeping/protection force, these recommendations, taken together with broad Darfur consultations and the findings of an updated UN-World Bank Joint Assessment, could form the basis of a meaningful programme of assistance directed to addressing the human rights needs of Darfur.

VII – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A – Conclusions

76. The High-Level Mission concludes that the situation of human rights in Darfur remains grave, and the corresponding needs profound. The situation is characterized by gross and systematic violations of human rights and grave breaches of international humanitarian law. War crimes and crimes against humanity continue across the region. The principal pattern is one of a violent counterinsurgency campaign waged by the Government of the Sudan in concert with Janjaweed /militia, and targeting mostly civilians. Rebel forces are also guilty of serious abuses of human rights and violations of humanitarian law. All parties to the conflict must recognize that applicable human rights and humanitarian law standards must be respected during internal armed conflict and that the “fog of war” is not an acceptable justification for violating these standards. While important steps have been taken by the international community, including the African Union and the United Nations, these have been largely resisted and obstructed, and have proven inadequate and ineffective. The needs identified by the Mission include immediate, effective protection of civilians, renewed progress toward peace, expanded humanitarian space, increased accountability for perpetrators, action to address root causes, meaningful compensation and redress for victims, and concerted efforts to implement the many existing recommendations of authoritative international human rights bodies. The Mission further concludes that the Government of the Sudan has manifestly failed to protect the population of Darfur from large-scale international crimes, and has itself orchestrated and participated in these crimes. As such, the solemn obligation of the international community to exercise its responsibility to protect has become evident and urgent.

B – Recommendations

1 – Recommendations to the Human Rights Council

a) The Human Rights Council should remain seized of the situation in Darfur, regret the Government’s manifest failure in its responsibility to protect civilians, condemn the continuing violations, and call for effective protection for civilians, accountability for perpetrators (including through action by the ICC) and compensation and redress for victims.

b) The Human Rights Council should establish a dedicated procedure or mechanism to monitor the situation of human rights in Darfur, to measure the degree of implementation of outstanding recommendations by relevant United Nations human rights mechanisms and reports (including the special procedures, the treaty bodies, the Commission of Inquiry report, the reports of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other relevant recommendations) and to report regularly to the Council. The mechanism should work in close cooperation with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, whose mandate should be extended as required.

c) The Human Rights Council should call for and actively support the establishment of a credible, independent national human rights commission for the Sudan, established in accordance with the Paris Principles and under the terms of the Interim National Constitution, with dedicated mandate, resources and capacity to address the grave situation in Darfur.

2 – Recommendations to the Government of the Sudan

d) The Government of the Sudan should cooperate fully in the deployment of the proposed UN/AU peacekeeping/protection force without further delay. It should remove all obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and abide scrupulously by the terms of the Moratorium on Restrictions on Humanitarian Work in Darfur and the Status of Forces Agreement. It should ensure the free and safe movement of human rights monitors, and facilitate the access of UNMIS human rights offices and ICRC officials to all detainees and prisoners. It should as well afford full cooperation to the International Criminal Court.

e) The Government of the Sudan should fully comply with its obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as those voluntarily undertaken in the signing of political agreements relating to the Darfur conflict, (CPA, DPA, and others) and fully implement the many recommendations of United Nations human rights mechanisms and inquiries, still outstanding. Sudan should end the targeting of civilians in Darfur, cease all support for Janjaweed/militia forces, and proceed with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of such forces. It should hold perpetrators to account, facilitate the safe return of refugees and IDPs, and ensure compensation and redress for victims.

f) The Government of the Sudan should advance the process of harmonization of all laws and policies with the Interim National Constitution and international human rights standards. It should work for the establishment of a credible, independent national human rights commission for the Sudan, established in accordance with the Paris Principles and under the terms of the Interim National Constitution, with dedicated resources and capacity to address the grave situation in Darfur. It should further create the necessary legislative framework and institutions for democratization and the holding of free and fair elections. It should also move toward putting in place fair and equitable policies and programmes to reverse decades-long discrimination and economic, political and cultural marginalization of the people of Darfur.

g) The Government of the Sudan should cooperate in the convening of a national conference on peace, human rights and a common vision for the Sudan, with the participation of political parties, women’s groups, human rights defenders, community representatives, tribal leaders, and a broad cross-section of civil society from across the country. The national conference should be supported and facilitated by the United Nations and the African Union.

3- Recommendations to armed rebel movements in Darfur

h) All armed rebels movements operating in and around Darfur should strictly observe and respect the requirements of international human rights and humanitarian law, take all necessary steps to clearly distinguish themselves from the civilian population, abstain from efforts to recruit fighters in IDP and refugee camps, cease all attacks against civilian and humanitarian targets, and ensure the free and safe access and movement of humanitarian personnel. All rebel movements should cooperate in good faith in the pursuit of peace.

