Strategy and activities in 2011

The Office will strive to support the peace process by helping to build a favourable environment designed to pre-empt any negative developments, and promote durable solutions. By virtue of its host communities. Meanwhile, it will statelessness mandate, UNHCR is looked pursue its efforts to shift the focus of upon as a key actor that can assist the CPA parties in resolving nationality and citizenship issues. In the critical “Three Areas”, the Office will provide guidance on protection issues, and support the inter-agency framework.

In eastern Sudan, UNHCR will aim to continue providing protection and assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers, addressing the needs of new arrivals and of those involved in secondary movements; to reduce the number of refugees who are dependent on direct assistance; and to make strategic use of resettlement as a durable solution. It plans to transform eight camps into self-sustaining villages by 2012, while focusing its assistance on self-reliance in the remaining camps. Government ministries will be engaged to support the maintenance of camp infrastructure, which will be opened up to local populations. UNHCR will continue advocating for developmental, area-wide recovery programmes that include refugees. As protection cluster lead for the east, UNHCR will focus more attention on IDPs.

Main objectives and targets

Favourable protection environment

Efforts to prevent statelessness are strengthened.

• The new legal framework on nationality and related administrative arrangements are consistent with international standards.

Activities to address internal displacement are enhanced.

• The protection of IDPs is improved through enhanced cooperation of the State, NGOs, and the UN.

Natural resources and the environment are better protected.

• In the east and in Darfur, the extent to which environmental issues pose a protection risk is reduced.

Fair protection processes

Reception conditions are improved.

• Some 80 per cent of asylum-seekers in the east have access to refugee status determination (RSD) procedures.

Standards in the registration and profiling of refugees and IDPs are improved or maintained.

• A population profile of IDPs in the south is undertaken or updated every six months.

Basic needs and services

The health of the population of concern remains stable.

• The crude mortality rate stands at 1.5 per thousand among refugees in the east and in Southern Sudan.
• The majority of refugees in the east who survive rape receive post-exposure prophylaxis within 72 hours of an incident.

The population of concern has sufficient access to education.

• The student-teacher ratio is 40:1 among refugees in Darfur and 50:1 among refugees in the east.
• Services for groups with specific needs are strengthened.

Security from violence and exploitation

The negative impact of displacement on host communities is reduced.

• Communities hosting IDPs in Darfur and refugees in the east and in Southern Sudan tolerate their continued presence amidst them of persons of concern.

Access to legal remedies is improved.

• Refugees in the east and IDPs in Southern Sudan have access to national justice systems.

Protection of children is strengthened.

• The majority of identified unaccompanied minors in eastern Sudan receive protection and care.

Community participation and self-management

The livelihoods and level of self-reliance of refugees, IDPs and returnees are improved.

• Some 95 per cent of refugees and IDPs in the south, and 50 per cent of refugees in the east, are able to engage in gainful employment.

Durable solutions

Durable solutions are realized for refugees and IDPs.

• Some 34 per cent of refugees in the east are permitted to integrate locally.
• All identified individuals in need of resettlement among refugees in the east are referred to resettlement countries.
• Some 90 per cent of returnees in the south have the same access to basic rights as other citizens.

Voluntary return of IDPs in Southern Sudan is realized.

• Eighty per cent of newly displaced people return voluntarily to their places of origin in safety and dignity.

On Thursday, Ibrahim Gambari, who also serves as AU-UN Joint Special Representative in Darfur, met with Ibrahim Mahmoud Hamid, Sudan’s Minister of the Interior, and several top defense and police officials to discuss the situation in Kalma camp.

Mr. Gambari thanked Mr. Hamid for his Government’s cooperation with the mission, known as UNAMID, stressing the need to rapidly resolve the situation in the camp to protect civilians in and around the site, where deadly clashes broke out recently between IDPs who support peace talks being held in Doha, Qatar, and those who oppose them.

The UN-AU envoy also called for a climate of cooperation and dialogue between the two parties in order to protect civilians, enable humanitarian assistance, recognize UNAMID’s mandate and respect the Sudanese Government’s sovereignty.

On six people who sought refuge at the mission’s local Community Policing Centre, Mr. Gambari stressed that under its mandate, UNAMID is obliged to ensure that due process and the protection of individual’s rights are ensured at all times.

For his part, Mr. Hamid promised that the Government will work closely with UNAMID towards a peaceful resolution to the situation, adding that security in Darfur is a priority for both parties.

He said that the security of Kalma camp as been a major source of concern for many years.

Also in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, Mr. Gambari briefed AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping and the heads of the five permanent members of the Security Council on UNAMID’s efforts to reach an amicable solution to the problems in the camp.

As many as 2.7 million Darfurians live as IDPs or as refugees in neighbouring countries as a result of the seven-year-old conflict in the western region of Sudan that has also resulted in an estimated 300,000 deaths.

UNAMID is also currently investigating reports of similar fighting in Daba Tago, 20 km west of Mellit, North Darfur.

Meanwhile, UNAMID continues to face restrictions in its movements. In South Darfur, a UNAMID convoy conducting a routine patrol was denied access to Changi village, 20 km east of Nyala, by authorities for the second time in ten days with no reasons given. Flight restrictions on UN aircraft in South Darfur are still in place, limiting the efforts of many aid groups, which cannot travel by road due to security concerns and rain-damaged roads.

The Court’s pre-trial chamber said that there are reasonable grounds to believe Mr. al-Bashir is responsible for three counts of genocide against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups, including genocide by killing; genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm; and genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of life meant to destroy each target group.

In March 2009 the Sudanese leader became the first sitting head of State to be indicted by the Court, which charged him with two counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity.

But the ICC’s pre-trial chamber at that time rejected Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s application to charge Mr. al-Bashir with genocide, ruling that there was insufficient evidence.

In February, the appeals chamber called for adding the charge of genocide to be reconsidered, finding the standard of proof set by the pre-trial chamber to be too demanding at the arrest warrant stage, amounting to an “error of law.”

