The newly-created nation of the Republic of Southern Sudan and the sobering threats to both peace and the hopes for an end to suffering were the focus of a June 16 hearing held by U.S. Rep. Chris Smith (NJ-04), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights. Smith released the following statement:

“Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. We are holding today’s hearing for the purpose of expressing our profound support and solidarity with the newest nation on the African subcontinent and assessing its challenges in transitioning successfully to independence. Recent brutal attacks by the Khartoum government on disputed areas in the North-South border area have raised alarms about renewed violence in this country that already has suffered too much. For decades, the Government of Sudan in Khartoum has waged war against the people of Southern Sudan and facilitated the enslavement of its people. Even as we meet today, the regime of President Omar Al-Bashir is seizing territory, causing the displacement of more than 100,000 people and killing countless other black Sudanese.

“Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been ravaged by civil war intermittently for four decades. The first civil war occurred during the period of 1955-1972, and the second ran from 1983-2005. More than two million people have died in Southern Sudan over the past two decades alone due to war-related causes and famine, and millions have been displaced from their homes.

“Since 1989, the United States has maintained multiple sanctions against the Government of Sudan because of human rights concerns in Southern Sudan, as well as the western region of Darfur, and Sudan’s support for international terrorism. I have had a face-to-face meeting with General Bashir in Khartoum pushing for lasting peace and an end to the abuses of his government. Unfortunately, he was far more interested in discussing the end of U.S. sanctions than he was in discussing how to end the suffering that his government and the rebel groups it sponsors have inflicted on countless, innocent lives.

”Beginning in 1995, human rights organizations have raised the issue of the kidnapping of African southerners by Arab elements from the North in conjunction with the second civil war between North and South. It is now estimated that between 11,000 and 35,000 Sudanese are being held against their will and subjected to vicious exploitation and violent abuse in the North.

“The Khartoum government claims that slavery is the product of inter-tribal warfare, which is not under its control. However, credible sources indicate that the Government of Sudan was involved in
arming and otherwise backing numerous militia groups involved in kidnapping and enslaving these southerners.

“Regardless of who initiated their enslavement, their freedom must be secured as part of the South’s declaration of independence. One Sudanese slave, Simon Deng, escaped and is now living in freedom in the United States. Deng said that every night while he was in captivity, he would go to sleep thinking, “Maybe tomorrow, someone will come to rescue me.” He now goes to sleep thinking of those fellow slaves he left behind, and knowing that they are thinking the same thought, living on the same hope – that tomorrow someone will come to rescue them.

“These people enslaved in the North must not be forgotten in the celebration of the new country. The United States and the rest of the international community must not let their suffering continue.
On January 9th, South Sudan held a peaceful and transparent referendum on southern secession, as called for in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). According to the South Sudan Referendum Commission, 98.8% voted for secession. In early February, Sudanese President Bashir officially accepted the result of the referendum. The United States, the African Union, the European Union, the United Nations and others endorsed the result as well. On July 9, 2011, the Federal Republic of Southern Sudan will officially declare its independence.

“Unfortunately, mutual military buildup, occasional clashes and unresolved issues from the CPA led to a tense atmosphere in the contentious Abyei region. On May 19th, according to a United Nations report, a Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Joint Integrated Unit convoy, accompanied by a U.N. peacekeeping force, was attacked by the SPLA outside Abyei. The northern military unit was being moved to a newly agreed-upon position. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) denied deliberately attacking the northern military unit as retaliation for an earlier SAF attack on an SPLA Joint Integrated Unit, but that May 19th attack took place in an area controlled by the Southern Sudan police force.

“As usual, the Khartoum government has vastly overreacted. Northern military forces invaded Abyei, displacing as many as 100,000 people and began moving in Arabs from the Misseriya ethnic group. This ethnic cleansing of the Abyei area will have a far-reaching impact on the resolution to this dispute. The indiscriminate bombings in Southern Kordofan, attacks in the Nuba Mountains area and reported door-to-door murders of non-Arab Africans is creating a scene as horrific as at any time during the civil wars.

“We are nearly on the eve of independence for Southern Sudan, yet many issues remain unresolved. There is the undefined border, citizenship questions regarding southerners living in the North, governance issues for the post-independence nation, equitable sharing of oil revenues, the question of the liberation and repatriation Sudanese still held in bondage and, of course, the continuing northern military attacks.

“The United States, one of the guarantors of the CPA, has a great deal at stake in the Southern Sudan’s successful transition to independence. Since 2004, the United States has spent $9.8 billion in humanitarian and other assistance. But that monetary investment is outweighed by the moral commitment to see this transition through to a successful conclusion.

“Now we must do all we can to help this new nation come into being in peace and help its government to safeguard the life and liberty of its people.”

I want to begin on a different point by thanking Ambassador Rice for her efforts to rebuild the UN human rights mechanism, which has been badly compromised by a pathological focus on Israel, and tarnished by a failure to focus on some of the world’s worst human rights violators.

But the purpose of this hearing is to examine the challenges faced by international peacekeeping operations, and to explore various options for making such operations more effective, particularly in protecting innocent civilians.

Since 1948, the member states of the United Nations have supported 63 peacekeeping operations on four continents.

Today, the UN fields more than 90,000 uniformed peacekeepers and thousands of civilian personnel in 15 peacekeeping missions, from Congo to Haiti to Lebanon.

We support UN peacekeeping efforts because it is in our national interest to see that states do not fail, that voids are not opened for terrorists to fill, and that economies and lives do not crumble under the weight of war.

And for those reasons, it’s very important that we pay our UN peacekeeping dues in full, as we propose in the State Department authorization bill passed by this committee and the House last month.

Around the world, many UN peacekeeping operations have yielded positive results on the ground.

In the Balkans and East Timor, in Kashmir and Liberia, in Cyprus and the Golan Heights, UN blue helmets have worked to create the political space for peace, prevent mass atrocities, and avoid the collapse of states.

As we consider the future of peacekeeping, it’s important to recognize that such operations have become increasingly complex.

More than ever before, they are designed to address the root causes of conflict, and to build sustainable peace.

This is reflected in the sheer scale of current operations, which have an average of nine times as many troops, observers and police, and 13 times as many civilians, as the average operation did 10 years ago.

But these expanded peacekeeping mandates have put a severe strain on the system.

The demand for resources often exceeds the supply provided by the international community, and as a result, peacekeeping missions frequently lack the troops, helicopters and other equipment they need.

At a time when peacekeepers are increasingly deployed in complex and unstable situations, and sometimes become the targets of combatants, that can be a recipe for disaster.

The United States has taken some important steps to address the lack of capacity and resources.

For example, the U.S. military has assisted in the strategic movement of troops, equipment, and supplies to support UN peacekeeping missions.

In Darfur, we have funded over 25 percent of the cost of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping operation and constructed and maintained 34 Darfur base camps for over 7,000 AU peacekeepers.

And through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, we will provide training and material assistance to 75,000 troops from a number of African countries, many of whom will be deployed with UN peacekeeping missions.

What else can the U.S. and other nations do to increase the capacity of the United Nations and regional organizations to respond to emerging crisis?

Are expanded peacekeeping mandates the right approach to dealing with the types of conflicts we face today? Or are we asking our peacekeepers to do too much?

And what steps can we take to help ensure that UN peacekeeping operations have adequate personnel and resources to carry out their missions?

One of the key tests of the international peacekeeping system is its ability to protect civilians, consistent with the emerging international norm known as “the responsibility to protect.”

This concept, endorsed by the UN Security Council in 2006, holds that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Should they fail to do so, the international community has a responsibility to step in and protect threatened populations – with the use of force if absolutely necessary.

But strong words have not always been matched by strong actions.

Since 1999, when a UN peacekeeping operation was established in the Eastern Congo, over 5 million people have died as a consequence of war, and an additional 45,000 perish every month.

And in conflict zones from Congo to Bosnia to Darfur, peacekeepers have been unable to prevent the use of rape as a weapon of war, and even genocide.

How can we equip the United Nations to more effectively protect civilians and prevent mass atrocities?

What can the United States do at the Security Council to discourage or overcome political foot-dragging – as we saw in Kosovo and Rwanda – that prevents rapid deployments at times of humanitarian crisis?

What is our strategy for making sure that women form a critical mass of peacekeepers and peacemakers, both to reduce sexual violence in conflict and to ensure that post-conflict reconstruction prioritizes the wellbeing of women and girls?