4- Recommendations to the international community

i) The Security Council should take urgent further action to ensure the effective protection of the civilian population of Darfur, including through the deployment of the proposed UN/AU peacekeeping/protection force and full cooperation with and support for the work of the International Criminal Court. All UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council resolutions should be fully implemented, including those relating to travel bans and the freezing of funds, assets, and economic resources of those who commit violations.

j) The General Assembly of the United Nations should request the compilation of a list of foreign companies that have an adverse impact on the situation of human rights in Darfur. The list should be published and periodically updated. In addition, the GA should call upon all UN institutions and offices to abstain from entering into business transactions with any of the identified companies.

k) The member States of the United Nations should urgently provide adequate funding and support for the UN support package to AMIS, for the deployment of the proposed UN/AU peacekeeping/protection force, for adequate numbers of international human rights monitors, for the continuing humanitarian needs of Darfur, for the establishment of a credible independent national human rights commission, and for programmes of compensation and redress for victims in Darfur. Member States should also be prepared to prosecute individuals suspected of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur through the exercise of universal jurisdiction in national courts outside of the Sudan.

l) The international community should adopt a fully unified approach in addressing Darfur, supporting the joint efforts of the UN and AU Envoys, and moving toward an expansion of the DPA process, to include all warring parties, as well as the representatives of civil society in Darfur. Particular attention must be paid to engaging women and women’s organizations at all levels of the process.

m) The international community should call for, support and facilitate the convening of a national conference on peace, human rights and a common vision for the Sudan, as proposed in subparagraph g, above.

n) The international community should organize a regional conference, under the auspices of the UN and the AU, with the participation of all neighbouring and other concerned States, on the safeguarding and promotion of peace and human rights in the region.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I

DECISION ADOPTED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL AT ITS FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION

S-4/101. Situation of human rights in Darfur

At its 4th meeting, on 13 December 2006, the Human Rights Council decided, without a vote, to adopt the following text:

“The Human Rights Council,
“1. Expresses its concern regarding the seriousness of the human rights and humanitarian situation in Darfur;

“2. Welcomes the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, urges its full implementation, and calls upon parties who have not signed it to do so, and upon all parties to observe the ceasefire;

“3. Welcomes the cooperation established by the Government of the Sudan with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan and calls upon the Government to continue and intensify its cooperation with the Human Rights Council, its mechanisms, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights;

“4. Decides to dispatch a High-Level Mission to assess the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of the Sudan in this regard, comprising five highly qualified persons, to be appointed by the President of the Human Rights Council following consultation with the members of the Council; as well as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan;

“5. Requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide all administrative, technical and logistical assistance required to enable the High-Level Mission to fulfil its mandate promptly and efficiently, in coordination with the President of the Human Rights Council and also requests the latter to consult as appropriate with the concerned country;

“6. Requests the High-Level Mission to report to the Council at its fourth session.”

ANNEX II

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE HIGH-LEVEL MISSION TO DARFUR

On 13 December 2006, at its Fourth Special Session, the Human Rights Council adopted decision S-4/101 on the situation of human rights in Darfur, in which it decided to dispatch a High-Level Mission to assess the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of the Sudan in this regard, and to report to the Council at its fourth session.

In accordance with the decision of the Human Rights Council, the High-Level Mission comprises five highly qualified persons, appointed by the President of the Council, as well as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan. It is thus composed of Professor Jody Williams (Head of Mission), Professor Bertrand Ramcharan (Member), Honorable Mart Nutt (Member), H.E. Ambassador Makarim Wibisono, (Member), H.E. Ambassador Patrice Tonda, (Member), and Dr. Sima Samar, (Special Rapporteur). Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the same resolution, the Mission will be supported and accompanied by a team of qualified staff appointed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The Mission will conduct its work inside and outside of the Sudan between 5 February and 15 March 2007, and thereafter will report to the fourth session of the Human Rights Council.

The High-Level Mission Members and staff shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded to them by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the United Nations Charter, and other applicable agreements.

ANNEX III

High-Level Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur
Programme of Work
Geneva Programme (1)

Sunday 4/2
Arrival in Geneva

Monday 5/2
09.00-10.00 Introductions and briefings at Palais des Nations
10.00-1015 Head of HLM Secretariat (Introduction, overview)
10.15-11.00 OHCHR, Sudan Desk (briefing on Sudan & Darfur)
11.00-11.10 OHCHR, (Administrative matters)
14.30–15.30 Geneva Institute for Human Rights
16.00-16.15 OHCHR, Executive Director, Commission of Inquiry for Darfur
16.15-16.30 OHCHR Gender and Women’s Human Rights Unit
16.30-16.45 OHCHR Special Procedures Unit
17.00-18.00 UN Special Advisor on Prevention of Genocide
18.15 -18.45 Meeting with High Commissioner for Human Rights
Head of the mission: meting with the Ambassador of Sudan in Geneva

Tuesday 6/2
09.00-10.00 Human Rights Watch
10.00-11.00 Amnesty International
11.00-11.30 UNICEF
11.30-12.30 OCHA

Wednesday 7/2
09.30-10.00 Norwegian Refugee Council
10.00-11.00 Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre
11.30-12.30 Mission consultations
14.00–15.00 President of the Human Rights Council
15.00-16.00 Mission consultations
16.30-17.00 International Centre for Transitional Justice
17.00–18.00 UNHCR
Head of the mission: meting with the Ambassador of Sudan in Geneva

Thursday 8/2
09.00-10.00 ICRC President and delegates
14.00-14.45 International Crisis Group
14.45–15.45 European Union Presidency
16.00-17.00 African Union
Head of the mission: meting with the Ambassador of Sudan in Geneva.