The arrest warrant issued today for Mr. al-Bashir does not replace or revoke last year’s, which remains in effect.

The United Nations estimates that 300,000 people have been killed and another 2.7 million forced from their homes since fighting erupted in 2003 in Darfur, pitting rebels against Government forces and allied Janjaweed militiamen. All sides are accused of serious human rights violations.

In May, the ICC’s judges referred Sudan’s lack of cooperation in failing to arrest the Mr. al-Bashir and other indictees – including Ahmad Harun, a former national government minister of the interior – to the Security Council.

Although Sudan is not a State Party to the Rome Statute that set up the ICC, it is obliged to “cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the court and the prosecutor” in accordance with a Council resolution adopted in 2005.

The ICC is a permanent court based in The Hague in the Netherlands and tries people accused of the most serious international offences, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Other than Darfur, the ICC currently has investigations open in four situations: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), northern Uganda, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Kenya.

Meanwhile, the security situation in Darfur has been relatively calm but unpredictable in the past 24 hours.

2. The purpose of the Retreat was to take stock of developments in Darfur since the holding of the first Envoys’ Retreat in Kigali, and to further develop the international community’s shared understanding of, and approach to, the situation in Darfur, in the wider context of Sudan.

3. The participants reviewed developments since their meeting in February 2010, and welcomed the peaceful conduct of national elections in Sudan in April, and the continuing rapprochement between Sudan and Chad. They expressed support for the Mediation and commended its achievements so far, including the increased participation of Darfurians, especially civil society and internally displaced persons and refugees, in the peace process. While welcoming the negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement, the participants noted the need for an all‐inclusive process that would lead to the conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement for Darfur. The participants agreed that it was imperative to reach a lasting solution to the conflict in Darfur before the end of the year, so that peace can take hold throughout Sudan ahead of the crucial referendum on the self‐determination of South Sudan in January 2011, and that national efforts to reach sustainable peace can continue thereafter. All efforts must be made to convince all Movements to come to the negotiation table without delay. In this regard, the participants urged the Government of Sudan to remain engaged and committed to finding a comprehensive solution.

4. With regard to security, the participants expressed grave concern over the deterioration in the situation in Darfur in recent months and the new challenges this has presented in efforts to bring peace, stability and humanitarian response to Darfur. They called on the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement to immediately cease hostilities and embrace dialogue. They also expressed concern over increased ethnic violence and the high rates of criminality, including the phenomenon of kidnapping of international workers and attacks against UNAMID personnel, which constitute war crime, and called for the release of all remaining hostages. They condemned in strong terms the criminality and called on the Government of Sudan to take appropriate measures to bring perpetrators to justice and to end impunity. The participants welcomed the increase in UNAMID’s outreach initiatives and protection of civilians. They underscored the need for full humanitarian access and freedom of movement for UNAMID and the humanitarian community. In particular, the meeting stressed the need for the Government of Sudan to lift all restrictions on the use of UNAMID air assets.

5. The participants observed the link between security, sustainable voluntary returns and development, and further underscored the necessity to achieve lasting peace through a comprehensively negotiated settlement. The role of various actors, including United Nations entities, regional organizations and countries in efforts to restore livelihood opportunities was acknowledged. It was underscored, however, that the Government of Sudan has both a leading role and key responsibility to improve security and bring sustainable development to Darfur, and that its role cannot be replaced by external actors. In this context, the participants urged the Government of Sudan to take all necessary steps, including the allocation of appropriate resources to that end. Noting that urbanization is a reality in Darfur, the meeting considered the potential for just and durable solutions, both in terms of returns to areas of origins or integration in an urban context. It recognized the importance of existing joint verification mechanisms to be fully activated.

6. On coordination, the participants commended UNAMID, UNMIS, the Mediation and the AU High‐Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) for regular interface and productive collaboration. The participants stressed the importance of making full use of existing coordination mechanisms to help the Sudanese achieve durable peace in their country.

7. Participants welcomed the initiative of convening this second retreat of an expanded group of Special Envoys and holding it in El Fasher. They agreed that there should be a follow‐up to the conclusions of the Retreat.

El Fasher, 5 July 2010

Photo: Olivier Chassot/UNAMID

Since the conflict began in early March between the two tribes, more than 200 people have died in clashes and hundreds have been displaced.

A reconciliation committee was established on 29 April involving native administraations and local leaders, with UNAMID and the Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Council (DPRC) in order to assist the tribes in reaching a lasting peace accord. A conference was organized last month in Zalingei aimed at addressing the causes of the conflict and to discuss ways in bringing the two tribes to a peaceful resolution.

At [UN] Headquarters there was not sufficient focus or institutional resources for early warning and risk analysis.†– Independent Inquiry into the action of the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.[1]

Introduction

The UN is currently not organized in such that the substantial and substantive information gathered through the various mechanisms of the UN human rights machinery in Geneva is brought together in a focused way, so as to better understand complex situations and thus be in a better position to take appropriate action. In short, there is a significant gap between the calls for effective conflict prevention and the institutional capacity of the UN as a whole. [2] One reminder of this disconnect is the genocide of some 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, which was surely preventable as it had been foreseen in the August 1993 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.[3]

April 2005 marked the 90th anniversary of the beginning of the atrocities committed towards Armenians and Assyrians in Ottoman Turkey (1915), the 60th anniversary of the end of the World War II and the liberation of the Jews, Roma and other survivors from Nazi concentration camps (1945), and the 30th anniversary of the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (1975).

With several relevant UN reform proposals currently under discussion (including a Mediation Support Unit, a Peacebuilding Commission and a revamping of the human rights machinery), one recent institutional development to strengthen the UN capacity to systematically prevent future genocides was the creation in 2004 of the position of a UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (hereinafter referred to as the †کSASGPG’). How can the SASGPG become an effective tool, within the UN, to prevent future genocides?

UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (SASGPG)

The post of a SASGPG was suggested by the UN Secretary-General in early 2004, as part of a larger Action Plan on the Prevention of Genocide.[4] On July 12, 2004, the UN Secretary-General named Juan E. Mendez, a human rights advocate, lawyer and former political prisoner from Argentina , as his first SASGPG, and provided the mandate.[5] The SASGPG is located in New York, holds a 40 per cent position and is assisted by a staff member from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and a staff member from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Mandate and approach

The SASGPG’s mandate to address prevention in relation to †کgenocide or related crimes’ indicates that the SASGPG may become involved in situations when the prospects for genocide are quite distant, including addressing situations that run the risk of resulting in ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights. Mendez has stated that he should “not be extremely tied to an overly technical definition of genocideâ€, and that, “since the task is one of prevention, you have to act even before all of the elements of the definition fall into place.â€[6] Indeed, the mandate explicitly states that the Special Advisor is not intended to make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention[7] has occurred or not. The function of the SASGPG is not to prosecute, judge or punish, but rather to focus on concrete conditions and issues where practical assistance and support can be provided.

The SASGPG will need to develop a sensitive but determined and operational approach. The mandate stipulates that “[t]he methodology employed would entail a careful verification of facts and serious political analyses and consultations, without excessive publicity,†and the purpose of activities to be “practical and intended to enable the United Nations to act in a timely fashion.†The verification of facts within the mandate opens the door for fact-finding missions, while consultations could take the form of facilitating in-country roundtables. By avoiding excessive publicity, the SASGPG could function as a †کfriendly advisor’ to warring parties alike, and thereby build confidence among all stakeholders, including governments. Not only must the SASGPG be independent, impartial, consistent and a person of integrity, he or she must also be viewed as being such. In addition to building confidence among the primary stakeholders, it will be crucial to build confidence among institutional partners within the UN system in order to mobilize resources beyond the SASGPG’s evidently under-staffed office. Indeed, there are several examples from the past where mechanisms and †کspecial offices’ have been isolated within the UN system. By employing and communicating a fundamentally assistance-oriented approach of what the SASGPG will do, and what he or she will not do, and by complementing the activities of other institutional actors within the UN, such clarity could be one way to build important intra-UN confidence.

Another consideration is whether the SASGPG should take on operational responsibilities, such as actively seeking to facilitate mediation between actors in a particular situation. This could be useful if the SASGPG would hold comparative advantage to do so. However, as the SASGPG is unlikely to constitute the main interlocutor of the international community, the SASGPG should rather seek to offer complementary services and activities. This could include arranging in-country or regional workshops aimed at fostering inter-communal tolerance where expressions of hate speech have been directed at certain populations at risk. The SASGPG can also (with authority) share the experiences of the significant human and economic costs when inter-communal tensions elsewhere have turned into organized violence. The SASGPG could seek to strengthen the core of moderates on all sides and support them (and encourage them to also involve others) to address contentious issues through inclusive political processes, as opposed to violent means. As the SASGPG is to work without excessive publicity, this approach will also serve the function of enabling political space for disputing parties, including governments, to adjust policies and positions without being seen as doing so (i.e. not losing face within respective constituencies). Once identified with such an approach, this could encourage States who for (arguably) uninformed reasons may be initially hesitant to extend a standing invitation to the SASGPG.

Resources

Considering the clearly insufficient 40 per cent position of the SASGPG supported by just two staff members, it is hard to imagine a larger discrepancy between resources allocated and the importance of the issues at stake. While secondments from governments can be sensitive, and the first SASGPG appears to prefer †کstarting small,’ although it could well be considered to enlarge the capacity of the office through contributions from experts nominated by governments or independently recruited professional staff.

In light of the current meager resources of the SASGPG office, the indirect support of Non-Governmental Organizations becomes all the more important. Collaboration between NGOs could provide independent assessments within their field of expertise to the SASGPG’s office (which the SASGPG obviously would decide whether to act upon or not). It would, for example, appear warranted if well-reputed organizations such as Minority Rights Group International, with its 40 years of expertise on inter-communal issues and minority protection around the world, were to establish links and synthesize and analyze information from sources (mentioned below) and cooperate with the SASGPG in an informal, yet supportive capacity.

Information, Analysis and Actions

The office of the SASGPG can act as a focal point for early warning information coming from any source inside or outside the United Nations system. The use of indicators is a necessary, but not sufficient, basis for evaluating situations at risk. Indicators would need to be complemented with contextual analysis of State capacity, governance, media and current and future events. The information management would need to develop a methodology drawing on past experiences (incl. from The Early Warning and Preventive Measures project initiated by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in 1998) and include indicator-based systems such as from the SIPRI Armed Conflict Database, non-indicator based analysis from the International Crisis Group, and research-based sources of information such as the Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland, and the Human Security Index at the University of British Columbia.[8] This being said, extensive UN information could well provide the bedrock of information. Indeed it is likely that the SASGPG will be simply overwhelmed. An effective system of information management and communication strategy is thus essential. It will be important to strike an appropriate balance between quantity of information and its quality in accuracy and reliability.

On Sept. 30, 2004 the SASGPG stated that, “the vulnerability of certain ethnic groups” and “the instability of the situation generally” are such that “we have not turned the corner on preventing genocide from happening in the future or even in the near future in Darfur.”

In stressing that the primary responsibility rests on national governments, the SASGPG should base his or her analysis and recommendations on a normative framework, conveying (and explaining) existing international standards. The function of a †کnormative intermediary’ translating standards into concrete policy options could draw upon the proven function of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities. [9] In this regard, the SASGPG may offer his or her own interpretation of such standards, including specific cases or through general recommendations, and thus contribute to a body of †کsoft jurisprudence.’