And finally, the key question: Is the international peacekeeping system, as it is conceived today, capable of preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing and other mass atrocities?

Or do we need to develop an entirely new model for our increasingly complex world?

We thank Ambassador Rice and our other panelists for being here today to share their insights on this important set of issues, and we do look forward to your testimony.

Shays Works for Ending Violence in Darfur

Washington, D.C. – Congressman Christopher Shays (R-CT) this week took steps to help improve the security situation in Darfur, voting for three separate pieces of legislation to address the situation in the Sudan.

As Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Shays visited Darfur in August with Save the Children to observe the humanitarian situation and the role and resources of USAID-funded NGOs and UN agencies in addressing the needs.

Shays voted for:

–H.R. 3127, the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, which authorizes the President to provide assistance to reinforce the deployment and operations of an expanded African Union peacekeeping force (AMIS) and directs the President to instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to advocate NATO reinforcement of AMIS, upon request of the African Union. Shays is a cosponsor of this bill and voted for it the first time it came through the House for a vote in April. It passed the House of Representatives again yesterday by voice vote;

–H. Res. 723, calling on the President to take immediate steps to help improve the security situation in Darfur, with a specific emphasis on civilian protection, which passed the House by a vote of 412 to 7; and

–H. Res. 992, urging the President to appoint a Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan, which passed the House by a vote of 414 to 3.

Contact: Sarah Moore, 202/225-5541

-30-

12 June 2006

Sudan is one of the highest foreign policy priorities for President Bush and his administration. We are seeing progress in Southern Sudan through the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the first steps toward a resolution to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur with the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA). The CPA and DPA are being worked in parallel so that peace and democracy come to all Sudanese, the genocide in Darfur is ended, the guilty are punished, and refugees and displaced people can return home. Challenges remain, but the United States remains focused on full implementation of the CPA and DPA.

<b>U.S. Support to the DPA</b>

The U.S. worked with the African Union (AU) to successfully broker an agreement between Sudan’s Government of National Unity (GNU) and the largest rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minawi, who signed the DPA on May 5, 2006.

The DPA establishes critical security, wealth-sharing, and power-sharing arrangements that address the long-standing marginalization of Darfur.

The DPA is an important step on the long road toward
reconciliation and healing.

The unchecked Chad-Sudan cross-border incursions threaten the progress made toward peace. The increasing insecurity in Eastern Chad is due to both the unstable political situation in that country and the spillover of conflict from Darfur.

<b>U.S. Support to the CPA</b>

The U.S. helped broker the historic CPA on January 9, 2005, ending 21 years of civil war.

The CPA provides the framework for addressing the
grievances of those living in the South and in the other marginalized areas of Eastern Sudan and Darfur.

Sudan has witnessed the founding of the GNU; the naming of Salva Kiir, a Southerner, as First Vice President; establishment of the Government of Southern Sudan; the appointment of Southerners as GNU cabinet ministers; founding of many CPA-mandated commissions; and the return of more than half a million displaced people to the South.

<b>U.S. Action Through the UN</b>

The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted unanimously
Resolution 1679, which the U.S. sponsored, endorsing the AU decision to transition the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a larger, more robust UN peacekeeping operation built around a core of African troops.

AMIS has played a vital role in curbing large-scale, organized violence in Darfur, but a UN force is required to implement the extensive monitoring and implementation duties spelled out in the DPA.

The U.S. drafted Resolution 1672 which imposes a travel ban and assets freeze on four Sudanese responsible for committing crimes on the people of Darfur; it is a down payment toward justice and accountability in Darfur.

<b>U.S. Support to Peacekeeping</b>

The U.S. continues to work with key donors, NATO Allies,and African partners to strengthen AMIS during the transition period to a UN force.

The U.S. supports 34 AMIS camps, maintenance of its
vehicles and communications equipment, pre-deployment
training of Rwandan and Senegalese troops, and airlifts of Rwandan troops.

The U.S. has contributed $220 million for AMIS since 2004 and has requested additional funding in the FY 2006 supplemental.

<b>U.S. Support to Humanitarian Assistance</b>

The U.S. is the largest single international donor to Sudan, providing more than 85% of the food the UN World Food Program (WFP) distributed to Sudan in the first four months
of 2006.

After a funding crisis prompted WFP to halve food rations to Darfur, President Bush directed 47,600 metric tons of food worth $48 million to be shipped to Sudan to help restore full rations later this summer.

Since 2005, the U.S. has provided more than $300 million in non-food assistance to Darfur and $1.3 billion in assistance countrywide.

The following summary is provided by the Congressional Research Service, which is a government entity that serves Congress and is run by the Library of Congress.

7/21/2005–Introduced.
Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2005 – Sets forth the sense of Congress with respect to the situation in Darfur, Sudan, including the sense of Congress that the atrocities unfolding in Darfur are genocide.
Amends the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 to direct the President, with waiver authority including congressional notification, to block the assets and deny visas and entry to any individual (and family member) responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity in Sudan.
Authorizes the President to provide assistance to reinforce the deployment and operations of an expanded African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Directs the President to instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to advocate NATO reinforcement of AMIS, upon request of the African Union.
Directs the President to deny the government of Sudan access to oil revenues, including by prohibiting U.S. entry to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in the oil sector of Sudan or involved in the shipment of goods for use by the armed forces of Sudan in order to ensure that the government of Sudan does not utilize any oil revenues to acquire offensive military equipment or to finance offensive military activities. (Exempts from such restriction ships or tankers involved in an internationally-recognized demobilization program or the shipment of non-lethal assistance necessary to carry the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan.)
Prohibits, with waiver authority, U.S. assistance to a country in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591(embargo on military assistance to Sudan). Directs the President to instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations to urge the adoption of a Security Council resolution supporting AMIS’ expansion.

At [UN] Headquarters there was not sufficient focus or institutional resources for early warning and risk analysis.†– Independent Inquiry into the action of the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.[1]

Introduction

The UN is currently not organized in such that the substantial and substantive information gathered through the various mechanisms of the UN human rights machinery in Geneva is brought together in a focused way, so as to better understand complex situations and thus be in a better position to take appropriate action. In short, there is a significant gap between the calls for effective conflict prevention and the institutional capacity of the UN as a whole. [2] One reminder of this disconnect is the genocide of some 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, which was surely preventable as it had been foreseen in the August 1993 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.[3]

April 2005 marked the 90th anniversary of the beginning of the atrocities committed towards Armenians and Assyrians in Ottoman Turkey (1915), the 60th anniversary of the end of the World War II and the liberation of the Jews, Roma and other survivors from Nazi concentration camps (1945), and the 30th anniversary of the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (1975).

With several relevant UN reform proposals currently under discussion (including a Mediation Support Unit, a Peacebuilding Commission and a revamping of the human rights machinery), one recent institutional development to strengthen the UN capacity to systematically prevent future genocides was the creation in 2004 of the position of a UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (hereinafter referred to as the †کSASGPG’). How can the SASGPG become an effective tool, within the UN, to prevent future genocides?

UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (SASGPG)

The post of a SASGPG was suggested by the UN Secretary-General in early 2004, as part of a larger Action Plan on the Prevention of Genocide.[4] On July 12, 2004, the UN Secretary-General named Juan E. Mendez, a human rights advocate, lawyer and former political prisoner from Argentina , as his first SASGPG, and provided the mandate.[5] The SASGPG is located in New York, holds a 40 per cent position and is assisted by a staff member from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and a staff member from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Mandate and approach

The SASGPG’s mandate to address prevention in relation to †کgenocide or related crimes’ indicates that the SASGPG may become involved in situations when the prospects for genocide are quite distant, including addressing situations that run the risk of resulting in ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights. Mendez has stated that he should “not be extremely tied to an overly technical definition of genocideâ€, and that, “since the task is one of prevention, you have to act even before all of the elements of the definition fall into place.â€[6] Indeed, the mandate explicitly states that the Special Advisor is not intended to make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention[7] has occurred or not. The function of the SASGPG is not to prosecute, judge or punish, but rather to focus on concrete conditions and issues where practical assistance and support can be provided.

