At [UN] Headquarters there was not sufficient focus or institutional resources for early warning and risk analysis.†– Independent Inquiry into the action of the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.[1]

Introduction

The UN is currently not organized in such that the substantial and substantive information gathered through the various mechanisms of the UN human rights machinery in Geneva is brought together in a focused way, so as to better understand complex situations and thus be in a better position to take appropriate action. In short, there is a significant gap between the calls for effective conflict prevention and the institutional capacity of the UN as a whole. [2] One reminder of this disconnect is the genocide of some 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, which was surely preventable as it had been foreseen in the August 1993 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.[3]

April 2005 marked the 90th anniversary of the beginning of the atrocities committed towards Armenians and Assyrians in Ottoman Turkey (1915), the 60th anniversary of the end of the World War II and the liberation of the Jews, Roma and other survivors from Nazi concentration camps (1945), and the 30th anniversary of the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (1975).

With several relevant UN reform proposals currently under discussion (including a Mediation Support Unit, a Peacebuilding Commission and a revamping of the human rights machinery), one recent institutional development to strengthen the UN capacity to systematically prevent future genocides was the creation in 2004 of the position of a UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (hereinafter referred to as the †کSASGPG’). How can the SASGPG become an effective tool, within the UN, to prevent future genocides?

UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (SASGPG)

The post of a SASGPG was suggested by the UN Secretary-General in early 2004, as part of a larger Action Plan on the Prevention of Genocide.[4] On July 12, 2004, the UN Secretary-General named Juan E. Mendez, a human rights advocate, lawyer and former political prisoner from Argentina , as his first SASGPG, and provided the mandate.[5] The SASGPG is located in New York, holds a 40 per cent position and is assisted by a staff member from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and a staff member from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Mandate and approach

The SASGPG’s mandate to address prevention in relation to †کgenocide or related crimes’ indicates that the SASGPG may become involved in situations when the prospects for genocide are quite distant, including addressing situations that run the risk of resulting in ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights. Mendez has stated that he should “not be extremely tied to an overly technical definition of genocideâ€, and that, “since the task is one of prevention, you have to act even before all of the elements of the definition fall into place.â€[6] Indeed, the mandate explicitly states that the Special Advisor is not intended to make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention[7] has occurred or not. The function of the SASGPG is not to prosecute, judge or punish, but rather to focus on concrete conditions and issues where practical assistance and support can be provided.

The SASGPG will need to develop a sensitive but determined and operational approach. The mandate stipulates that “[t]he methodology employed would entail a careful verification of facts and serious political analyses and consultations, without excessive publicity,†and the purpose of activities to be “practical and intended to enable the United Nations to act in a timely fashion.†The verification of facts within the mandate opens the door for fact-finding missions, while consultations could take the form of facilitating in-country roundtables. By avoiding excessive publicity, the SASGPG could function as a †کfriendly advisor’ to warring parties alike, and thereby build confidence among all stakeholders, including governments. Not only must the SASGPG be independent, impartial, consistent and a person of integrity, he or she must also be viewed as being such. In addition to building confidence among the primary stakeholders, it will be crucial to build confidence among institutional partners within the UN system in order to mobilize resources beyond the SASGPG’s evidently under-staffed office. Indeed, there are several examples from the past where mechanisms and †کspecial offices’ have been isolated within the UN system. By employing and communicating a fundamentally assistance-oriented approach of what the SASGPG will do, and what he or she will not do, and by complementing the activities of other institutional actors within the UN, such clarity could be one way to build important intra-UN confidence.