Friday 9/2
09.30-10.00 Consultations, academic researchers on Darfur
10.00-10.30 Pre-deployment Security Briefing
10.30-11.00 Mission consultations
11.00-11.45 Former UN Resident Coordinator in Sudan
11.45-12.45 Press briefing
14.00 – 15.00 Representatives of 6 international humanitarian organizations
15.00-17.00 Mission consultations

Saturday 10/2
06.50/07.00 Departure for Addis Ababa

Addis Ababa Programme

Saturday, 10/2
21.05/21.55 Arrival in Addis Ababa

Sunday, 11/2
Mission consultations

Monday, 12/2
09.00-10.15 Mission Consultations
10.15-11.15 Meeting with former Governor of Darfur
11.15-12.30 Senior Officials of the African Union Peace and Security Team
15.00-16.00 African Union Military Briefing
16.00-17.00 Consultations, academic researchers on Darfur
17.00-17.30 Consultations, academic researchers on Darfur

Tuesday, 13/2
09.00-10.15 Mission Consultations
10.15-11.30 Acting SRSG for Sudan and UNMIS representatives
12.00-12.15 ECA Deputy Executive Secretary
12.15-13.30 Representatives of ECA Working Group on Darfur

Wednesday, 14/2
A.m. Mission consultations
16.00-17.00 Sudanese Organization Against Torture

Thursday 15/2
Travel to Chad

Chad Programme

Friday, 16/2
09.30-10.30 Working session
10.30-12.00 HLM preparations on research/interview techniques while in camps
14.00-15.00 Representatives of Suleiman Jamous
15.00-16.00 JEM and NRF representatives
16.00-19.00 Mission consultations

Saturday, 17/2
08.00 Depart from N’Djamena Airport to Abeche
09.30 Arrival in Abeche and transfer to Gaga Refugee Camp
11.30-14.30 Interviews with refugees from Darfur
14.30-16.00 Return to Abeche
16.00-19.30 Mission consultations

Sunday, 18/2
08.30 Depart for Farchana area
09.00-15.00 Interviews with refugees in Breidjing camp
15.00 Depart camp for Abeche
16.00-18.00 Meeting with UNHCR Protection staff in Abeche
18.00-19.30 UNICEF

Monday, 19/2
09.30 Depart Abeche Airport for N’Djamena
11.30 Arrival in N’Djamena
15.00-17.00 Meeting with the UN Country Team
17.00-20.00 Mission consultations
00.00 Departure for Geneva

Tuesday, 20/2
Arrival in Geneva

Geneva Programme (2)

Wednesday, 21/2 – Friday, 23/2
Data compilation and review

Monday, 26/2
Reconvening of Mission members in Geneva
Consultations and report writing

Tuesday, 27/2
Consultations and report writing

Wednesday 28/2
Consultations and report writing
Teleconference with Mr Suleiman Jamous

Thursday, 1/3
Consultations and report writing
UN Special Envoy Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim

Friday, 2/3
Consultation and report writing

ANNEX IV

LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

United Nations Documents
1. OHCHR, Compilation of obligations and commitments by the Sudan on Darfur, 2007
2. OHCHR, Compilation of recommendations made to the Sudan on Darfur, 2007
3. OHCHR, Third Periodic report on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan, April 2006
4. OHCHR, Fourth Periodic Report on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan, July 2006
5. OHCHR, Sixth Periodic Report on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan, November 2006
6. OHCHR, Fifth Periodic Report on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan, October 2006
7. OHCHR, Report of the commission on Human Right on the situation of human rights in Darfur region of the Sudan, E/CN.4/2005/3, May 2004
8. OHCHR, Briefing Paper for the Human Rights Council special session on the human rights situation in Darfur, December 2006
9. OHCHR, Briefing note for the High Level Mission on the status of Darfur-specific recommendations made by UN Special Procedures, February 2007
10. United Nations, Monthly reports of the Secretary-General on Darfur (15 reports between April, 2005 and February, 2007)
11. United Nations, Monthly reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan (10 reports between April 2005 and February 2007)
12. United Nations, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan pursuant to paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556(2004), paragraph 15 of resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraph 17 of resolution 1574 (2004) (S/2005/10 (January 2005 to December 2006)
13. United Nations, Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Sudan, E/CN.4/2006/111, January 2006 and A/61/469, September 2006
14. United Nations, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons – Mission to Sudan, E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.6, February 2006
15. United Nations, Letter from Mr. Juan E. Mendez, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/S-4/3, December 2006
16. United Nations, Letter from Ms. Sima Samar, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council, A/HRC/S-4/4, December 2006
17. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan, S/2005/579, September,2005
18. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan S/2005/285, May 2005
19. Letter from Mr. Antonio Cassese, former Chairperson of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council, 7 December 2006
20. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan S/2006/662, August 2006
21. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2006/665, August 2006
22. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 25 January 2005
23. United Nations Security Council resolutions (1679/2006),1706/2006, 1709/2006, 1713/2006, 1714/2006
24. United Nations, Reports of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, S/2006/65, January 2006, S/2006/250 of April 2006, and S/2006/795 of October 2006
25. Report of the Secretary –General on Chad and the central African Republic (S/2006/1019), 2 Dec.2006)
26. UN Economic Commission for Africa, Causes and background to the conflict in Darfur Region- Background paper prepared for presentation to the Consultative Meeting of African Parliamentarians on Darfur
27. UNMIS Human Rights Section, Briefing paper to the HLM, February 2007
28. UNMIS Political Affairs Section, Briefing paper for the High Level Mission, February 2007
29. UNMIS Child Protection Unit, Note for HLM on children in Darfur, February 2007
30. OCHA, Geneva and field briefings to the High Level Mission to Darfur, February 2007
31. UNHCR, Geneva and field briefings to the High Level Mission to Darfur, February 2007
32. UNICEF, Geneva and field briefings for the High Level Mission to Darfur, February 2007
33. OCHA, OCHA Briefing Book on Chad