The SASGPG will need to develop a sensitive but determined and operational approach. The mandate stipulates that “[t]he methodology employed would entail a careful verification of facts and serious political analyses and consultations, without excessive publicity,†and the purpose of activities to be “practical and intended to enable the United Nations to act in a timely fashion.†The verification of facts within the mandate opens the door for fact-finding missions, while consultations could take the form of facilitating in-country roundtables. By avoiding excessive publicity, the SASGPG could function as a †کfriendly advisor’ to warring parties alike, and thereby build confidence among all stakeholders, including governments. Not only must the SASGPG be independent, impartial, consistent and a person of integrity, he or she must also be viewed as being such. In addition to building confidence among the primary stakeholders, it will be crucial to build confidence among institutional partners within the UN system in order to mobilize resources beyond the SASGPG’s evidently under-staffed office. Indeed, there are several examples from the past where mechanisms and †کspecial offices’ have been isolated within the UN system. By employing and communicating a fundamentally assistance-oriented approach of what the SASGPG will do, and what he or she will not do, and by complementing the activities of other institutional actors within the UN, such clarity could be one way to build important intra-UN confidence.

Another consideration is whether the SASGPG should take on operational responsibilities, such as actively seeking to facilitate mediation between actors in a particular situation. This could be useful if the SASGPG would hold comparative advantage to do so. However, as the SASGPG is unlikely to constitute the main interlocutor of the international community, the SASGPG should rather seek to offer complementary services and activities. This could include arranging in-country or regional workshops aimed at fostering inter-communal tolerance where expressions of hate speech have been directed at certain populations at risk. The SASGPG can also (with authority) share the experiences of the significant human and economic costs when inter-communal tensions elsewhere have turned into organized violence. The SASGPG could seek to strengthen the core of moderates on all sides and support them (and encourage them to also involve others) to address contentious issues through inclusive political processes, as opposed to violent means. As the SASGPG is to work without excessive publicity, this approach will also serve the function of enabling political space for disputing parties, including governments, to adjust policies and positions without being seen as doing so (i.e. not losing face within respective constituencies). Once identified with such an approach, this could encourage States who for (arguably) uninformed reasons may be initially hesitant to extend a standing invitation to the SASGPG.

Resources

Considering the clearly insufficient 40 per cent position of the SASGPG supported by just two staff members, it is hard to imagine a larger discrepancy between resources allocated and the importance of the issues at stake. While secondments from governments can be sensitive, and the first SASGPG appears to prefer †کstarting small,’ although it could well be considered to enlarge the capacity of the office through contributions from experts nominated by governments or independently recruited professional staff.

In light of the current meager resources of the SASGPG office, the indirect support of Non-Governmental Organizations becomes all the more important. Collaboration between NGOs could provide independent assessments within their field of expertise to the SASGPG’s office (which the SASGPG obviously would decide whether to act upon or not). It would, for example, appear warranted if well-reputed organizations such as Minority Rights Group International, with its 40 years of expertise on inter-communal issues and minority protection around the world, were to establish links and synthesize and analyze information from sources (mentioned below) and cooperate with the SASGPG in an informal, yet supportive capacity.

Information, Analysis and Actions

The office of the SASGPG can act as a focal point for early warning information coming from any source inside or outside the United Nations system. The use of indicators is a necessary, but not sufficient, basis for evaluating situations at risk. Indicators would need to be complemented with contextual analysis of State capacity, governance, media and current and future events. The information management would need to develop a methodology drawing on past experiences (incl. from The Early Warning and Preventive Measures project initiated by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in 1998) and include indicator-based systems such as from the SIPRI Armed Conflict Database, non-indicator based analysis from the International Crisis Group, and research-based sources of information such as the Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland, and the Human Security Index at the University of British Columbia.[8] This being said, extensive UN information could well provide the bedrock of information. Indeed it is likely that the SASGPG will be simply overwhelmed. An effective system of information management and communication strategy is thus essential. It will be important to strike an appropriate balance between quantity of information and its quality in accuracy and reliability.

On Sept. 30, 2004 the SASGPG stated that, “the vulnerability of certain ethnic groups” and “the instability of the situation generally” are such that “we have not turned the corner on preventing genocide from happening in the future or even in the near future in Darfur.”

In stressing that the primary responsibility rests on national governments, the SASGPG should base his or her analysis and recommendations on a normative framework, conveying (and explaining) existing international standards. The function of a †کnormative intermediary’ translating standards into concrete policy options could draw upon the proven function of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities. [9] In this regard, the SASGPG may offer his or her own interpretation of such standards, including specific cases or through general recommendations, and thus contribute to a body of †کsoft jurisprudence.’

It requires strategic planning to determine whether, when and how the SASGPG will inform the Secretary-General, including the appropriateness of f bringing a situation to the attention of the Security Council, and there are similar questions with regard to other possibly †کindependent’ tools of action at the SASGPG’s disposal (including fact-finding missions for verifications and consultations). Should the SASGPG commence with the most urgent cases? In order to build trust in the mandate and approach, it could be useful to focus on multiple situations simultaneously, and seek to establish some early †کsuccess,’ however small. This might mean the most urgent situation, but it could also mean engaging in a dialogue with member States and populations where tensions are far less acute. In order to develop the †کroutine’ of in-country visits, it could be helpful if a few †کfriendly governments’ extend invitations to the SASGPG, who could for example hold in-country consultations on, for example, issues such as education, culture and language.

Actions to Date

The first SASGPG has not been serving in this position for enough time to merit a deep analysis. By April 2005, the SASGPG reported he had issued five notes to the UN Security Council on Darfur, one note on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and one note on Cote d’Ivoire.[10] The notes have addressed a variety of issues, for example the letter regarding DRC focused on the need to establish protection zones for civilians especially in the east of the DRC and near the borders with Burundi and Rwanda. However, so far it is uncertain what, if any, effect these notes have had on the actual situations.

Conclusion

While 2004 saw international events and gatherings commemorating the 10 years since the genocide in Rwanda, the international community remains unable to effectively address the tragedy in Darfur, which is merely the latest situation labeled by the UN as ethnic cleansing, and by some quarters, genocide.

The establishment of a SASGPG should be welcomed as a new actor in the range of instruments which could assist in developing effective genocide prevention capacity within the UN. Both governments and non-governmental actors should support this new mechanism; the former by offering resources and inviting the SASGPG for in-country visits, and the latter by providing systematic independent analysis on situations that merit the attention and engagement of the SASGPG.

Erik Friberg, a Swedish national, is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia . He can be reached at erik.friberg@csis.or.id

Further readings:

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report with Executive Summary, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997,

Malone, D., and Fen Hampson (eds.), From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. Lynne Rienner, 2002.

Packer, J. and E. Friberg, Genocide and Minorities: Preventing the Preventable, Minority Rights Group International Briefing, London, 2004,

Stanton, G. H., The International Campaign to End Genocide: A Review of Its First Five Years, 2004, see http://www.genocidewatch.org/iceghistory.htm

Schabas, W., The Genocide Convention at Fifty, USIP Special Report 41, Washington , 1999,

The Report of the independent inquiry into the action of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999.

[2] For a good account of the early warning and preventive action in the wider context of institutional transformation of the United Nations (prior to the 2004 High-Level Panel Report), see J. Cockell, “Early warning analysis and policy planning in UN preventive actionâ€, in D. Carment and A. Schnabel (eds.) Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace of Grand Illusion?, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003. See also C. L. Sriram and K. Wermester, From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, International Peace Academy, New York, 2003,

[3] Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1.

[4] UN Secretary-General Speech at the Stockholm International Forum January 2004, and speech at the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva April 2004. Other suggested parts of the Action Plan, including a treaty-monitoring Committee to the 1948 Genocide Convention, remain to be implemented.

[5] Outline of the mandate for the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, UN Doc. No. S/2004/567.

[6] Albion Monitor, †کUN Genocide Advisor Says Darfur Getting Worse’, 9 March 2005, .

[7] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.

[8] For a useful gathering and analysis of potential databases in this regard, see Rodik, Petra, Drazen Penzar and Armano Srbljinovoc “An Overview of Databases of Conflicts and Political Crisesâ€, in Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, Volume 1, Issue 1-2, 2003, pp. 9-21.

[9] See S. Ratner, “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 591-698. See also: J. Packer, “Making International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 715-724; and W. Kemp (ed.) Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Kluwer Law, The Hague , 2001.

[10] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Press Release 1 March 2005,

H. R. 1424

To impose sanctions against perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur, Sudan, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 17, 2005

Mr. PAYNE (for himself, Mr. TANCREDO, Mr. MEEKS of New York, Ms. LEE, Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. PITTS, Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi, and Mr. RUSH) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL
To impose sanctions against perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur, Sudan, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Darfur Genocide Accountability Act of 2005′.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.