Another consideration is whether the SASGPG should take on operational responsibilities, such as actively seeking to facilitate mediation between actors in a particular situation. This could be useful if the SASGPG would hold comparative advantage to do so. However, as the SASGPG is unlikely to constitute the main interlocutor of the international community, the SASGPG should rather seek to offer complementary services and activities. This could include arranging in-country or regional workshops aimed at fostering inter-communal tolerance where expressions of hate speech have been directed at certain populations at risk. The SASGPG can also (with authority) share the experiences of the significant human and economic costs when inter-communal tensions elsewhere have turned into organized violence. The SASGPG could seek to strengthen the core of moderates on all sides and support them (and encourage them to also involve others) to address contentious issues through inclusive political processes, as opposed to violent means. As the SASGPG is to work without excessive publicity, this approach will also serve the function of enabling political space for disputing parties, including governments, to adjust policies and positions without being seen as doing so (i.e. not losing face within respective constituencies). Once identified with such an approach, this could encourage States who for (arguably) uninformed reasons may be initially hesitant to extend a standing invitation to the SASGPG.

Resources

Considering the clearly insufficient 40 per cent position of the SASGPG supported by just two staff members, it is hard to imagine a larger discrepancy between resources allocated and the importance of the issues at stake. While secondments from governments can be sensitive, and the first SASGPG appears to prefer †کstarting small,’ although it could well be considered to enlarge the capacity of the office through contributions from experts nominated by governments or independently recruited professional staff.

In light of the current meager resources of the SASGPG office, the indirect support of Non-Governmental Organizations becomes all the more important. Collaboration between NGOs could provide independent assessments within their field of expertise to the SASGPG’s office (which the SASGPG obviously would decide whether to act upon or not). It would, for example, appear warranted if well-reputed organizations such as Minority Rights Group International, with its 40 years of expertise on inter-communal issues and minority protection around the world, were to establish links and synthesize and analyze information from sources (mentioned below) and cooperate with the SASGPG in an informal, yet supportive capacity.

Information, Analysis and Actions

The office of the SASGPG can act as a focal point for early warning information coming from any source inside or outside the United Nations system. The use of indicators is a necessary, but not sufficient, basis for evaluating situations at risk. Indicators would need to be complemented with contextual analysis of State capacity, governance, media and current and future events. The information management would need to develop a methodology drawing on past experiences (incl. from The Early Warning and Preventive Measures project initiated by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in 1998) and include indicator-based systems such as from the SIPRI Armed Conflict Database, non-indicator based analysis from the International Crisis Group, and research-based sources of information such as the Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland, and the Human Security Index at the University of British Columbia.[8] This being said, extensive UN information could well provide the bedrock of information. Indeed it is likely that the SASGPG will be simply overwhelmed. An effective system of information management and communication strategy is thus essential. It will be important to strike an appropriate balance between quantity of information and its quality in accuracy and reliability.

On Sept. 30, 2004 the SASGPG stated that, “the vulnerability of certain ethnic groups” and “the instability of the situation generally” are such that “we have not turned the corner on preventing genocide from happening in the future or even in the near future in Darfur.”

In stressing that the primary responsibility rests on national governments, the SASGPG should base his or her analysis and recommendations on a normative framework, conveying (and explaining) existing international standards. The function of a †کnormative intermediary’ translating standards into concrete policy options could draw upon the proven function of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities. [9] In this regard, the SASGPG may offer his or her own interpretation of such standards, including specific cases or through general recommendations, and thus contribute to a body of †کsoft jurisprudence.’

It requires strategic planning to determine whether, when and how the SASGPG will inform the Secretary-General, including the appropriateness of f bringing a situation to the attention of the Security Council, and there are similar questions with regard to other possibly †کindependent’ tools of action at the SASGPG’s disposal (including fact-finding missions for verifications and consultations). Should the SASGPG commence with the most urgent cases? In order to build trust in the mandate and approach, it could be useful to focus on multiple situations simultaneously, and seek to establish some early †کsuccess,’ however small. This might mean the most urgent situation, but it could also mean engaging in a dialogue with member States and populations where tensions are far less acute. In order to develop the †کroutine’ of in-country visits, it could be helpful if a few †کfriendly governments’ extend invitations to the SASGPG, who could for example hold in-country consultations on, for example, issues such as education, culture and language.

Actions to Date

The first SASGPG has not been serving in this position for enough time to merit a deep analysis. By April 2005, the SASGPG reported he had issued five notes to the UN Security Council on Darfur, one note on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and one note on Cote d’Ivoire.[10] The notes have addressed a variety of issues, for example the letter regarding DRC focused on the need to establish protection zones for civilians especially in the east of the DRC and near the borders with Burundi and Rwanda. However, so far it is uncertain what, if any, effect these notes have had on the actual situations.