It requires strategic planning to determine whether, when and how the SASGPG will inform the Secretary-General, including the appropriateness of f bringing a situation to the attention of the Security Council, and there are similar questions with regard to other possibly †کindependent’ tools of action at the SASGPG’s disposal (including fact-finding missions for verifications and consultations). Should the SASGPG commence with the most urgent cases? In order to build trust in the mandate and approach, it could be useful to focus on multiple situations simultaneously, and seek to establish some early †کsuccess,’ however small. This might mean the most urgent situation, but it could also mean engaging in a dialogue with member States and populations where tensions are far less acute. In order to develop the †کroutine’ of in-country visits, it could be helpful if a few †کfriendly governments’ extend invitations to the SASGPG, who could for example hold in-country consultations on, for example, issues such as education, culture and language.

Actions to Date

The first SASGPG has not been serving in this position for enough time to merit a deep analysis. By April 2005, the SASGPG reported he had issued five notes to the UN Security Council on Darfur, one note on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and one note on Cote d’Ivoire.[10] The notes have addressed a variety of issues, for example the letter regarding DRC focused on the need to establish protection zones for civilians especially in the east of the DRC and near the borders with Burundi and Rwanda. However, so far it is uncertain what, if any, effect these notes have had on the actual situations.

Conclusion

While 2004 saw international events and gatherings commemorating the 10 years since the genocide in Rwanda, the international community remains unable to effectively address the tragedy in Darfur, which is merely the latest situation labeled by the UN as ethnic cleansing, and by some quarters, genocide.

The establishment of a SASGPG should be welcomed as a new actor in the range of instruments which could assist in developing effective genocide prevention capacity within the UN. Both governments and non-governmental actors should support this new mechanism; the former by offering resources and inviting the SASGPG for in-country visits, and the latter by providing systematic independent analysis on situations that merit the attention and engagement of the SASGPG.

Erik Friberg, a Swedish national, is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia . He can be reached at erik.friberg@csis.or.id

Further readings:

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report with Executive Summary, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997,

Malone, D., and Fen Hampson (eds.), From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. Lynne Rienner, 2002.

Packer, J. and E. Friberg, Genocide and Minorities: Preventing the Preventable, Minority Rights Group International Briefing, London, 2004,

Stanton, G. H., The International Campaign to End Genocide: A Review of Its First Five Years, 2004, see http://www.genocidewatch.org/iceghistory.htm

Schabas, W., The Genocide Convention at Fifty, USIP Special Report 41, Washington , 1999,

The Report of the independent inquiry into the action of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999.

[2] For a good account of the early warning and preventive action in the wider context of institutional transformation of the United Nations (prior to the 2004 High-Level Panel Report), see J. Cockell, “Early warning analysis and policy planning in UN preventive actionâ€, in D. Carment and A. Schnabel (eds.) Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace of Grand Illusion?, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003. See also C. L. Sriram and K. Wermester, From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, International Peace Academy, New York, 2003,

[3] Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1.

[4] UN Secretary-General Speech at the Stockholm International Forum January 2004, and speech at the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva April 2004. Other suggested parts of the Action Plan, including a treaty-monitoring Committee to the 1948 Genocide Convention, remain to be implemented.

[5] Outline of the mandate for the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, UN Doc. No. S/2004/567.

[6] Albion Monitor, †کUN Genocide Advisor Says Darfur Getting Worse’, 9 March 2005, .

[7] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.

[8] For a useful gathering and analysis of potential databases in this regard, see Rodik, Petra, Drazen Penzar and Armano Srbljinovoc “An Overview of Databases of Conflicts and Political Crisesâ€, in Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, Volume 1, Issue 1-2, 2003, pp. 9-21.

[9] See S. Ratner, “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 591-698. See also: J. Packer, “Making International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 715-724; and W. Kemp (ed.) Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Kluwer Law, The Hague , 2001.

[10] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Press Release 1 March 2005,

Genocide prevention and the UN:

The potential of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General

By: Erik Friberg

“At [UN] Headquarters there was not sufficient focus or institutional resources for early warning and risk analysis.†– Independent Inquiry into the action of the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.[1]

Introduction

The UN is currently not organized in such that the substantial and substantive information gathered through the various mechanisms of the UN human rights machinery in Geneva is brought together in a focused way, so as to better understand complex situations and thus be in a better position to take appropriate action. In short, there is a significant gap between the calls for effective conflict prevention and the institutional capacity of the UN as a whole.[2] One reminder of this disconnect is the genocide of some 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, which was surely preventable as it had been foreseen in the August 1993 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.[3]

April 2005 marked the 90th anniversary of the beginning of the atrocities committed towards Armenians and Assyrians in Ottoman Turkey (1915), the 60th anniversary of the end of the World War II and the liberation of the Jews, Roma and other survivors from Nazi concentration camps (1945), and the 30th anniversary of the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (1975).

With several relevant UN reform proposals currently under discussion (including a Mediation Support Unit, a Peacebuilding Commission and a revamping of the human rights machinery), one recent institutional development to strengthen the UN capacity to systematically prevent future genocides was the creation in 2004 of the position of a UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (hereinafter referred to as the †?SASGPG’). How can the SASGPG become an effective tool, within the UN, to prevent future genocides?

UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (SASGPG)

The post of a SASGPG was suggested by the UN Secretary-General in early 2004, as part of a larger Action Plan on the Prevention of Genocide.[4] On July 12, 2004, the UN Secretary-General named Juan E. Mendez, a human rights advocate, lawyer and former political prisoner from Argentina , as his first SASGPG, and provided the mandate.[5] The SASGPG is located in New York, holds a 40 per cent position and is assisted by a staff member from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and a staff member from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Mandate and approach

The SASGPG’s mandate to address prevention in relation to †?genocide or related crimes’ indicates that the SASGPG may become involved in situations when the prospects for genocide are quite distant, including addressing situations that run the risk of resulting in ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights. Mendez has stated that he should “not be extremely tied to an overly technical definition of genocideâ€, and that, “since the task is one of prevention, you have to act even before all of the elements of the definition fall into place.â€[6] Indeed, the mandate explicitly states that the Special Advisor is not intended to make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention[7] has occurred or not. The function of the SASGPG is not to prosecute, judge or punish, but rather to focus on concrete conditions and issues where practical assistance and support can be provided.