(2) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN- The term `Government of Sudan’ means the National Congress Party-led government in Khartoum, Sudan, or the successor Government of National Unity to be formed pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Nairobi, Kenya on January 9, 2005. Measures against the Government of Sudan, as defined in this paragraph, shall not apply to the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) or to areas formerly under the control of opposition groups.

(3) MEMBER STATES- The term `member states’ means the member states of the United Nations.

(4) SUDAN NORTH-SOUTH PEACE AGREEMENT- The term `Sudan North-South Peace Agreement’ means the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army on January 9, 2005.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives and the Senate declared that the atrocities occurring in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide.

(2) On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, `[w]hen we reviewed the evidence compiled by our team, along with other information available to the State Department, we concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the [Janjaweed] bear responsibility–and genocide may still be occurring’.

(3) On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1556, calling upon the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and carried out other atrocities in the Darfur region.

(4) On September 18, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1564, determining that the Government of Sudan had failed to meet its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1556, calling for a military flight ban in and over the Darfur region, demanding the names of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and arrested for verification, establishing an International Commission of Inquiry into violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws, and threatening sanctions should the Government of Sudan fail to fully comply with Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564, such as actions to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector.

(5) In late January 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur submitted a 176-page report to Secretary General Kofi Annan detailing the atrocities committed by the Government of Sudan and its Janjaweed militia allies.

(6) The Commission declared that `based on thorough analysis of the information gathered in the course of the investigations, the Commission established that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law.’.

(7) The Commission further stated that Sudanese Government officials and other individuals may have committed genocidal acts, and submitted a sealed document with 51 suspects for prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that–

(1) the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide;

(2) the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army must be fully and unconditionally implemented and a new coalition government established under such Agreement;

(3) the African Union must amend the mandate of the African Union Mission in the Sudan to focus directly on protecting civilians from attacks and to neutralize the Janjaweed militia and other militia groups engaged in attacks against civilians;

(4) the United Nations or NATO should deploy at least 10,000 troops to the Darfur region to augment the African Union Mission in the Sudan;

(5) the United States strongly condemns attacks on humanitarian workers and calls on all forces in Darfur, including forces of the Government of Sudan, all militia, and forces of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, to refrain from such attacks;

(6) the President should appoint a Presidential Special Envoy to Sudan–

(A) to seek comprehensive peace throughout Sudan;

(B) to support the implementation of the Sudan North-South Peace Agreement;

(C) to find ways to bring stability and peace to Darfur;

(D) to address instability throughout Sudan; and

(E) to address the related crisis in Northern Uganda;

(7) the United States should support accountability through action by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the prompt prosecution and adjudication in a competent international court of justice or the United States-proposed Sudan Tribunal of individuals responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide; and

(8) the President of the United States shall instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to demand–

(A) the extension of the military embargo to the Government of Sudan, as called for in paragraphs 7 through 9 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556;

(B) the freezing of property and assets of government and military officials and their family members; Janjaweed leaders; and individuals engaged in planning, directing, and implementing of the atrocities in Darfur;

(C) that member states significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain;

(D) steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of Sudan, military officials of that Government, militia leaders, and other individuals involved in the planning, directing, and enforcing measures against civilians; and

(E) steps to discourage international and regional organizations from convening any conference in Sudan.

SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) Blocking of Assets- Beginning on the date that is 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act or 30 days after the formation of the National Unity Government of Sudan, the President shall, consistent with the authorities granted in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block the property and assets of officials of the Government of Sudan and their family members; military officials and their family members; individuals implicated in the atrocities in Darfur as well as businesses partially or fully controlled by the above aforementioned individuals; and property and assets controlled by the National Congress Party.

(b) Visa Restriction- Notwithstanding section 428(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236(b)), the Secretary of State shall prohibit the granting of a visa to–

(1) officials of the Government of Sudan implicated in the atrocities in Darfur;

(2) officials of the military of Sudan implicated in the atrocities in Darfur;

(3) militia members or other individuals implicated in the atrocities in Darfur; and

(4) family members of an individual described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3).

(c) Travel Restrictions- The Secretary of State shall take measures to significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff at the Sudanese diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C., and restrict or control the movement within the United States of all such staff who remain.

(d) Restriction on International Conferences- The Secretary of State shall instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to oppose any conference organized by United Nations member agencies or other international and regional organizations from being held in Sudan.

(e) Reporting Requirement- Not later than 30 days after a decision to freeze the property or assets of, or deny a visa or entry to, any person under this section, the President shall report the name of such person to the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION TO USE FORCE TO STOP GENOCIDE IN DARFUR, SUDAN.

(a) Authorization to Use Force- The President is authorized to use all necessary means, including use of the United States armed forces, to stop genocide in Darfur, Sudan, consistent with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564, and in response to the Comprehensive Sudan Peace Act of 2004.

(b) Authorization to Neutralize Perpetrators of the Violence- The President is authorized and strongly encouraged to consider utilizing unmanned armed planes and other military assets to neutralize–

(1) Janjaweed or other militia groups intent in targeting civilians;

(2) helicopters or fixed aircraft used to attack civilians or to provide cover and assistance to militia groups; and

(3) intelligence or military headquarters used to plan and direct attacks against civilians.

(c) No-Fly Zones- The President is authorized to use force to enforce a no-fly zone over the Darfur region by utilizing American military assets, including–

(1) those currently stationed in the Horn of Africa region and/or use of NATO forces;

(2) options that employ technological capabilities to intercept and jam communications between the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed; and

(3) cost-effective equipment such as aerostats, airships, or unmanned aerial vehicles to achieve situational awareness.

(d) Port Entry Denial- The President is authorized to deny port entry to the United States to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in business or trade activities in the oil sector of Sudan and/or involved in the shipment of goods for use by the Sudan Armed Forces.

SEC. 7. PROHIBITION ON TRADING IN UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.

(a) Prohibition- The President shall exercise the authorities he has under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (without regard to the requirements set forth in section 202 of that Act) to prohibit any entity engaged in any commercial activity in Sudan–

(1) from raising capital in the United States; or

(2) from trading its securities (or depository receipts with respect to its securities) in any capital market in the United States.

(b) Penalties- The penalties under section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act shall apply to violations under subsection (a) to the same extent as such penalties apply to violations under that Act.

(c) Waiver- The President may waive the application of sanctions in section 5 and this section if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

(d) Notification of Waivers of Sanctions- Not later than 30 days before waiving the provisions of any sanctions currently in force with regard to Sudan, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing the waiver and the reasons therefor.

SEC. 8. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

(a) Disclosure of Business Activities in Sudan-

(1) ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS- The Secretary of the Treasury shall, not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than the end of each 1-year period thereafter, submit to the Congress a report that includes-

(A) the identity of all entities that are engaged in commercial activity in Sudan;

(B) the nature and extent of that commercial activity in Sudan, including any plans for expansion or diversification;

(C) the identity of all agencies of the Sudanese Government with which any such entity is doing business; and

(D) the relationship of the commercial activity to any violations of religious freedom and other human rights in Sudan.

(2) DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC- The Secretary of the Treasury shall publish or otherwise make available to the public each report submitted under subsection (a).

(b) Conforming Amendment- Section 8(b)(1) of the Sudan Peace Act (50 U.S.C.1701 note) is amended to read as follows:

`(1) The best estimates of the extent of aerial bombardment of, as well as the extent of militia activity against, civilian centers in Sudan, by the Government of Sudan, including targets, frequency, and best estimates of damage.’.

Genocide prevention and the UN:

The potential of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General

By: Erik Friberg

“At [UN] Headquarters there was not sufficient focus or institutional resources for early warning and risk analysis.†– Independent Inquiry into the action of the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.[1]

Introduction

The UN is currently not organized in such that the substantial and substantive information gathered through the various mechanisms of the UN human rights machinery in Geneva is brought together in a focused way, so as to better understand complex situations and thus be in a better position to take appropriate action. In short, there is a significant gap between the calls for effective conflict prevention and the institutional capacity of the UN as a whole.[2] One reminder of this disconnect is the genocide of some 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, which was surely preventable as it had been foreseen in the August 1993 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.[3]

April 2005 marked the 90th anniversary of the beginning of the atrocities committed towards Armenians and Assyrians in Ottoman Turkey (1915), the 60th anniversary of the end of the World War II and the liberation of the Jews, Roma and other survivors from Nazi concentration camps (1945), and the 30th anniversary of the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (1975).