Conclusion

While 2004 saw international events and gatherings commemorating the 10 years since the genocide in Rwanda, the international community remains unable to effectively address the tragedy in Darfur, which is merely the latest situation labeled by the UN as ethnic cleansing, and by some quarters, genocide.

The establishment of a SASGPG should be welcomed as a new actor in the range of instruments which could assist in developing effective genocide prevention capacity within the UN. Both governments and non-governmental actors should support this new mechanism; the former by offering resources and inviting the SASGPG for in-country visits, and the latter by providing systematic independent analysis on situations that merit the attention and engagement of the SASGPG.

Erik Friberg, a Swedish national, is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia . He can be reached at erik.friberg@csis.or.id

Further readings:

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report with Executive Summary, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997,

Malone, D., and Fen Hampson (eds.), From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. Lynne Rienner, 2002.

Packer, J. and E. Friberg, Genocide and Minorities: Preventing the Preventable, Minority Rights Group International Briefing, London, 2004,

Stanton, G. H., The International Campaign to End Genocide: A Review of Its First Five Years, 2004, see http://www.genocidewatch.org/iceghistory.htm

Schabas, W., The Genocide Convention at Fifty, USIP Special Report 41, Washington , 1999,

The Report of the independent inquiry into the action of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999.

[2] For a good account of the early warning and preventive action in the wider context of institutional transformation of the United Nations (prior to the 2004 High-Level Panel Report), see J. Cockell, “Early warning analysis and policy planning in UN preventive actionâ€, in D. Carment and A. Schnabel (eds.) Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace of Grand Illusion?, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003. See also C. L. Sriram and K. Wermester, From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, International Peace Academy, New York, 2003,

[3] Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1.

[4] UN Secretary-General Speech at the Stockholm International Forum January 2004, and speech at the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva April 2004. Other suggested parts of the Action Plan, including a treaty-monitoring Committee to the 1948 Genocide Convention, remain to be implemented.

[5] Outline of the mandate for the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, UN Doc. No. S/2004/567.

[6] Albion Monitor, †کUN Genocide Advisor Says Darfur Getting Worse’, 9 March 2005, .

[7] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.

[8] For a useful gathering and analysis of potential databases in this regard, see Rodik, Petra, Drazen Penzar and Armano Srbljinovoc “An Overview of Databases of Conflicts and Political Crisesâ€, in Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, Volume 1, Issue 1-2, 2003, pp. 9-21.

[9] See S. Ratner, “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 591-698. See also: J. Packer, “Making International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 715-724; and W. Kemp (ed.) Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Kluwer Law, The Hague , 2001.

[10] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Press Release 1 March 2005,

Genocide prevention and the UN:

The potential of the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General

By: Erik Friberg

“At [UN] Headquarters there was not sufficient focus or institutional resources for early warning and risk analysis.†– Independent Inquiry into the action of the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.[1]

Introduction

The UN is currently not organized in such that the substantial and substantive information gathered through the various mechanisms of the UN human rights machinery in Geneva is brought together in a focused way, so as to better understand complex situations and thus be in a better position to take appropriate action. In short, there is a significant gap between the calls for effective conflict prevention and the institutional capacity of the UN as a whole.[2] One reminder of this disconnect is the genocide of some 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, which was surely preventable as it had been foreseen in the August 1993 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.[3]

April 2005 marked the 90th anniversary of the beginning of the atrocities committed towards Armenians and Assyrians in Ottoman Turkey (1915), the 60th anniversary of the end of the World War II and the liberation of the Jews, Roma and other survivors from Nazi concentration camps (1945), and the 30th anniversary of the fall of Phnom Penh to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (1975).