Peace Agreements and related materials
34. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 20 July 2002
35. Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006
36. UNMIS, CPA Monitor, 2006 (October, November and December issues)
37. UNMIS, DPA Monitor, 2006 (October, November and December issues)

International Criminal Court (ICC)
38. Statement by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council, December 2006
39. Fourth report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council, December 2006
40. Fifth report of the Prosecutor to the Assembly of State Parties, December 2006

Materials produced by the Government of Sudan
41. Salient facts about Darfur, Sudanese Government, 2006

African Union documents
42. AU, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Darfur to the Peace and Security Council, Sep. 06
43. AU, Communiqué of the 66th meeting of the Peace and Security Council to the UN Security Council, Nov. 06
44. AU- led joint assessment mission: 10-20 December 2005, the African Union and the Conflict in the Darfur Region of the Sudan- Meetings of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 2004-2006

——

Six Months Since 1706: The International Failure to Protect Darfur

admin — Fri, 16 Mar 2007 13:54:11 +0000

Source: Africa Action, 9 March 2007

Six months ago, at the end of August 2006, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed a critical resolution, authorizing a robust UN peacekeeping force for Darfur, western Sudan. This act was the result of years of advocacy and international political wrangling, against the backdrop of escalating violence in Darfur. The resolution expressed the will and intent of the international community to send a 22,000-strong UN force to Darfur, to supplement the African Union (AU) mission and to provide protection to civilians and humanitarian operations on the ground.

While the need for such a force was urgent, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the UN, Jean-Marie Guehenno, acknowledged last summer that a six-month timeframe between authorization and deployment was most realistic, given the logistical challenges in Darfur.(1)

Six months after the passage of Resolution 1706, the authorized UN force has yet to be deployed. Its implementation has been stalled by Khartoum’s opposition, and by the failure of the U.S. and the international community to act resolutely in response. Subsequent discussions of a compromise “hybrid” AU/UN force have not finalized agreement on the force’s size, mandate and command and control, and the first two phases of a UN support package for the AU have brought no improvement in the security situation in Darfur. Senior U.S. and international officials continue to emphasize their expectation of Khartoum’s cooperation, yet there is no sign of a breakthrough in the deployment of an international peacekeeping force for Darfur.

As the death toll approaches half a million people, and thousands of civilians in Darfur continue to be displaced on a regular basis, it is all too clear that the international community has failed in its responsibility to protect the people of Darfur. A robust international intervention is urgently needed to stop the violence, to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, and to create conditions conducive to a comprehensive peace process. But no such intervention is yet underway.

Two and a half years ago, the U.S. recognized the situation in Darfur as genocide. This acknowledgement still has not spurred the action needed to ensure the deployment of an international peacekeeping force to stop the violence. The inability of the U.S. and other UN members to stand firm on a message of opposition to genocide has allowed the Government of Sudan to block any effective action to stop the violence. Unless the international community follows through on Resolution 1706, the people of Darfur will be left without protection against the ongoing genocide.

The following report offers a month-by-month account of the fate of UN Security Council Resolution 1706, and the continuing failure of the international community to protect the people of Darfur.

August 2006

On August 31, 2006, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops to Darfur, with the adoption of Resolution 1706. This crucial vote passed with only three abstentions, from the Russian Federation, China and Qatar. The text of the resolution detailed the mandate, command structure, troop levels and other support necessary to provide protection for civilians vulnerable to violence in Darfur.

The African Union Mission to Sudan (AMIS), deployed since 2004, had for many months found itself lacking the resources, training and manpower to confront the overwhelming violence. As part of a transition envisioned in Resolution 1706, the UN was tasked to take over AMIS’ responsibility upon the expiration of the latter’s mandate on October 1, 2006, replacing AMIS’s 7,000 troops with almost 22,000 UN personnel. This expanded and better-resourced troop force would provide stability, ensure the safety of civilians, and would contribute to the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, signed in May 2006.

The ultimate deadline for deployment was set as December 31, 2006. U.S. State Department officials emphasized that the lack of consent from the Sudanese government would not deter the implementation of the plan. Statements from other members of the UN Security Council made clear their support for a UN peacekeeping operation for Darfur. Meanwhile, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir denounced Resolution 1706, stating that the planned UN deployment would violate his country’s sovereignty.(2)

September 2006

The passage of Resolution 1706 marked a new opportunity for international action, and in September the urgency of the situation in Darfur was ever more apparent. In response to the international plan to deploy UN peacekeepers, President Bashir countered with a proposal to deploy over 10,000 Sudanese troops to Darfur to enforce the peace. Reports from the ground suggested that such an offensive was already in progress, with government air strikes against rebel-held areas in North Darfur.(3)

On September 5, 2006, in response to the AU request for a UN transition, Khartoum said that the AU mission must leave the region by the end of the month, when its mandate expired. The Sudanese government added that the AU had no right to invite a transfer of its mission to the UN or any other party.(4)

September 9, 2006 marked the two-year anniversary of the U.S.’ recognition that the situation in Darfur constitutes genocide. In response to pressure from advocates, and as a demonstration of U.S. commitment to Darfur, on September 19, President Bush announced the appointment of Andrew Natsios as Presidential Special Envoy to Sudan, charged with coordinating U.S. efforts to end the violence in the region.(5)

With the approaching expiration of the AMIS mandate on September 30, and no concrete steps to succeed that mission, the AU found itself under heavy international pressure to extend its term in Darfur. The Sudanese government condemned the AU request for a UN transition and insisted that AMIS would only be allowed to remain in the region without UN support.(6)

At a meeting held at UN headquarters in New York on September 21, African Heads of State agreed to extend the AU mandate through the end of the year.(7) This decision, while avoiding the disastrous potential of a security vacuum, only served to maintain a deadly status quo, as the UN deployment remained stalled. The AMIS force still lacked the essential capabilities to provide protection in Darfur.