With several relevant UN reform proposals currently under discussion (including a Mediation Support Unit, a Peacebuilding Commission and a revamping of the human rights machinery), one recent institutional development to strengthen the UN capacity to systematically prevent future genocides was the creation in 2004 of the position of a UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (hereinafter referred to as the †?SASGPG’). How can the SASGPG become an effective tool, within the UN, to prevent future genocides?

UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (SASGPG)

The post of a SASGPG was suggested by the UN Secretary-General in early 2004, as part of a larger Action Plan on the Prevention of Genocide.[4] On July 12, 2004, the UN Secretary-General named Juan E. Mendez, a human rights advocate, lawyer and former political prisoner from Argentina , as his first SASGPG, and provided the mandate.[5] The SASGPG is located in New York, holds a 40 per cent position and is assisted by a staff member from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and a staff member from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Mandate and approach

The SASGPG’s mandate to address prevention in relation to †?genocide or related crimes’ indicates that the SASGPG may become involved in situations when the prospects for genocide are quite distant, including addressing situations that run the risk of resulting in ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights. Mendez has stated that he should “not be extremely tied to an overly technical definition of genocideâ€, and that, “since the task is one of prevention, you have to act even before all of the elements of the definition fall into place.â€[6] Indeed, the mandate explicitly states that the Special Advisor is not intended to make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention[7] has occurred or not. The function of the SASGPG is not to prosecute, judge or punish, but rather to focus on concrete conditions and issues where practical assistance and support can be provided.

The SASGPG will need to develop a sensitive but determined and operational approach. The mandate stipulates that “[t]he methodology employed would entail a careful verification of facts and serious political analyses and consultations, without excessive publicity,†and the purpose of activities to be “practical and intended to enable the United Nations to act in a timely fashion.†The verification of facts within the mandate opens the door for fact-finding missions, while consultations could take the form of facilitating in-country roundtables. By avoiding excessive publicity, the SASGPG could function as a †?friendly advisor’ to warring parties alike, and thereby build confidence among all stakeholders, including governments. Not only must the SASGPG be independent, impartial, consistent and a person of integrity, he or she must also be viewed as being such. In addition to building confidence among the primary stakeholders, it will be crucial to build confidence among institutional partners within the UN system in order to mobilize resources beyond the SASGPG’s evidently under-staffed office. Indeed, there are several examples from the past where mechanisms and †?special offices’ have been isolated within the UN system. By employing and communicating a fundamentally assistance-oriented approach of what the SASGPG will do, and what he or she will not do, and by complementing the activities of other institutional actors within the UN, such clarity could be one way to build important intra-UN confidence.

Another consideration is whether the SASGPG should take on operational responsibilities, such as actively seeking to facilitate mediation between actors in a particular situation. This could be useful if the SASGPG would hold comparative advantage to do so. However, as the SASGPG is unlikely to constitute the main interlocutor of the international community, the SASGPG should rather seek to offer complementary services and activities. This could include arranging in-country or regional workshops aimed at fostering inter-communal tolerance where expressions of hate speech have been directed at certain populations at risk. The SASGPG can also (with authority) share the experiences of the significant human and economic costs when inter-communal tensions elsewhere have turned into organized violence. The SASGPG could seek to strengthen the core of moderates on all sides and support them (and encourage them to also involve others) to address contentious issues through inclusive political processes, as opposed to violent means. As the SASGPG is to work without excessive publicity, this approach will also serve the function of enabling political space for disputing parties, including governments, to adjust policies and positions without being seen as doing so (i.e. not losing face within respective constituencies). Once identified with such an approach, this could encourage States who for (arguably) uninformed reasons may be initially hesitant to extend a standing invitation to the SASGPG.

Resources

Considering the clearly insufficient 40 per cent position of the SASGPG supported by just two staff members, it is hard to imagine a larger discrepancy between resources allocated and the importance of the issues at stake. While secondments from governments can be sensitive, and the first SASGPG appears to prefer †?starting small,’ although it could well be considered to enlarge the capacity of the office through contributions from experts nominated by governments or independently recruited professional staff.

In light of the current meager resources of the SASGPG office, the indirect support of Non-Governmental Organizations becomes all the more important. Collaboration between NGOs could provide independent assessments within their field of expertise to the SASGPG’s office (which the SASGPG obviously would decide whether to act upon or not). It would, for example, appear warranted if well-reputed organizations such as Minority Rights Group International, with its 40 years of expertise on inter-communal issues and minority protection around the world, were to establish links and synthesize and analyze information from sources (mentioned below) and cooperate with the SASGPG in an informal, yet supportive capacity.

Information, Analysis and Actions

The office of the SASGPG can act as a focal point for early warning information coming from any source inside or outside the United Nations system. The use of indicators is a necessary, but not sufficient, basis for evaluating situations at risk. Indicators would need to be complemented with contextual analysis of State capacity, governance, media and current and future events. The information management would need to develop a methodology drawing on past experiences (incl. from The Early Warning and Preventive Measures project initiated by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in 1998) and include indicator-based systems such as from the SIPRI Armed Conflict Database, non-indicator based analysis from the International Crisis Group, and research-based sources of information such as the Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland, and the Human Security Index at the University of British Columbia.[8] This being said, extensive UN information could well provide the bedrock of information. Indeed it is likely that the SASGPG will be simply overwhelmed. An effective system of information management and communication strategy is thus essential. It will be important to strike an appropriate balance between quantity of information and its quality in accuracy and reliability.

On Sept. 30, 2004 the SASGPG stated that, “the vulnerability of certain ethnic groups” and “the instability of the situation generally” are such that “we have not turned the corner on preventing genocide from happening in the future or even in the near future in Darfur.”

In stressing that the primary responsibility rests on national governments, the SASGPG should base his or her analysis and recommendations on a normative framework, conveying (and explaining) existing international standards. The function of a †?normative intermediary’ translating standards into concrete policy options could draw upon the proven function of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities. [9] In this regard, the SASGPG may offer his or her own interpretation of such standards, including specific cases or through general recommendations, and thus contribute to a body of †?soft jurisprudence.’

It requires strategic planning to determine whether, when and how the SASGPG will inform the Secretary-General, including the appropriateness of f bringing a situation to the attention of the Security Council, and there are similar questions with regard to other possibly †?independent’ tools of action at the SASGPG’s disposal (including fact-finding missions for verifications and consultations). Should the SASGPG commence with the most urgent cases? In order to build trust in the mandate and approach, it could be useful to focus on multiple situations simultaneously, and seek to establish some early †?success,’ however small. This might mean the most urgent situation, but it could also mean engaging in a dialogue with member States and populations where tensions are far less acute. In order to develop the †?routine’ of in-country visits, it could be helpful if a few †?friendly governments’ extend invitations to the SASGPG, who could for example hold in-country consultations on, for example, issues such as education, culture and language.

Actions to Date

The first SASGPG has not been serving in this position for enough time to merit a deep analysis. By April 2005, the SASGPG reported he had issued five notes to the UN Security Council on Darfur, one note on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and one note on Cote d’Ivoire.[10] The notes have addressed a variety of issues, for example the letter regarding DRC focused on the need to establish protection zones for civilians especially in the east of the DRC and near the borders with Burundi and Rwanda. However, so far it is uncertain what, if any, effect these notes have had on the actual situations.

Conclusion

While 2004 saw international events and gatherings commemorating the 10 years since the genocide in Rwanda, the international community remains unable to effectively address the tragedy in Darfur, which is merely the latest situation labeled by the UN as ethnic cleansing, and by some quarters, genocide.

The establishment of a SASGPG should be welcomed as a new actor in the range of instruments which could assist in developing effective genocide prevention capacity within the UN. Both governments and non-governmental actors should support this new mechanism; the former by offering resources and inviting the SASGPG for in-country visits, and the latter by providing systematic independent analysis on situations that merit the attention and engagement of the SASGPG.

Erik Friberg, a Swedish national, is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia . He can be reached at erik.friberg@csis.or.id

Further readings:

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report with Executive Summary, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997,

Malone, D., and Fen Hampson (eds.), From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. Lynne Rienner, 2002.

Packer, J. and E. Friberg, Genocide and Minorities: Preventing the Preventable, Minority Rights Group International Briefing, London, 2004,

Stanton, G. H., The International Campaign to End Genocide: A Review of Its First Five Years, 2004, see http://www.genocidewatch.org/iceghistory.htm

Schabas, W., The Genocide Convention at Fifty, USIP Special Report 41, Washington , 1999,

The Report of the independent inquiry into the action of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999.