With several relevant UN reform proposals currently under discussion (including a Mediation Support Unit, a Peacebuilding Commission and a revamping of the human rights machinery), one recent institutional development to strengthen the UN capacity to systematically prevent future genocides was the creation in 2004 of the position of a UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (hereinafter referred to as the †?SASGPG’). How can the SASGPG become an effective tool, within the UN, to prevent future genocides?

UN Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide (SASGPG)

The post of a SASGPG was suggested by the UN Secretary-General in early 2004, as part of a larger Action Plan on the Prevention of Genocide.[4] On July 12, 2004, the UN Secretary-General named Juan E. Mendez, a human rights advocate, lawyer and former political prisoner from Argentina , as his first SASGPG, and provided the mandate.[5] The SASGPG is located in New York, holds a 40 per cent position and is assisted by a staff member from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and a staff member from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

Mandate and approach

The SASGPG’s mandate to address prevention in relation to †?genocide or related crimes’ indicates that the SASGPG may become involved in situations when the prospects for genocide are quite distant, including addressing situations that run the risk of resulting in ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights. Mendez has stated that he should “not be extremely tied to an overly technical definition of genocideâ€, and that, “since the task is one of prevention, you have to act even before all of the elements of the definition fall into place.â€[6] Indeed, the mandate explicitly states that the Special Advisor is not intended to make a determination on whether genocide within the meaning of the Genocide Convention[7] has occurred or not. The function of the SASGPG is not to prosecute, judge or punish, but rather to focus on concrete conditions and issues where practical assistance and support can be provided.

The SASGPG will need to develop a sensitive but determined and operational approach. The mandate stipulates that “[t]he methodology employed would entail a careful verification of facts and serious political analyses and consultations, without excessive publicity,†and the purpose of activities to be “practical and intended to enable the United Nations to act in a timely fashion.†The verification of facts within the mandate opens the door for fact-finding missions, while consultations could take the form of facilitating in-country roundtables. By avoiding excessive publicity, the SASGPG could function as a †?friendly advisor’ to warring parties alike, and thereby build confidence among all stakeholders, including governments. Not only must the SASGPG be independent, impartial, consistent and a person of integrity, he or she must also be viewed as being such. In addition to building confidence among the primary stakeholders, it will be crucial to build confidence among institutional partners within the UN system in order to mobilize resources beyond the SASGPG’s evidently under-staffed office. Indeed, there are several examples from the past where mechanisms and †?special offices’ have been isolated within the UN system. By employing and communicating a fundamentally assistance-oriented approach of what the SASGPG will do, and what he or she will not do, and by complementing the activities of other institutional actors within the UN, such clarity could be one way to build important intra-UN confidence.

Another consideration is whether the SASGPG should take on operational responsibilities, such as actively seeking to facilitate mediation between actors in a particular situation. This could be useful if the SASGPG would hold comparative advantage to do so. However, as the SASGPG is unlikely to constitute the main interlocutor of the international community, the SASGPG should rather seek to offer complementary services and activities. This could include arranging in-country or regional workshops aimed at fostering inter-communal tolerance where expressions of hate speech have been directed at certain populations at risk. The SASGPG can also (with authority) share the experiences of the significant human and economic costs when inter-communal tensions elsewhere have turned into organized violence. The SASGPG could seek to strengthen the core of moderates on all sides and support them (and encourage them to also involve others) to address contentious issues through inclusive political processes, as opposed to violent means. As the SASGPG is to work without excessive publicity, this approach will also serve the function of enabling political space for disputing parties, including governments, to adjust policies and positions without being seen as doing so (i.e. not losing face within respective constituencies). Once identified with such an approach, this could encourage States who for (arguably) uninformed reasons may be initially hesitant to extend a standing invitation to the SASGPG.

Resources

Considering the clearly insufficient 40 per cent position of the SASGPG supported by just two staff members, it is hard to imagine a larger discrepancy between resources allocated and the importance of the issues at stake. While secondments from governments can be sensitive, and the first SASGPG appears to prefer †?starting small,’ although it could well be considered to enlarge the capacity of the office through contributions from experts nominated by governments or independently recruited professional staff.