The SASGPG will need to develop a sensitive but determined and operational approach. The mandate stipulates that “[t]he methodology employed would entail a careful verification of facts and serious political analyses and consultations, without excessive publicity,†and the purpose of activities to be “practical and intended to enable the United Nations to act in a timely fashion.†The verification of facts within the mandate opens the door for fact-finding missions, while consultations could take the form of facilitating in-country roundtables. By avoiding excessive publicity, the SASGPG could function as a †?friendly advisor’ to warring parties alike, and thereby build confidence among all stakeholders, including governments. Not only must the SASGPG be independent, impartial, consistent and a person of integrity, he or she must also be viewed as being such. In addition to building confidence among the primary stakeholders, it will be crucial to build confidence among institutional partners within the UN system in order to mobilize resources beyond the SASGPG’s evidently under-staffed office. Indeed, there are several examples from the past where mechanisms and †?special offices’ have been isolated within the UN system. By employing and communicating a fundamentally assistance-oriented approach of what the SASGPG will do, and what he or she will not do, and by complementing the activities of other institutional actors within the UN, such clarity could be one way to build important intra-UN confidence.

Another consideration is whether the SASGPG should take on operational responsibilities, such as actively seeking to facilitate mediation between actors in a particular situation. This could be useful if the SASGPG would hold comparative advantage to do so. However, as the SASGPG is unlikely to constitute the main interlocutor of the international community, the SASGPG should rather seek to offer complementary services and activities. This could include arranging in-country or regional workshops aimed at fostering inter-communal tolerance where expressions of hate speech have been directed at certain populations at risk. The SASGPG can also (with authority) share the experiences of the significant human and economic costs when inter-communal tensions elsewhere have turned into organized violence. The SASGPG could seek to strengthen the core of moderates on all sides and support them (and encourage them to also involve others) to address contentious issues through inclusive political processes, as opposed to violent means. As the SASGPG is to work without excessive publicity, this approach will also serve the function of enabling political space for disputing parties, including governments, to adjust policies and positions without being seen as doing so (i.e. not losing face within respective constituencies). Once identified with such an approach, this could encourage States who for (arguably) uninformed reasons may be initially hesitant to extend a standing invitation to the SASGPG.

Resources

Considering the clearly insufficient 40 per cent position of the SASGPG supported by just two staff members, it is hard to imagine a larger discrepancy between resources allocated and the importance of the issues at stake. While secondments from governments can be sensitive, and the first SASGPG appears to prefer †?starting small,’ although it could well be considered to enlarge the capacity of the office through contributions from experts nominated by governments or independently recruited professional staff.

In light of the current meager resources of the SASGPG office, the indirect support of Non-Governmental Organizations becomes all the more important. Collaboration between NGOs could provide independent assessments within their field of expertise to the SASGPG’s office (which the SASGPG obviously would decide whether to act upon or not). It would, for example, appear warranted if well-reputed organizations such as Minority Rights Group International, with its 40 years of expertise on inter-communal issues and minority protection around the world, were to establish links and synthesize and analyze information from sources (mentioned below) and cooperate with the SASGPG in an informal, yet supportive capacity.

Information, Analysis and Actions

The office of the SASGPG can act as a focal point for early warning information coming from any source inside or outside the United Nations system. The use of indicators is a necessary, but not sufficient, basis for evaluating situations at risk. Indicators would need to be complemented with contextual analysis of State capacity, governance, media and current and future events. The information management would need to develop a methodology drawing on past experiences (incl. from The Early Warning and Preventive Measures project initiated by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in 1998) and include indicator-based systems such as from the SIPRI Armed Conflict Database, non-indicator based analysis from the International Crisis Group, and research-based sources of information such as the Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland, and the Human Security Index at the University of British Columbia.[8] This being said, extensive UN information could well provide the bedrock of information. Indeed it is likely that the SASGPG will be simply overwhelmed. An effective system of information management and communication strategy is thus essential. It will be important to strike an appropriate balance between quantity of information and its quality in accuracy and reliability.

On Sept. 30, 2004 the SASGPG stated that, “the vulnerability of certain ethnic groups” and “the instability of the situation generally” are such that “we have not turned the corner on preventing genocide from happening in the future or even in the near future in Darfur.”

In stressing that the primary responsibility rests on national governments, the SASGPG should base his or her analysis and recommendations on a normative framework, conveying (and explaining) existing international standards. The function of a †?normative intermediary’ translating standards into concrete policy options could draw upon the proven function of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities. [9] In this regard, the SASGPG may offer his or her own interpretation of such standards, including specific cases or through general recommendations, and thus contribute to a body of †?soft jurisprudence.’

It requires strategic planning to determine whether, when and how the SASGPG will inform the Secretary-General, including the appropriateness of f bringing a situation to the attention of the Security Council, and there are similar questions with regard to other possibly †?independent’ tools of action at the SASGPG’s disposal (including fact-finding missions for verifications and consultations). Should the SASGPG commence with the most urgent cases? In order to build trust in the mandate and approach, it could be useful to focus on multiple situations simultaneously, and seek to establish some early †?success,’ however small. This might mean the most urgent situation, but it could also mean engaging in a dialogue with member States and populations where tensions are far less acute. In order to develop the †?routine’ of in-country visits, it could be helpful if a few †?friendly governments’ extend invitations to the SASGPG, who could for example hold in-country consultations on, for example, issues such as education, culture and language.

Actions to Date

The first SASGPG has not been serving in this position for enough time to merit a deep analysis. By April 2005, the SASGPG reported he had issued five notes to the UN Security Council on Darfur, one note on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and one note on Cote d’Ivoire.[10] The notes have addressed a variety of issues, for example the letter regarding DRC focused on the need to establish protection zones for civilians especially in the east of the DRC and near the borders with Burundi and Rwanda. However, so far it is uncertain what, if any, effect these notes have had on the actual situations.