[2] For a good account of the early warning and preventive action in the wider context of institutional transformation of the United Nations (prior to the 2004 High-Level Panel Report), see J. Cockell, “Early warning analysis and policy planning in UN preventive actionâ€, in D. Carment and A. Schnabel (eds.) Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace of Grand Illusion?, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003. See also C. L. Sriram and K. Wermester, From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, International Peace Academy, New York, 2003,

[3] Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1.

[4] UN Secretary-General Speech at the Stockholm International Forum January 2004, and speech at the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva April 2004. Other suggested parts of the Action Plan, including a treaty-monitoring Committee to the 1948 Genocide Convention, remain to be implemented.

[5] Outline of the mandate for the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, UN Doc. No. S/2004/567.

[6] Albion Monitor, †?UN Genocide Advisor Says Darfur Getting Worse’, 9 March 2005, .

[7] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.

[8] For a useful gathering and analysis of potential databases in this regard, see Rodik, Petra, Drazen Penzar and Armano Srbljinovoc “An Overview of Databases of Conflicts and Political Crisesâ€, in Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, Volume 1, Issue 1-2, 2003, pp. 9-21.

[9] See S. Ratner, “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 591-698. See also: J. Packer, “Making International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 715-724; and W. Kemp (ed.) Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Kluwer Law, The Hague , 2001.

[10] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Press Release 1 March 2005,

SECURITY COUNCIL REFERS SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN, TO PROSECUTOR OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Resolution 1593 (2005) Adopted by Vote of 11 in Favour
To None Against, with 4 Abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States)

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council decided this evening to refer the situation prevailing in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

Adopting resolution 1593 (2005) by a vote of 11 in favour, none against with 4 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States), the Council decided also that the Government of the Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur would cooperate fully with the Court and Prosecutor, providing them with any necessary assistance.

The Council decided further that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside the Sudan which was not a party to the Rome Statute would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Sudan authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction had been expressly waived by that contributing State.

Inviting the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that would facilitate the Court’s work, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, the Council encouraged the Court, in accordance with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat impunity in Darfur. It also emphasized the need to promote healing and reconciliation, as well as the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace.

Speaking in explanation of position after the vote were the representatives of the United States, Algeria, China, Denmark, Philippines, Japan, United Kingdom, Argentina, France, Greece, United Republic of Tanzania, Romania, Russian Federation, Benin and Brazil.

The representative of the Sudan also addressed the Council.

The meeting began at 10:40 p.m. and ended at 11:55 p.m.

Council Resolution

Security Council resolution 1593 (2005) reads, as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Taking note of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur (S/2005/60),

“Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect,

“Also recalling articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute and encouraging States to contribute to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims,

“Taking note of the existence of agreements referred to in Article 98-2 of the Rome Statute,

“Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

“2. Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully;

“3. Invites the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity;

“4. Also encourages the Court, as appropriate and in accordance with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat impunity in Darfur;

“5. Also emphasizes the need to promote healing and reconciliation and encourages in this respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace, with African Union and international support as necessary;

“6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State;

“7. Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily;

“8. Invites the Prosecutor to address the Council within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution;

“9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Action on Text

The draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 11 in favour with 4 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States).

Following the vote, ANNE WOODS PATTERSON (United States) said her country strongly supported bringing to justice those responsible for the crimes and atrocities that had occurred in Darfur and ending the climate of impunity there. Violators of international humanitarian law and human rights law must be held accountable. Justice must be served in Darfur. By adopting today’s resolution, the international community had established an accountability mechanism for the perpetrators of crimes and atrocities in Darfur. The resolution would refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation and prosecution.

While the United States believed that a better mechanism would have been a hybrid tribunal in Africa, it was important that the international community spoke with one voice in order to help promote effective accountability. The United States continued to fundamentally object to the view that the Court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials, of States not party to the Rome Statute. Because it did not agree to a Council referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court, her country had abstained on the vote. She decided not to oppose the resolution because of the need for the international community to work together in order to end the climate of impunity in the Sudan, and because the resolution provided protection from investigation or prosecution for United States nationals and members of the armed forces of non-State parties.

The United States was and would be an important contributor to the peacekeeping and related humanitarian efforts in the Sudan, she said. The language providing protection for the United States and other contributing States was precedent-setting, as it clearly acknowledged the concerns of States not party to the Rome Statute and recognized that persons from those States should not be vulnerable to investigation or prosecution by the Court, absent consent by those States or a referral by the Council. In the future, she believed that, absent consent of the State involved, any investigations or prosecutions of nationals of non-party States should come only pursuant to a decision by the Council.

Although her delegation had abstained on the Council referral to the Court, it had not dropped, and indeed continued to maintain, its long-standing and firm objections and concerns regarding the Court, she continued. The Rome Statute was flawed and did not have sufficient protection from the possibility of politicized prosecutions. Non-parties had no obligations in connection with that treaty, unless otherwise decided by the Council, upon which members of the Organization had conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

She was pleased that the resolution recognized that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral would be borne by the United Nations, and that instead such costs would be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those that contributed voluntarily. That principle was extremely important. Any effort to retrench on that principle by the United Nations or other organizations to which the United States contributed could result in its withholding funding or taking other action in response.

The Council included, at her country’s request, a provision that exempted persons of non-party States in the Sudan from the ICC prosecution. Persons from countries not party who were supporting the United Nations’ or African Union’s efforts should not be placed in jeopardy. The resolution provided clear protection for United States persons. No United States person supporting operations in the Sudan would be subject to investigation or prosecution because of this resolution. That did not mean that there would be immunity for American citizens that acted in violation of the law. The United States would continue to discipline its own people when appropriate.

ABDALLAH BAALI (Algeria) said his country believed strongly in the crucial importance of combating impunity if peace and stability were to take root — a need that was even more vital in the case of Darfur, where relations between various communities had been destroyed over the years. It was, therefore, important that the fight against impunity had the equal goal of re-establishing harmony among the peoples of Darfur while serving the cause of peace.

He said that any international démarche towards those ends must be reinforced in a way that guaranteed a fair and transparent trial process; brought justice for the victims by restoring their rights and providing reparations for their moral and material suffering; contributed towards national reconciliation, a political settlement of the crisis and the consolidation of peace and stability throughout the Sudan; and promoted the support of all Sudanese in that process, including, in particular, securing the cooperation of the Government.

Because of those factors, the African Union was best placed to carry out so delicate an undertaking because it could provide peace, while also satisfying the need for justice, he said. President Olusegun Obasanjo had made a proposal, on behalf of the African Union, based on the need to secure peace without sacrificing the need for justice. Regrettably, for the sake of reconciliation, the Council had neither considered that proposal nor assessed its potential to enable its members to combat impunity. One could not claim to support the African Union while brushing aside its proposals without deigning even to consider them. At the eruption of the Darfur conflict, it had been none other than the African Union that had deployed its soldiers and begun negotiating the various complex issues involved. What was true of the Sudan was true all over Africa, and Algeria regretted that for the sake of compromise at any cost those who defended the principle of universal justice had, in fact, confirmed that even in the Council there could be a double standard.

WANG GUANGYA (China), explaining his delegation’s abstention, said that China had followed the situation in Darfur closely and supported a political solution. Like the rest of the international community, China deplored deeply the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law and believed that the perpetrators must be brought to justice. The question before the Council was what was the most appropriate way to do so. While ensuring justice, it was important to sustain the hard-won gains of the North-South peace process.

He said his country would have preferred that the perpetrators stand trial in Sudanese courts, which had recently taken action against people involved in human rights violations in Darfur. China did not favour the referral to the International Criminal Court without the consent of the Sudanese Government. In addition, China, which was not a party to the Rome Statute, had major reservations regarding some of its provisions and had found it difficult to endorse the Council authorization of that referral.

ELLEN MARGRETHE LØJ (Denmark) said that it had been two months since the Council had received the report of the Commission of Inquiry, which had strongly recommended referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC. The Court had the mandate, capacity and funding necessary to ensure swift and effective prosecution. She was encouraged that the Council had voted to adopt a resolution to bring an internationally recognized follow-up to the crimes in Darfur. She recognized the difficulty of some delegations to accept the text and appreciated the flexibility shown.