In light of the current meager resources of the SASGPG office, the indirect support of Non-Governmental Organizations becomes all the more important. Collaboration between NGOs could provide independent assessments within their field of expertise to the SASGPG’s office (which the SASGPG obviously would decide whether to act upon or not). It would, for example, appear warranted if well-reputed organizations such as Minority Rights Group International, with its 40 years of expertise on inter-communal issues and minority protection around the world, were to establish links and synthesize and analyze information from sources (mentioned below) and cooperate with the SASGPG in an informal, yet supportive capacity.

Information, Analysis and Actions

The office of the SASGPG can act as a focal point for early warning information coming from any source inside or outside the United Nations system. The use of indicators is a necessary, but not sufficient, basis for evaluating situations at risk. Indicators would need to be complemented with contextual analysis of State capacity, governance, media and current and future events. The information management would need to develop a methodology drawing on past experiences (incl. from The Early Warning and Preventive Measures project initiated by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in 1998) and include indicator-based systems such as from the SIPRI Armed Conflict Database, non-indicator based analysis from the International Crisis Group, and research-based sources of information such as the Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland, and the Human Security Index at the University of British Columbia.[8] This being said, extensive UN information could well provide the bedrock of information. Indeed it is likely that the SASGPG will be simply overwhelmed. An effective system of information management and communication strategy is thus essential. It will be important to strike an appropriate balance between quantity of information and its quality in accuracy and reliability.

On Sept. 30, 2004 the SASGPG stated that, “the vulnerability of certain ethnic groups” and “the instability of the situation generally” are such that “we have not turned the corner on preventing genocide from happening in the future or even in the near future in Darfur.”

In stressing that the primary responsibility rests on national governments, the SASGPG should base his or her analysis and recommendations on a normative framework, conveying (and explaining) existing international standards. The function of a †?normative intermediary’ translating standards into concrete policy options could draw upon the proven function of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities. [9] In this regard, the SASGPG may offer his or her own interpretation of such standards, including specific cases or through general recommendations, and thus contribute to a body of †?soft jurisprudence.’

It requires strategic planning to determine whether, when and how the SASGPG will inform the Secretary-General, including the appropriateness of f bringing a situation to the attention of the Security Council, and there are similar questions with regard to other possibly †?independent’ tools of action at the SASGPG’s disposal (including fact-finding missions for verifications and consultations). Should the SASGPG commence with the most urgent cases? In order to build trust in the mandate and approach, it could be useful to focus on multiple situations simultaneously, and seek to establish some early †?success,’ however small. This might mean the most urgent situation, but it could also mean engaging in a dialogue with member States and populations where tensions are far less acute. In order to develop the †?routine’ of in-country visits, it could be helpful if a few †?friendly governments’ extend invitations to the SASGPG, who could for example hold in-country consultations on, for example, issues such as education, culture and language.

Actions to Date

The first SASGPG has not been serving in this position for enough time to merit a deep analysis. By April 2005, the SASGPG reported he had issued five notes to the UN Security Council on Darfur, one note on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and one note on Cote d’Ivoire.[10] The notes have addressed a variety of issues, for example the letter regarding DRC focused on the need to establish protection zones for civilians especially in the east of the DRC and near the borders with Burundi and Rwanda. However, so far it is uncertain what, if any, effect these notes have had on the actual situations.

Conclusion

While 2004 saw international events and gatherings commemorating the 10 years since the genocide in Rwanda, the international community remains unable to effectively address the tragedy in Darfur, which is merely the latest situation labeled by the UN as ethnic cleansing, and by some quarters, genocide.

The establishment of a SASGPG should be welcomed as a new actor in the range of instruments which could assist in developing effective genocide prevention capacity within the UN. Both governments and non-governmental actors should support this new mechanism; the former by offering resources and inviting the SASGPG for in-country visits, and the latter by providing systematic independent analysis on situations that merit the attention and engagement of the SASGPG.

Erik Friberg, a Swedish national, is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Indonesia . He can be reached at erik.friberg@csis.or.id

Further readings:

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report with Executive Summary, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997,

Malone, D., and Fen Hampson (eds.), From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System. Lynne Rienner, 2002.