Conclusion

While 2004 saw international events and gatherings commemorating the 10 years since the genocide in Rwanda, the international community remains unable to effectively address the tragedy in Darfur, which is merely the latest situation labeled by the UN as ethnic cleansing, and by some quarters, genocide.

The establishment of a SASGPG should be welcomed as a new actor in the range of instruments which could assist in developing effective genocide prevention capacity within the UN. Both governments and non-governmental actors should support this new mechanism; the former by offering resources and inviting the SASGPG for in-country visits, and the latter by providing systematic independent analysis on situations that merit the attention and engagement of the SASGPG.

Erik Friberg, a Swedish national, is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia . He can be reached at erik.friberg@csis.or.id

Further readings:

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report with Executive Summary, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997,

Malone, D., and Fen Hampson (eds.), From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. Lynne Rienner, 2002.

Packer, J. and E. Friberg, Genocide and Minorities: Preventing the Preventable, Minority Rights Group International Briefing, London, 2004,

Stanton, G. H., The International Campaign to End Genocide: A Review of Its First Five Years, 2004, see http://www.genocidewatch.org/iceghistory.htm

Schabas, W., The Genocide Convention at Fifty, USIP Special Report 41, Washington , 1999,

The Report of the independent inquiry into the action of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999.

[2] For a good account of the early warning and preventive action in the wider context of institutional transformation of the United Nations (prior to the 2004 High-Level Panel Report), see J. Cockell, “Early warning analysis and policy planning in UN preventive actionâ€, in D. Carment and A. Schnabel (eds.) Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace of Grand Illusion?, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003. See also C. L. Sriram and K. Wermester, From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, International Peace Academy, New York, 2003,

[3] Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1.

[4] UN Secretary-General Speech at the Stockholm International Forum January 2004, and speech at the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva April 2004. Other suggested parts of the Action Plan, including a treaty-monitoring Committee to the 1948 Genocide Convention, remain to be implemented.

[5] Outline of the mandate for the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, UN Doc. No. S/2004/567.

[6] Albion Monitor, †?UN Genocide Advisor Says Darfur Getting Worse’, 9 March 2005, .

[7] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.

[8] For a useful gathering and analysis of potential databases in this regard, see Rodik, Petra, Drazen Penzar and Armano Srbljinovoc “An Overview of Databases of Conflicts and Political Crisesâ€, in Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, Volume 1, Issue 1-2, 2003, pp. 9-21.

[9] See S. Ratner, “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 591-698. See also: J. Packer, “Making International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 715-724; and W. Kemp (ed.) Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Kluwer Law, The Hague , 2001.

[10] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Press Release 1 March 2005,

SECURITY COUNCIL REFERS SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN, TO PROSECUTOR OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Resolution 1593 (2005) Adopted by Vote of 11 in Favour
To None Against, with 4 Abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States)

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council decided this evening to refer the situation prevailing in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

Adopting resolution 1593 (2005) by a vote of 11 in favour, none against with 4 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States), the Council decided also that the Government of the Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur would cooperate fully with the Court and Prosecutor, providing them with any necessary assistance.

The Council decided further that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside the Sudan which was not a party to the Rome Statute would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Sudan authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction had been expressly waived by that contributing State.

Inviting the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that would facilitate the Court’s work, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, the Council encouraged the Court, in accordance with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat impunity in Darfur. It also emphasized the need to promote healing and reconciliation, as well as the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace.

Speaking in explanation of position after the vote were the representatives of the United States, Algeria, China, Denmark, Philippines, Japan, United Kingdom, Argentina, France, Greece, United Republic of Tanzania, Romania, Russian Federation, Benin and Brazil.

The representative of the Sudan also addressed the Council.

The meeting began at 10:40 p.m. and ended at 11:55 p.m.

Council Resolution

Security Council resolution 1593 (2005) reads, as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Taking note of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur (S/2005/60),

“Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect,

“Also recalling articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute and encouraging States to contribute to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims,

“Taking note of the existence of agreements referred to in Article 98-2 of the Rome Statute,

“Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

“2. Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully;

“3. Invites the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity;

“4. Also encourages the Court, as appropriate and in accordance with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat impunity in Darfur;

“5. Also emphasizes the need to promote healing and reconciliation and encourages in this respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace, with African Union and international support as necessary;

“6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State;

“7. Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily;

“8. Invites the Prosecutor to address the Council within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution;

“9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Action on Text

The draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 11 in favour with 4 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States).

Following the vote, ANNE WOODS PATTERSON (United States) said her country strongly supported bringing to justice those responsible for the crimes and atrocities that had occurred in Darfur and ending the climate of impunity there. Violators of international humanitarian law and human rights law must be held accountable. Justice must be served in Darfur. By adopting today’s resolution, the international community had established an accountability mechanism for the perpetrators of crimes and atrocities in Darfur. The resolution would refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation and prosecution.

While the United States believed that a better mechanism would have been a hybrid tribunal in Africa, it was important that the international community spoke with one voice in order to help promote effective accountability. The United States continued to fundamentally object to the view that the Court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials, of States not party to the Rome Statute. Because it did not agree to a Council referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court, her country had abstained on the vote. She decided not to oppose the resolution because of the need for the international community to work together in order to end the climate of impunity in the Sudan, and because the resolution provided protection from investigation or prosecution for United States nationals and members of the armed forces of non-State parties.

The United States was and would be an important contributor to the peacekeeping and related humanitarian efforts in the Sudan, she said. The language providing protection for the United States and other contributing States was precedent-setting, as it clearly acknowledged the concerns of States not party to the Rome Statute and recognized that persons from those States should not be vulnerable to investigation or prosecution by the Court, absent consent by those States or a referral by the Council. In the future, she believed that, absent consent of the State involved, any investigations or prosecutions of nationals of non-party States should come only pursuant to a decision by the Council.