Denmark had only been able to support the text after some alterations were made, she said. Regarding the formulation on existing agreements referred to in article 98-2 of the Rome Statute, she noted that that reference was purely factual and referred to the existence of such agreements. Thus, the reference was in no way impinging on the Rome Statute. The result was a valid compromise leading to the first referral of a situation to the ICC. She looked forward to the Court taking the first steps to ending the culture of impunity in Darfur.

LAURO BAJA (Philippines) noted that today’s was the third resolution borne out of the Council’s consideration of Darfur. He had voted for the resolution in response to the urgency and gravity of the crimes, which the Council and the international community were obliged to address. Any failure of action two months after the presentation of the report would have reduced the Council to irrelevance in ending impunity and protecting human rights and international humanitarian law.

He shared the concerns of some regarding the manner in which the resolution was arrived at. Once again, veto threats prevented the expression of a clear and robust signal from the Council. That was why calls for Council reform were growing louder with each passing day. He also believed that the ICC was a fatality in the resolution. Did the Council have the prerogative to mandate the jurisdiction of the Court?

KENZO OSHIMA (Japan) said he had voted in favour of the resolution because impunity for serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity must not be allowed. Japan supported in principle the referral to the International Criminal Court within the appropriate time-frame, although it was not a party to the Rome Statute and would have much preferred more agreement among Council members.

EMYR JONES PARRY (United Kingdom) said that by tonight’s vote the Council had acted to ensure accountability for the crimes committed in Darfur. The United Kingdom hoped to send a salutary warning to other parties who may be tempted to commit similar human rights violations. The United Kingdom welcomed the adoption of the two other resolutions on the Sudan this week and called for a redoubling of efforts on behalf of peace and justice for the people of Darfur, and the Sudan as a whole, who had suffered enough. The three resolutions were a substantial contribution towards that end.

CÉSAR MAYORAL (Argentina) said he had voted in support of the resolution on the basis of the report to the Council by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who stated clearly what had been crimes against humanity in Darfur. The legal context for dealing with such violations was the ICC. He understood that the ICC would be the proper place to combat impunity. The resolution gave strong support to the Court and demonstrated significant progress within the United Nations to ensure the functioning of an international system for human rights, for which the Court was an essential tool.

He noted that it was the first time the Council had referred to the Court a situation involving crimes over which the Court had jurisdiction. It was a crucial precedent. The letter and spirit of the Rome Statute must be respected, taking into account the legitimate concerns of States. Accordingly, he regretted that the Council had to adopt a text that provided an exemption to the Court, and hoped that that would not become normal practice. The exemption referred to in operative paragraph 6 only applied to those States not party to the Rome Statute.

JEAN-MARC DE LA SABLIERE (France) said the events in Darfur were deeply troubling, and the greatest concern was the plight of the people there. The Secretary-General’s reports had provided a detailed picture of those atrocities. The Council had a duty to take action. Its policy must include three elements. The first was the need to assist the African Union to strengthen its mandate for protection and monitoring. The Council had done that by adopting resolution 1590 last week. Then, there was the need to exert pressure on the warring parties to fulfil their obligations and achieve a political settlement. The Council did that by adopting resolution 1591 a few days ago. Finally, it was necessary to put an end to impunity. That was what the Council had done today.

The Commission’s report recommended the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC, he said. The Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights had asked the Council to urgently provide a positive outcome following that recommendation. Referring the issue to the ICC was the only solution. It was necessary to do right by the victims, and doing so would prevent those violations from continuing. That was why France had been the initiator of the resolution and voted in its favour. He was gratified by the adoption of this historic resolution, by which the Council, for the first time, referred a situation to the ICC.

Thus, the Council had sent a strong message to all those in Darfur who had committed or were tempted to commit atrocious crimes, and to the victims. The international community would not allow those crimes to remain unpunished. It also marked a turning point and sent a message farther than Darfur. His delegation had been ready to acknowledge immunity from the ICC for nationals from States not party to the Rome Statute. He reaffirmed his confidence in the ICC and hoped that those clauses concerning immunity from the Court would be dropped very soon.

ADAMANTIOS TH. VASSILAKIS (Greece) stressed that impunity must not be allowed to go unpunished and that was why his country had turned to the International Criminal Court. It would have preferred a text that did not make exceptions, but it was better than one that allowed violations to go unpunished. The text strengthened the Council’s authority, as well as that of the International Criminal Court, which would have the possibility of showing its competence. The three recently adopted resolutions on Darfur would assist in restoring peace in the Sudan.

AUGUSTINE MAHIGA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that every new delay in the adoption of the resolution represented a failure to serve the interests of justice, and his delegation regretted that the text took on matters that did not concern the Council. It did not permit any avoidance of the International Criminal Court’s authority, and the United Republic of Tanzania hoped that the international community would not abandon the people of the Sudan, particularly those of Darfur.

MIHNEA IOAN MOTOC (Romania) said that text spoke for itself in showing the way the Council could come together to address serious issues. The adoption of resolution 1593 was a stand against impunity and an expression of confidence in the ICC to handle complex cases, like the one the Council was referring to it today. At the end of the day, the Council had sent a message that there was no way that anyone anywhere could get away without retribution for grave crimes. By deciding to refer Darfur to the ICC, the Council had enhanced its conflict prevention and resolution capabilities. Upholding the ICC by adopting the resolution would be to no avail unless States remained supportive of the Court as it exercised its prerogatives.

ANDREY DENISOV (Russian Federation) said that Council members had reaffirmed that the struggle against impunity was one of the elements of long-term stability in Darfur. All those responsible for grave crimes must be punished, as pointed out in the report of the Commission of Inquiry. The resolution adopted today would promote an effective solution to the fight against impunity.

JOEL ADECHI (Benin) said the vote was a major event in the context of the international community’s attempts to ensure there was no impunity for violations of international humanitarian law in the past decade. Benin had voted in favour of the resolution because it was party to the Rome Statute and also because the worsening of the situation in Darfur meant that the Council must take action to end the suffering of the civilians, ending impunity by providing impartial justice. Benin had also voted in favour out of respect for human dignity and the right to life. The African Union recognized that the international community had a responsibility to protect civilians when they were not protected by their own governments. The resolution must help them to achieve their legitimate dream of an end to their suffering and enable them to look ahead to the future with serenity.

Council President RONALDO MOTA SARDENBERG (Brazil), speaking in his national capacity, said his country was in favour of the resolution, but had been unable to join those who had voted in favour. However, Brazil was ready to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court whenever necessary. The Court provided all the necessary checks and balances to prevent politically motivated prosecutions, and any fears to the contrary were both unwarranted and unhelpful.

However, there were limits to the responsibilities of the Council vis-à-vis international instruments, and Brazil had consistently maintained that position since the negotiations on the Rome Statute. But the Court remained the only suitable institution to deal with the violations in the Sudan. Brazil had been unable to support operative paragraph 6, which recognized exclusive jurisdiction. It would not strengthen the role of the International Criminal Court.

ELFATIH MOHAMED AHMED ERWA (Sudan) said that, once more, the Council had persisted in adopting unwise decisions against his country, which only served to further complicate the situation on the ground. The positions over the ICC were well known. The Darfur question had been exploited in light of those positions. It was a paradox that the language in which the resolution was negotiated was the same language that had buffeted the Council before on another African question. The resolution adopted was full of exemptions. He reminded the Council that the Sudan was also not party to the ICC, making implementation of the resolution fraught with procedural impediments. As long as the Council believed that the scales of justice were based on exceptions and exploitation of crises in developing countries and bargaining among major Powers, it did not settle the question of accountability in Darfur, but exposed the fact that the ICC was intended for developing and weak countries and was a tool to exercise cultural superiority.

The Council, by adopting the resolution, had once again ridden roughshod over the African position, he said. The initiative by Nigeria, as chair of the African Union, had not even been the subject of consideration. Also, the Council had adopted the resolution at a time when the Sudanese judiciary had gone a long way in holding trials, and was capable of ensuring accountability. Some here wanted to activate the ICC and exploit the situation in Darfur. Accountability was a long process that could not be achieved overnight. The Council was continuing to use a policy of double standards, and sending the message that exemptions were only for major Powers. The resolution would only serve to weaken prospects for settlement and further complicate the already complex situation.