Packer, J. and E. Friberg, Genocide and Minorities: Preventing the Preventable, Minority Rights Group International Briefing, London, 2004,

Stanton, G. H., The International Campaign to End Genocide: A Review of Its First Five Years, 2004, see http://www.genocidewatch.org/iceghistory.htm

Schabas, W., The Genocide Convention at Fifty, USIP Special Report 41, Washington , 1999,

The Report of the independent inquiry into the action of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999.

[2] For a good account of the early warning and preventive action in the wider context of institutional transformation of the United Nations (prior to the 2004 High-Level Panel Report), see J. Cockell, “Early warning analysis and policy planning in UN preventive actionâ€, in D. Carment and A. Schnabel (eds.) Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace of Grand Illusion?, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003. See also C. L. Sriram and K. Wermester, From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, International Peace Academy, New York, 2003,

[3] Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, UN. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1.

[4] UN Secretary-General Speech at the Stockholm International Forum January 2004, and speech at the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva April 2004. Other suggested parts of the Action Plan, including a treaty-monitoring Committee to the 1948 Genocide Convention, remain to be implemented.

[5] Outline of the mandate for the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, UN Doc. No. S/2004/567.

[6] Albion Monitor, †?UN Genocide Advisor Says Darfur Getting Worse’, 9 March 2005, .

[7] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.

[8] For a useful gathering and analysis of potential databases in this regard, see Rodik, Petra, Drazen Penzar and Armano Srbljinovoc “An Overview of Databases of Conflicts and Political Crisesâ€, in Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, Volume 1, Issue 1-2, 2003, pp. 9-21.

[9] See S. Ratner, “Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 591-698. See also: J. Packer, “Making International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict,†New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 32(3): 715-724; and W. Kemp (ed.) Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Kluwer Law, The Hague , 2001.

[10] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Press Release 1 March 2005,

SECURITY COUNCIL REFERS SITUATION IN DARFUR, SUDAN, TO PROSECUTOR OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Resolution 1593 (2005) Adopted by Vote of 11 in Favour
To None Against, with 4 Abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States)

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council decided this evening to refer the situation prevailing in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

Adopting resolution 1593 (2005) by a vote of 11 in favour, none against with 4 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States), the Council decided also that the Government of the Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur would cooperate fully with the Court and Prosecutor, providing them with any necessary assistance.

The Council decided further that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside the Sudan which was not a party to the Rome Statute would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Sudan authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction had been expressly waived by that contributing State.

Inviting the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that would facilitate the Court’s work, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, the Council encouraged the Court, in accordance with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat impunity in Darfur. It also emphasized the need to promote healing and reconciliation, as well as the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace.

Speaking in explanation of position after the vote were the representatives of the United States, Algeria, China, Denmark, Philippines, Japan, United Kingdom, Argentina, France, Greece, United Republic of Tanzania, Romania, Russian Federation, Benin and Brazil.

The representative of the Sudan also addressed the Council.

The meeting began at 10:40 p.m. and ended at 11:55 p.m.

Council Resolution

Security Council resolution 1593 (2005) reads, as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Taking note of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur (S/2005/60),

“Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect,

“Also recalling articles 75 and 79 of the Rome Statute and encouraging States to contribute to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims,

“Taking note of the existence of agreements referred to in Article 98-2 of the Rome Statute,

“Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

“2. Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully;

“3. Invites the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region, which would contribute to regional efforts in the fight against impunity;

“4. Also encourages the Court, as appropriate and in accordance with the Rome Statute, to support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law, protect human rights and combat impunity in Darfur;

“5. Also emphasizes the need to promote healing and reconciliation and encourages in this respect the creation of institutions, involving all sectors of Sudanese society, such as truth and/or reconciliation commissions, in order to complement judicial processes and thereby reinforce the efforts to restore long-lasting peace, with African Union and international support as necessary;

“6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing State;

“7. Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily;

“8. Invites the Prosecutor to address the Council within three months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution;

“9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Action on Text

The draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 11 in favour with 4 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States).