Although her delegation had abstained on the Council referral to the Court, it had not dropped, and indeed continued to maintain, its long-standing and firm objections and concerns regarding the Court, she continued. The Rome Statute was flawed and did not have sufficient protection from the possibility of politicized prosecutions. Non-parties had no obligations in connection with that treaty, unless otherwise decided by the Council, upon which members of the Organization had conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

She was pleased that the resolution recognized that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral would be borne by the United Nations, and that instead such costs would be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those that contributed voluntarily. That principle was extremely important. Any effort to retrench on that principle by the United Nations or other organizations to which the United States contributed could result in its withholding funding or taking other action in response.

The Council included, at her country’s request, a provision that exempted persons of non-party States in the Sudan from the ICC prosecution. Persons from countries not party who were supporting the United Nations’ or African Union’s efforts should not be placed in jeopardy. The resolution provided clear protection for United States persons. No United States person supporting operations in the Sudan would be subject to investigation or prosecution because of this resolution. That did not mean that there would be immunity for American citizens that acted in violation of the law. The United States would continue to discipline its own people when appropriate.

ABDALLAH BAALI (Algeria) said his country believed strongly in the crucial importance of combating impunity if peace and stability were to take root — a need that was even more vital in the case of Darfur, where relations between various communities had been destroyed over the years. It was, therefore, important that the fight against impunity had the equal goal of re-establishing harmony among the peoples of Darfur while serving the cause of peace.

He said that any international démarche towards those ends must be reinforced in a way that guaranteed a fair and transparent trial process; brought justice for the victims by restoring their rights and providing reparations for their moral and material suffering; contributed towards national reconciliation, a political settlement of the crisis and the consolidation of peace and stability throughout the Sudan; and promoted the support of all Sudanese in that process, including, in particular, securing the cooperation of the Government.

Because of those factors, the African Union was best placed to carry out so delicate an undertaking because it could provide peace, while also satisfying the need for justice, he said. President Olusegun Obasanjo had made a proposal, on behalf of the African Union, based on the need to secure peace without sacrificing the need for justice. Regrettably, for the sake of reconciliation, the Council had neither considered that proposal nor assessed its potential to enable its members to combat impunity. One could not claim to support the African Union while brushing aside its proposals without deigning even to consider them. At the eruption of the Darfur conflict, it had been none other than the African Union that had deployed its soldiers and begun negotiating the various complex issues involved. What was true of the Sudan was true all over Africa, and Algeria regretted that for the sake of compromise at any cost those who defended the principle of universal justice had, in fact, confirmed that even in the Council there could be a double standard.

WANG GUANGYA (China), explaining his delegation’s abstention, said that China had followed the situation in Darfur closely and supported a political solution. Like the rest of the international community, China deplored deeply the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law and believed that the perpetrators must be brought to justice. The question before the Council was what was the most appropriate way to do so. While ensuring justice, it was important to sustain the hard-won gains of the North-South peace process.

He said his country would have preferred that the perpetrators stand trial in Sudanese courts, which had recently taken action against people involved in human rights violations in Darfur. China did not favour the referral to the International Criminal Court without the consent of the Sudanese Government. In addition, China, which was not a party to the Rome Statute, had major reservations regarding some of its provisions and had found it difficult to endorse the Council authorization of that referral.

ELLEN MARGRETHE LØJ (Denmark) said that it had been two months since the Council had received the report of the Commission of Inquiry, which had strongly recommended referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC. The Court had the mandate, capacity and funding necessary to ensure swift and effective prosecution. She was encouraged that the Council had voted to adopt a resolution to bring an internationally recognized follow-up to the crimes in Darfur. She recognized the difficulty of some delegations to accept the text and appreciated the flexibility shown.

Denmark had only been able to support the text after some alterations were made, she said. Regarding the formulation on existing agreements referred to in article 98-2 of the Rome Statute, she noted that that reference was purely factual and referred to the existence of such agreements. Thus, the reference was in no way impinging on the Rome Statute. The result was a valid compromise leading to the first referral of a situation to the ICC. She looked forward to the Court taking the first steps to ending the culture of impunity in Darfur.

LAURO BAJA (Philippines) noted that today’s was the third resolution borne out of the Council’s consideration of Darfur. He had voted for the resolution in response to the urgency and gravity of the crimes, which the Council and the international community were obliged to address. Any failure of action two months after the presentation of the report would have reduced the Council to irrelevance in ending impunity and protecting human rights and international humanitarian law.

He shared the concerns of some regarding the manner in which the resolution was arrived at. Once again, veto threats prevented the expression of a clear and robust signal from the Council. That was why calls for Council reform were growing louder with each passing day. He also believed that the ICC was a fatality in the resolution. Did the Council have the prerogative to mandate the jurisdiction of the Court?

KENZO OSHIMA (Japan) said he had voted in favour of the resolution because impunity for serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity must not be allowed. Japan supported in principle the referral to the International Criminal Court within the appropriate time-frame, although it was not a party to the Rome Statute and would have much preferred more agreement among Council members.

EMYR JONES PARRY (United Kingdom) said that by tonight’s vote the Council had acted to ensure accountability for the crimes committed in Darfur. The United Kingdom hoped to send a salutary warning to other parties who may be tempted to commit similar human rights violations. The United Kingdom welcomed the adoption of the two other resolutions on the Sudan this week and called for a redoubling of efforts on behalf of peace and justice for the people of Darfur, and the Sudan as a whole, who had suffered enough. The three resolutions were a substantial contribution towards that end.

CÉSAR MAYORAL (Argentina) said he had voted in support of the resolution on the basis of the report to the Council by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who stated clearly what had been crimes against humanity in Darfur. The legal context for dealing with such violations was the ICC. He understood that the ICC would be the proper place to combat impunity. The resolution gave strong support to the Court and demonstrated significant progress within the United Nations to ensure the functioning of an international system for human rights, for which the Court was an essential tool.