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5153rd meeting, on 29 March 2005

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1547 (2004) of 11 June 2004, 1556 (2004) of 30 July 2004, 1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004, 1574 (2004) of 19 November 2004, 1585
(2005) of 10 March 2005, 1588 (2005) of 17 March 2005, and 1590 of 24 March 2005, and statements of its President concerning Sudan,
Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan, and recalling the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,
Recalling the commitments made by the parties in the 8 April N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Humanitarian and Security Protocols between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and recalling the commitments made in the Joint Communique of 3 July 2004 between the Government of Sudan and the Secretary-General,
Welcoming the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army(SPLM/A) in Nairobi, Kenya on 9 January 2005,
Recognizing that the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement must build on the Agreement to bring peace and stability to the entire country, and calling on all Sudanese parties, in particular those party to the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, to take immediate steps to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur and to take all necessary action to prevent further violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and to put an end to impunity, including in the Darfur region,
Expressing its utmost concern over the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population in the Darfur region as well as throughout Sudan, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons,
Considering that the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons will be a critical factor for the consolidation of the
peace process,

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Expressing also its deep concern for the security of humanitarian workers and their access to populations in need, including refugees, internally displaced persons and other war-affected populations,
Condemning the continued violations of the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 and the Abuja Protocols of 9 November 2004 by all sides in Darfur and the deterioration of the security situation and negative impact this has had on humanitarian assistance efforts,
Strongly condemning all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Darfur region, in particular the continuation of violence
against civilians and sexual violence against women and girls since the adoption of resolution 1574 (2004), urging all parties to take necessary steps to prevent further violations, and expressing its determination to ensure that those responsible for all such violations are identified and brought to justice without delay,
Recognizing that international support for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is critically important to its success, emphasizing
that progress towards resolution of the conflict in Darfur would create conditions conducive for delivery of such assistance, and alarmed that the violence in Darfur nonetheless continues,
Recalling the demands, in resolutions 1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), and 1574 (2004), that all parties to the conflict in Darfur refrain from any violence
against civilians and cooperate fully with the African Union Mission in Darfur,
Welcoming the 16 February 2005 N’djamena Summit on Darfur and the continued commitment of the African Union to play a key role in facilitating a resolution to the conflict in Darfur in all respects, and the announcement by the Government of Sudan on 16 February 2005 that it would take immediate steps, including withdrawal of its forces from Labado, Qarifa, and Marla in Darfur, and the withdrawal of its Antonov aircraft from Darfur,
Commending the efforts of the African Union, in particular its Chairman,acknowledging the progress made by the African Union in the deployment of an international protection force, police, and military observers, and calling on all member states to contribute generously and urgently to the African Union Mission in Darfur,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security, 1379 (2001) and 1460 (2003) on children in armed conflicts, as well as resolutions
1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts and resolution 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and UN personnel,
Taking note of the Secretary-General’s reports of 31 January 2005 (S/2005/57 and Add.1), 3 December 2004 (S/2004/947), 4 February 2005 (S/2005/68), and
4 March 2005 (S/2005/140), as well as the report of 25 January 2005 of the International Commission of Inquiry (S/2005/60),
Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Deplores strongly that the Government of Sudan and rebel forces and all
other armed groups in Darfur have failed to comply fully with their commitments
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and the demands of the Council referred to in resolutions 1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), and 1574 (2004), condemns the continued violations of the 8 April 2004 N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Protocols, including air strikes by the Government of Sudan in December 2004 and January 2005 and rebel attacks on Darfur villages in January 2005, and the failure of the Government of Sudan to disarm Janjaweed militiamen and apprehend and bring to justice
Janajaweed leaders and their associates who have carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities, and demands that all parties take immediate steps to fulfil all their commitments to respect the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the Abuja Protocols, including notification of force positions, to facilitate humanitarian assistance, and to cooperate fully with the African Union Mission;
2. Emphasizes that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur, and calls upon the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups, particularly
the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army to resume the Abuja talks rapidly without preconditions and negotiate in good faith to speedily reach agreement, and urges the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to play an active and constructive role in support of the Abuja talks and take immediate steps to support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur;
3. Decides, in light of the failure of all parties to the conflict in Darfur to fulfil their commitments,
(a) to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the
Council (herein “the Committee”), to undertake to following tasks:
i. to monitor implementation of the measures referred to in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of this paragraph and paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004),
and paragraph 7 below;
ii. to designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by subparagraphs (d) and (e) of this paragraph and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with subparagraphs (f) and (g);
iii. to establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by subparagraphs (d) and (e);
iv. to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work;
v. to consider requests from and, as appropriate, provide prior approval to the Government of Sudan for the movement of military equipment and supplies into the Darfur region in accordance with paragraph 7 below;
vi. to assess reports from the Panel of Experts established under subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, and Member States, in particular those in the region, on specific steps they are taking to implement the measures imposed by subparagraphs (d) and (e) and paragraph 7 below;
vii. to encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of
such States to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;
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(b) to request the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, to appoint for a period of six months, within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, a Panel of Experts comprised of four members and based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to travel regularly to El-Fasher, Sudan and other locations in Sudan, and to operate under the direction of the Committee to undertake the following tasks:
i. to assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the measures in subparagraphs (d) and (e),paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), and paragraph 7 of this resolution, and to make recommendations to the Committee on actions the Council may want to consider;
ii. to provide a mid-term briefing on its work to the Committee, and an interim report no later than 90 days after adoption of this resolution, and a final report no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate to the Council through the Committee with its findings and recommendations; and
iii. to coordinate its activities as appropriate with ongoing operations of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS);
(c) that those individuals, as designated by the Committee established by subparagraph (a) above, based on the information provided by Member States, the
Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights or the Panel of Experts established under subparagraph (b) of this paragraph above, and other
relevant sources, who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004) and paragraph 7 of this resolution as implemented by a state, or are responsible for offensive military
overflights described in paragraph 6 of this resolution, shall be subject to the measures identified in subparagraphs (d) and (e) below;
(d) that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent entry into or transit through their territories of all persons as designated by the Committee pursuant to subparagraph (c) above, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall obligate a State to refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals;
(e) that all States shall freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources that are on their territories on the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the
persons designated by the Committee pursuant to subparagraph (c) above, or that are held by entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and decides further that all States
shall ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available by their nationals or by any persons within their territories to or for the benefit of such persons or entities;
(f) that the measures imposed by subparagraph (d) above shall not apply
where the Committee established by subparagraph (a) above determines on a case by case basis that such travel is justified on the ground of humanitarian need,
including religious obligation, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the Council’s resolutions for the creation of peace and stability in Sudan and the region;
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(g) that the measures imposed by subparagraph (e) of this resolution do notapply to funds, other financial assets and economic resources that:
i. have been determined by relevant States to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and
medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance
of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets and economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within two working days of such notification;
ii. have been determined by relevant States to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee, or
iii. have been determined by relevant States to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, or other
financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated by the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
4. Decides that the measures referred to in subparagraphs 3 (d) and (e) shall enter into force 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution, unless the Security Council determines before then that the parties to the conflict in Darfur have complied with all the commitments and demands referred to in paragraph 1 above and paragraph 6 below;
5. Expresses its readiness to consider the modification or termination of the measures under paragraph 3, on the recommendation of the Committee or at the end of a period of 12 months from the date of adoption of this resolution, or earlier if the
Security Council determines before then that the parties to the conflict in Darfur have complied with all the commitments and demands referred to in paragraph 1 above and paragraph 6 below;
6. Demands that the Government of Sudan, in accordance with its commitments under the 8 April 2004 N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Security Protocol, immediately cease conducting offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region, and invites the African Union Ceasefire Commission to share pertinent information as appropriate in this regard with the Secretary-General, the Committee, or the Panel of Experts established
under paragraph 3 (b);
7. Reaffirms the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), and decides that these measures shall immediately upon adoption of
this resolution, also apply to all the parties to the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur; decides that these measures shall not apply to the supplies and related technical training and assistance listed in paragraph 9 of resolution 1556 (2004);
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decides that these measures shall not apply with respect to assistance and supplies provided in support of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
further decides that these measures shall not apply to movements of military equipment and supplies into the Darfur region that are approved in advance by the
Committee established under paragraph 3 (a) upon a request by the Government of Sudan; and invites the African Union Ceasefire Commission to share pertinent
information as appropriate in this regard with the Secretary-General, the Committee, or the Panel of Experts established under paragraph 3 (b);
8. Reiterates that, in the event the parties fail to fulfil their commitments and demands as outlined in paragraphs 1 and 6, and the situation in Darfur continues to deteriorate, the Council will consider further measures as provided for in Article
41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.