Claiming that the UN harbored an “agenda” against Sudan, President Bashir again rejected the proposal of Resolution 1706, asserting that the UN “wants to make a pretext through the Darfur issue to control us and recolonize Sudan.”(8) Security in Darfur continued to plummet, as aid workers were increasingly targeted, contributing to decreased humanitarian access to displaced civilians and to a growing food crisis.(9)

October 2006

In October, as the Sudanese government continued to express staunch opposition to Resolution 1706, the international community remained deadlocked on next steps.

On October 2, more than a month after the passage of Resolution 1706, President Bush met with Special Envoy Natsios and criticized the UN response on Darfur, stating that it “should not wait any longer to approve a blue-helmeted force, a UN force of peacekeepers, to protect the innocent people.”(10) Yet the U.S. failed to articulate a strategy to advance UN action towards this goal.

In mid-October, Andrew Natsios traveled to Darfur for the first time in his capacity as U.S. Special Envoy. He visited camps for displaced people, met with AMIS and UN officials, and held talks with senior officials and political leaders in Khartoum.(11) Sudan persevered in its vocal rejection of Resolution 1706. In October, the Sudanese government once again flouted the authority of that international body, when it expelled UN Special Envoy Jan Pronk for statements made in his web log concerning Sudanese military defeats in Darfur.(12)

While expressing concern over the declining humanitarian situation and escalating violence in Darfur, the international community failed to rally the political will to pursue Resolution 1706 to address the worsening crisis. Sudan continued to receive diplomatic and economic support from its allies in the UN Security Council, Russia and China, and encountered only rhetorical opposition to its position on peacekeeping from other major international actors.

November 2006

In November, the international commitment to a peacekeeping intervention in Darfur continued to wane, and President Bashir grew increasingly vocal in his opposition to Resolution 1706, likening it to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile, the violence on the ground forced increasing numbers of aid agencies, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, to suspend or shut down their operations, leaving hundreds of thousands of vulnerable civilians without a humanitarian lifeline.(13)

In the face of Sudanese opposition to the implementation of Resolution 1706, international attention shifted to the search for a solution to the violence in Darfur that would accommodate Khartoum’s concerns.

On November 14, 2006, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for an international meeting to determine the role of the UN in a peacekeeping force for Darfur. Representatives of the AU and the UN met with Sudanese representatives on November 16, 2006 for a High Level Consultation on the situation in Darfur at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

In the resulting document, Sudan agreed in principle to allow a joint AU-UN peacekeeping operation into Darfur. However, Sudanese representatives said that the final approval would depend on consultations with their superiors in Khartoum.(14) Secretary-General Annan said that President Bashir’s “agreement” to the operation was a “turning point” and that the key was then to “press ahead with immediate implementation because we cannot afford a gap [or] a vacuum at the end of the year.”(15)

This new compromise sought to create a hybrid AU-UN force of some 27,000 soldiers, mainly African troops and including the 7,000 AMIS soldiers currently deployed.(16) However, it rapidly became clear that the developments in Addis Ababa did not improve the prospects for the deployment of a protection force for Darfur. President Bashir maintained that any UN role in Darfur be limited to technical and logistical support, and that only African troops under AU leadership would be acceptable.

There was, in fact, no agreement reached in Addis Ababa upon the command responsibilities, mandate, troop levels or timeline for an international peacekeeping operation for Darfur. In the aftermath of the meeting, Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol explained that Khartoum would accept some UN logistical support for AMIS efforts in Darfur, but no UN peacekeepers.(17)

The “Conclusions” document, emerging from the Addis Ababa consultation, made a clear distinction between a hybrid “force” and a hybrid “operation”, opting to reference the latter exclusively, contrary to what had been authorized in Resolution 1706. This distinction was made on Khartoum’s directive, to underscore Sudan’s opposition to any UN military peacekeeping presence in Darfur.(18) On November 18, Sudan’s UN envoy commented: “This is a new plan that can be largely accepted by Sudan and takes 1706 to the graveyard.”(19)

At a November 30 meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council in Abuja, the AU adopted a proposal for the deployment of a hybrid force and the AMIS mandate was once again renewed through June 2007, under the expectation that UN would provide “backstopping and command and control structures.”(20) In a concession to Khartoum, the AU stated that the UN should only have a supporting role, emphasizing the African composition of the mission. President Bashir added that he would be willing to “take technical, advisory and financial support from the UN, but no UN force.” (21)

In a public attempt by the U.S. to apply pressure on the Sudanese government to agree to an enlarged peacekeeping operation, Natsios began to reference an unspecified “Plan B.” Under this vague plan, Sudan was given until January 1, 2007 to demonstrate its willingness to accept an international peacekeeping force, or the U.S. would implement measures in response.(22)

December 2006

By December, agreement was emerging on next steps in the UN’s involvement in Darfur, but there was yet no plan for the deployment of UN peacekeepers to western Sudan.

During Natsios’ visit with President Bashir and other Sudanese officials in the second week of the month, he urged the deployment of the first two phases of a three-phase UN support package.(23) The three tiered plan for UN support, unanimously backed by the UN Security Council on December 19, 2006, provided for escalating UN involvement towards a hybrid force.