He noted that it was the first time the Council had referred to the Court a situation involving crimes over which the Court had jurisdiction. It was a crucial precedent. The letter and spirit of the Rome Statute must be respected, taking into account the legitimate concerns of States. Accordingly, he regretted that the Council had to adopt a text that provided an exemption to the Court, and hoped that that would not become normal practice. The exemption referred to in operative paragraph 6 only applied to those States not party to the Rome Statute.

JEAN-MARC DE LA SABLIERE (France) said the events in Darfur were deeply troubling, and the greatest concern was the plight of the people there. The Secretary-General’s reports had provided a detailed picture of those atrocities. The Council had a duty to take action. Its policy must include three elements. The first was the need to assist the African Union to strengthen its mandate for protection and monitoring. The Council had done that by adopting resolution 1590 last week. Then, there was the need to exert pressure on the warring parties to fulfil their obligations and achieve a political settlement. The Council did that by adopting resolution 1591 a few days ago. Finally, it was necessary to put an end to impunity. That was what the Council had done today.

The Commission’s report recommended the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC, he said. The Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights had asked the Council to urgently provide a positive outcome following that recommendation. Referring the issue to the ICC was the only solution. It was necessary to do right by the victims, and doing so would prevent those violations from continuing. That was why France had been the initiator of the resolution and voted in its favour. He was gratified by the adoption of this historic resolution, by which the Council, for the first time, referred a situation to the ICC.

Thus, the Council had sent a strong message to all those in Darfur who had committed or were tempted to commit atrocious crimes, and to the victims. The international community would not allow those crimes to remain unpunished. It also marked a turning point and sent a message farther than Darfur. His delegation had been ready to acknowledge immunity from the ICC for nationals from States not party to the Rome Statute. He reaffirmed his confidence in the ICC and hoped that those clauses concerning immunity from the Court would be dropped very soon.

ADAMANTIOS TH. VASSILAKIS (Greece) stressed that impunity must not be allowed to go unpunished and that was why his country had turned to the International Criminal Court. It would have preferred a text that did not make exceptions, but it was better than one that allowed violations to go unpunished. The text strengthened the Council’s authority, as well as that of the International Criminal Court, which would have the possibility of showing its competence. The three recently adopted resolutions on Darfur would assist in restoring peace in the Sudan.

AUGUSTINE MAHIGA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that every new delay in the adoption of the resolution represented a failure to serve the interests of justice, and his delegation regretted that the text took on matters that did not concern the Council. It did not permit any avoidance of the International Criminal Court’s authority, and the United Republic of Tanzania hoped that the international community would not abandon the people of the Sudan, particularly those of Darfur.

MIHNEA IOAN MOTOC (Romania) said that text spoke for itself in showing the way the Council could come together to address serious issues. The adoption of resolution 1593 was a stand against impunity and an expression of confidence in the ICC to handle complex cases, like the one the Council was referring to it today. At the end of the day, the Council had sent a message that there was no way that anyone anywhere could get away without retribution for grave crimes. By deciding to refer Darfur to the ICC, the Council had enhanced its conflict prevention and resolution capabilities. Upholding the ICC by adopting the resolution would be to no avail unless States remained supportive of the Court as it exercised its prerogatives.

ANDREY DENISOV (Russian Federation) said that Council members had reaffirmed that the struggle against impunity was one of the elements of long-term stability in Darfur. All those responsible for grave crimes must be punished, as pointed out in the report of the Commission of Inquiry. The resolution adopted today would promote an effective solution to the fight against impunity.

JOEL ADECHI (Benin) said the vote was a major event in the context of the international community’s attempts to ensure there was no impunity for violations of international humanitarian law in the past decade. Benin had voted in favour of the resolution because it was party to the Rome Statute and also because the worsening of the situation in Darfur meant that the Council must take action to end the suffering of the civilians, ending impunity by providing impartial justice. Benin had also voted in favour out of respect for human dignity and the right to life. The African Union recognized that the international community had a responsibility to protect civilians when they were not protected by their own governments. The resolution must help them to achieve their legitimate dream of an end to their suffering and enable them to look ahead to the future with serenity.

Council President RONALDO MOTA SARDENBERG (Brazil), speaking in his national capacity, said his country was in favour of the resolution, but had been unable to join those who had voted in favour. However, Brazil was ready to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court whenever necessary. The Court provided all the necessary checks and balances to prevent politically motivated prosecutions, and any fears to the contrary were both unwarranted and unhelpful.

However, there were limits to the responsibilities of the Council vis-à-vis international instruments, and Brazil had consistently maintained that position since the negotiations on the Rome Statute. But the Court remained the only suitable institution to deal with the violations in the Sudan. Brazil had been unable to support operative paragraph 6, which recognized exclusive jurisdiction. It would not strengthen the role of the International Criminal Court.

ELFATIH MOHAMED AHMED ERWA (Sudan) said that, once more, the Council had persisted in adopting unwise decisions against his country, which only served to further complicate the situation on the ground. The positions over the ICC were well known. The Darfur question had been exploited in light of those positions. It was a paradox that the language in which the resolution was negotiated was the same language that had buffeted the Council before on another African question. The resolution adopted was full of exemptions. He reminded the Council that the Sudan was also not party to the ICC, making implementation of the resolution fraught with procedural impediments. As long as the Council believed that the scales of justice were based on exceptions and exploitation of crises in developing countries and bargaining among major Powers, it did not settle the question of accountability in Darfur, but exposed the fact that the ICC was intended for developing and weak countries and was a tool to exercise cultural superiority.

The Council, by adopting the resolution, had once again ridden roughshod over the African position, he said. The initiative by Nigeria, as chair of the African Union, had not even been the subject of consideration. Also, the Council had adopted the resolution at a time when the Sudanese judiciary had gone a long way in holding trials, and was capable of ensuring accountability. Some here wanted to activate the ICC and exploit the situation in Darfur. Accountability was a long process that could not be achieved overnight. The Council was continuing to use a policy of double standards, and sending the message that exemptions were only for major Powers. The resolution would only serve to weaken prospects for settlement and further complicate the already complex situation.