The first or “light” phase would supply 105 military officers, 33 UN police, 48 international staffers, armored personnel carriers, night vision goggles and global positioning systems, among other logistical support.(24) The second or “heavy” phase of support to AMIS would involve the deployment of several hundred UN military, police and civilian personnel, with aviation and logistical equipment. The third and final phase would constitute the AU-UN hybrid force, led by a jointly appointed special envoy and with a significant UN role in command and control.(25)

In a letter to then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, dated December 23, 2006, President Bashir stated: “I would like to reaffirm the readiness of the Government of Sudan to start immediately…the implementation of the Addis Ababa Conclusions and the Abuja Communiqué.”(26) But the key elements of a hybrid force, such as the size, mandate and command of the mission, remained unresolved. Furthermore, Sudan’s participation in the “Tripartite Committee” charged with the implementation of a peacekeeping plan ensured that it would have veto power over any effective action to protect civilians.

While international diplomats exchanged contradictory statements over the terms and composition of a protection force, civilians on the ground in Darfur continued to be vulnerable to escalating violence and attacks. On December 31, the originally intended deadline for the deployment of UN peacekeepers under Resolution 1706 passed, and the further extension of the AU mandate until mid-2007 offered no substitute for the deployment of a robust force to protect Darfur.

January 2007

On January 1, the U.S. deadline passed for Sudan to demonstrate its commitment to the deployment of the hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force. The international diplomatic community remained stalled, and there were no consequences for Khartoum and no new plans to break the deadlock.

Deployment of the first phase of the UN support package progressed haltingly through the month. On January 11, the UN Mission in Sudan transferred the first set of equipment and supplies to AMIS, which included generators, tents, cookers, sleeping bags, mosquito nets, ground positioning systems and night vision goggles. The implementation of the second phase was yet to be decided upon.(27)

In early January, the new UN Envoy to Sudan, Jan Eliasson, met with Sudanese President Bashir to discuss the crisis in Darfur. Eliasson described his talks with Bashir as productive, and said that he had been assured of the Sudanese government’s “very strong cooperation and assistance” with the UN and the AU.(28) But Bashir continued to resist the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in Darfur.

During a visit to China in January, Natsios met with a State Councilor and other officials to discuss Darfur, declaring the talks during this four-day visit to be “productive.”(29) He added that the U.S. would like to maintain communication with China to make progress on the Darfur issue.

In a letter to President Bashir, the newly appointed UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon requested Khartoum’s permission for the deployment of a first wave of UN troops, numbering 2,300, to begin the process of installing the hybrid force.(30) Meanwhile, in January, thousands more Darfuri civilians were displaced as a result of new attacks, further swelling the population of the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps.(31)

February 2007

In the beginning of February, Secretary-General Ban finished a five-day visit to Sudan, during which he met with President Bashir. In an interview with BBC, Secretary-General Ban claimed to have established trust with President Bashir and hoped to rely on his promises in the negotiating process.(32)

In reporting the results of his consultations, Secretary-General Ban also stated, “The next step is to wait for a positive and clear agreement from the Government of Sudan which will pave the way toward the deployment of hybrid operations in Darfur.”(33) Yet their discussions did not produce an agreement on the deployment of a hybrid protection force, and the UN has yet to receive a response to the Secretary-General’s letter concerning the next steps in the deployment of UN troops.

The AU and UN continued to engage in consultations attempting to finalize the proposed hybrid force. These consultations worked to produce a “basic framework”, which would allow for a mission of 17,300 troops and 5,300 police and a joint command mechanism based in Addis Ababa.(34) The Secretary-General’s monthly report on Darfur, dated February 23, provided an update on the progress of the deployment of the first or “light” phase of UN support. Of the UN advisors meant to support AMIS, only 81 military and police officers were currently in Darfur.(35) This represented less than half of the agreed-upon number.

President Bashir emphasized the continuing negotiations on the second and third phase of UN support, reiterating his rejection of Resolution 1706 and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force.(36) He elaborated, “That plan to transform the peacekeeping job in Darfur from African Union to United Nations held a hidden agenda aimed at putting Sudan under the United Nations trusteeship.”(37)

After months of secrecy, the contours of the Bush administration’s “Plan B” were partially revealed and included stationing four U.S. Army colonels along the Sudanese border with Chad. This move, along with a reported plan to block U.S. commercial bank transactions to the Sudanese government, was designed to send a message of U.S. censure to Sudan.(38)

These sanctions, according to a statement by Natsios, would be triggered by: (1) renewed attacks on displaced persons camps or driving NGOs from Darfur, (2) blocking the progress of peace negotiations, and (3) refusing to implement the hybrid force.(39) Advocacy groups pointed out that all of these conditions had already been met. The U.S. strategy remained unclear, and the threat of “Plan B” achieved no breakthrough.

At the end of February 2007, a full six months after the passage of Resolution 1706, there had been no progress towards the deployment of the authorized UN force for Darfur.

Conclusion

There continues to be an urgent need for an international peacekeeping force for Darfur, to prevent violent attacks on civilians and displaced people, to ensure the safety of humanitarian aid workers, and to pave the way for a peace process. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said in his most recent report to the Security Council at the end of February, “As long as violence and attacks continue in Darfur, the efforts to reach a political settlement will not succeed.”(40) A newly released report from the U.S. State Department highlights the genocide in Darfur as the worst human rights abuse of 2006, and the crisis is escalating.

The African Union mission in Darfur must immediately be supplemented by a robust UN peacekeeping mission, as authorized last August by UN Security Council Resolution 1706. The three-phased UN support package for the AU, currently being implemented, must quickly proceed to the deployment of a 20,000-strong UN peacekeeping force with a robust protection mandate.

To advance the deployment of this force, the U.S. must use its leverage directly with the Sudanese government to achieve its cooperation with the international community. The U.S. must also make Darfur a factor in its bilateral relations with Khartoum’s allies – China and Russia – and other key countries. All members of the UN Security Council must engage in the pursuit of the force authorized in Resolution 1706. They must challenge Khartoum’s opposition to a UN peacekeeping force, and secure the deployment of this force on an urgent basis.

A UN force is not a panacea for Darfur, but in the immediate term, it is the most important priority in order to stop the violence, provide protection, and offer hope for future peace. The international community must now find the political will to take the next steps towards the deployment of the authorized UN peacekeeping force for Darfur. The people of Darfur cannot continue to wait for international protection from genocide.

The ICC “Application” Concerning International Crimes in Darfur

admin — Fri, 02 Mar 2007 16:34:13 +0000

Dilatory, exceedingly cautious, of little consequence, and taking minimal cognizance of the salient ethnic features of human destruction in Darfur

By Eric Reeves, 28 February 2007

As the Darfur genocide enters its fifth year, and two years after UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (March 2005) referred violations of international law in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC), the ICC has finally identified two of those instrumentally responsible for ethnic slaughter in Darfur. Under Article 58 of the Rome Statute that created the ICC, evidence of large-scale crimes against humanity will now be submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber (a form of international “grand jury”), which will “review the evidence submitted [by the ICC Prosecution] and decide how to proceed” (Summary, Situation in Darfur, Prosecutor’s Application Under Article 58(7), February 27, 2007, page 9; hereafter “PA”).

For this complete report, please CLICK HERE or visit: http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article155.html

* Eric Reeves is a professor at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, and has published extensively on Sudan. He can be reached at ereeves@smith.edu; website : www.sudanreeves.org

Is Khartoum Interested in Darfur Peace Talks? The Case of Suleiman Jamous

admin — Fri, 02 Mar 2007 16:33:11 +0000

The regime’s genocidaires are using UN personnel to imprison a man critical to
success during the impending rebel commanders’ conference.

By Eric Reeves
February 15, 2007

Although the name “Suleiman Jamous” is hardly familiar, even within the world of Darfur advocacy, he is one of the true heroes to emerge from the desperate conflict of the past four years. Jamous, chief humanitarian coordinator for the rebel movements, has done more than anyone to enable humanitarian relief efforts to cross the lines of various rebel factions, reaching tens of thousands of Darfuris who would otherwise have been forced into camps for the displaced, thus losing all ability to use local resources and creating yet greater pressures within these desperately overcrowded camps. He is a man who is by nature conciliatory, even as he is politically savvy and enjoys the trust of nearly all the commanders on ground. Given the highly fractious nature of the rebel movement in Darfur, this is an enormously valuable, indeed critical asset.

For this complete report, please CLICK HERE or visit: http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article153.html

Understanding Genocide in Darfur: The View from Khartoum

admin — Fri, 02 Mar 2007 16:38:10 +0000

Source: Eric Reeves, 26 January 2007

Why the regime remains so confident the genocidal status quo is unthreatened

January 26, 2007 – In understanding why Khartoum remains resolutely opposed to significant numbers of UN peace support personnel in Darfur, it is first of all critical to make sense of just what the National Islamic Front regime sees as it surveys the international scene. What is there, we must ask, that convinces these brutal genocidaires that they will pay no price for the ongoing, indiscriminate bombing of civilians in North Darfur? for the large-scale, violent displacement of thousands of civilians in West Darfur reported by humanitarian organizations in recent days? Which diplomatic realities secure this racist security cabal in its belief that it can continue to re-mobilize and heavily re-arm the Janjaweed without consequence—despite the UN Security Council “demand” of July 2004 that these brutal militias be disarmed and their leaders brought to justice? What forms of diffidence and cowardice among African and Western nations convince Khartoum’s thugs that despite the direst of warnings coming from UN and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations in Darfur—speaking bluntly about intolerable levels of insecurity—they may continue to beat, intimidate, harass, and obstruct aid workers in Darfur?

For this complete report CLICK HERE or visit: http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article150.html

Janjaweed defector confesses Sudan’s atrocities in Darfur

admin — Fri, 02 Mar 2007 16:57:35 +0000

Source: The Times, 19 October 2007

By Martin Fletcher

LONDON–Outside the back window Bakerloo Line trains rattle past. Downstairs someone makes tea. But in the upstairs living room of a nondescript house off Lambeth Road in South London a slight, softly spoken young man tells a story of atrocities in a far-off land that is anything but mundane.

Dily, a Sudanese Janjaweed speaking to BBC Newsnight programme on Wed 17 Oct 2006 (The Times)Dily, a Sudanese Arab, recounts how for three years he and his fellow Janjawid charged the farming villages of Darfur on their camels and horses, raking the huts with gunfire and shouting: "Kill the slaves. Kill the slaves."

He reckons he attacked about 30 villages in all, and cannot count the people he shot. The villages were invariably destroyed, he says. The homes were burnt to the ground and the men, women and children killed – sometimes with the help of government airstrikes. If there were survivors "they would be left there . . . They couldn't get help. Sometimes they made it to camps but mostly they died of thirst or starvation".

Dily is a rarity in that wretched conflict. Filled with disgust, he finally escaped the Janjawid's clutches and last month, with the help of "people smugglers", reached Britain, where he is now seeking political asylum. He expresses remorse. He is willing to talk, and the story he tells flatly contradicts the Sudanese Government's claims that it has no control over the Janjawid – the predominantly Arab "devils on horseback" who have driven two million of Darfur's black Africans into camps and killed at least 200,000.

He says the Government deceived innocent Arab shepherds like himself into joining the Janjawid, saying they had to defend their communities against attack by Darfur's black African rebel groups. He says they were trained and armed by Sudanese soldiers, ordered by the Government to attack Darfur's villages and given military support when necessary. The Janjawid was formed for ethnic cleansing, he insists. "Why (else) would you attack villages, kill people, displace them and kill them in their thousands?"

Dily is not his real name, and he would be photographed only with a scarf around his face and a baseball cap pulled low over his eyes. His wife and young child remain in Sudan and he fears for their safety if he is identified.

Nor can Dily's story be independently verified, but he specifies names, places and events, speaks with the accent and idiom of the area he says he comes from, and has persuaded Darfuris living in Britain that he is genuine.

"He's for real," said Ishag Mekki, the deputy chairman of the Darfur Union, which represents Darfuris in Britain. James Smith, the chief executive of the Aegis Trust, a pressure group which campaigns against genocide, concurs: "We've checked his credibility as much as we can and we're convinced he is who he says he is."

Dily, who is in his early twenties, rarely smiled and fidgeted nervously with his hands as he spoke through an interpreter. He said he was tending his family's camel herd in northern Darfur when rebel groups began attacking government targets in 2003: severe droughts had set black African farmers against nomadic Arabs and the rebels accused the Government of siding with the Arabs.

Dily said he was pressed to join the Janjawid by tribal elders, who were under pressure from government officials. "We were told we were Arab nomads and we had to protect our lands and our cattle," he said.

Dily and about 20 other youths from his area rode off on their camels to a training camp near the town of Kebkabiya where they joined hundreds of other Janjawid recruits. He says uniformed Sudanese soldiers spent about 20 days teaching them how to use guns – a Kalashnikov in his case – and attack villages.

Those with camels were separated from those with horses. They were organised into battalions of more than 500 men each. They were paid two million Sudanese pounds – roughly 500 pounds – for the use of their camels and promised a monthly salary of 500,000 Sudanese pounds.

Then they were unleashed. Apart from occasional visits home, Dily and his battalion – led by a former bandit – spent the next three years on the move, destroying one village after another. "The Government said attack all villages. The local commanders decided which," he said.

The battalion would send scouts to check whether there were armed fighters in the targeted village. "If there were no fighters we just attacked straight away. If there were we had to be more cautious." Sometimes they used satellite telephones to request airstrikes by the Sudanese military helicopters before attacking. "We would see smoke and fire and then we would go in."

The attacks usually started early and lasted most of the day. The commanders said the villages had to be destroyed, and they did not spare women or children. "Mostly they said "Kill the blacks. Kill the blacks," Dily said. "The majority of (the victims) were civilians, most of them women."

Dily said he never raped a woman but other Janjawid did. "They took girls and women away, just out of sight, and started to rape them. Sometimes you heard gunshots if they refused." They took away the cattle. Some were drunk.

Dily said he felt no elation during or after the attacks. He and his colleagues did not even know what they were fighting for, but faced execution if they disobeyed orders. "I hated the war and I hated the killings and decided to leave and to leave Sudan altogether," he said.

One night he slipped away from the camp, risking death and knowing that he might never see his wife and child again. He hid in the mountains for three days, then made his way to the town of Kutum. A fellow Arab drove him to Mellit, and from there he was smuggled by car to the Libyan border for 500,000 Sudanese pounds. He was determined to reach Britain because, he was told, "it's different from other European countries. They look after refugees".

He borrowed money from friends of his father in Tripoli's Sudanese community and paid $1,200 (£640) to reach Italy on a small boat packed with 25 other illegal immigrants. He paid another $200 to reach Paris by train and $300 to be smuggled into Britain in a lorry carrying boxes of bottled water.

He arrived somewhere – he thinks Oxford – on September 20. He was arrested and sent to Croydon to apply for asylum. He is now living in a hostel, haunted by memories of burning villages. "Anybody who participates in war has to feel sorry for what happened," he says.

The Aegis Trust plans to present Dily's testimony to the International Criminal Court as evidence of genocide by Sudan's leaders, who are still refusing to let United Nations troops into Darfur. "Everything this man says confirms that the Government of Sudan, contrary to its protestations, has been organising and supporting the Janjawid's ethnic-cleansing operations from the beginning," said Dr Smith, of the Trust.

Told of Dily's testimony on a BBC Newsnight programme, Hilary Benn, the International Development Secretary who has just returned from a visit to Sudan, said: "It's clearly very serious evidence and I would urge that that information is passed to the International Criminal Court investigators."

THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR

February 2003 The Darfur Liberation Front, later the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), claims discrimination by the mainly Arabic Government against black Africans

Spring 2004 Government is accused of using Arab militia – Janjawid – against SLA

January 2005 UN reports that Government and militias collaborated to commit atrocities, but "genocidal intent appears to be missing"

May 2006 Government and SLA sign peace deal, promise to disarm the Janjawid

August 2006 Janjawid still armed. UN resolution calls for a peacekeeping force

September 2006 African Union ignores order to leave

October 2006 Bush imposes further sanctions

(The Times)