Following the vote, ANNE WOODS PATTERSON (United States) said her country strongly supported bringing to justice those responsible for the crimes and atrocities that had occurred in Darfur and ending the climate of impunity there. Violators of international humanitarian law and human rights law must be held accountable. Justice must be served in Darfur. By adopting today’s resolution, the international community had established an accountability mechanism for the perpetrators of crimes and atrocities in Darfur. The resolution would refer the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation and prosecution.

While the United States believed that a better mechanism would have been a hybrid tribunal in Africa, it was important that the international community spoke with one voice in order to help promote effective accountability. The United States continued to fundamentally object to the view that the Court should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials, of States not party to the Rome Statute. Because it did not agree to a Council referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court, her country had abstained on the vote. She decided not to oppose the resolution because of the need for the international community to work together in order to end the climate of impunity in the Sudan, and because the resolution provided protection from investigation or prosecution for United States nationals and members of the armed forces of non-State parties.

The United States was and would be an important contributor to the peacekeeping and related humanitarian efforts in the Sudan, she said. The language providing protection for the United States and other contributing States was precedent-setting, as it clearly acknowledged the concerns of States not party to the Rome Statute and recognized that persons from those States should not be vulnerable to investigation or prosecution by the Court, absent consent by those States or a referral by the Council. In the future, she believed that, absent consent of the State involved, any investigations or prosecutions of nationals of non-party States should come only pursuant to a decision by the Council.

Although her delegation had abstained on the Council referral to the Court, it had not dropped, and indeed continued to maintain, its long-standing and firm objections and concerns regarding the Court, she continued. The Rome Statute was flawed and did not have sufficient protection from the possibility of politicized prosecutions. Non-parties had no obligations in connection with that treaty, unless otherwise decided by the Council, upon which members of the Organization had conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

She was pleased that the resolution recognized that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral would be borne by the United Nations, and that instead such costs would be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those that contributed voluntarily. That principle was extremely important. Any effort to retrench on that principle by the United Nations or other organizations to which the United States contributed could result in its withholding funding or taking other action in response.

The Council included, at her country’s request, a provision that exempted persons of non-party States in the Sudan from the ICC prosecution. Persons from countries not party who were supporting the United Nations’ or African Union’s efforts should not be placed in jeopardy. The resolution provided clear protection for United States persons. No United States person supporting operations in the Sudan would be subject to investigation or prosecution because of this resolution. That did not mean that there would be immunity for American citizens that acted in violation of the law. The United States would continue to discipline its own people when appropriate.

ABDALLAH BAALI (Algeria) said his country believed strongly in the crucial importance of combating impunity if peace and stability were to take root — a need that was even more vital in the case of Darfur, where relations between various communities had been destroyed over the years. It was, therefore, important that the fight against impunity had the equal goal of re-establishing harmony among the peoples of Darfur while serving the cause of peace.

He said that any international démarche towards those ends must be reinforced in a way that guaranteed a fair and transparent trial process; brought justice for the victims by restoring their rights and providing reparations for their moral and material suffering; contributed towards national reconciliation, a political settlement of the crisis and the consolidation of peace and stability throughout the Sudan; and promoted the support of all Sudanese in that process, including, in particular, securing the cooperation of the Government.

Because of those factors, the African Union was best placed to carry out so delicate an undertaking because it could provide peace, while also satisfying the need for justice, he said. President Olusegun Obasanjo had made a proposal, on behalf of the African Union, based on the need to secure peace without sacrificing the need for justice. Regrettably, for the sake of reconciliation, the Council had neither considered that proposal nor assessed its potential to enable its members to combat impunity. One could not claim to support the African Union while brushing aside its proposals without deigning even to consider them. At the eruption of the Darfur conflict, it had been none other than the African Union that had deployed its soldiers and begun negotiating the various complex issues involved. What was true of the Sudan was true all over Africa, and Algeria regretted that for the sake of compromise at any cost those who defended the principle of universal justice had, in fact, confirmed that even in the Council there could be a double standard.

WANG GUANGYA (China), explaining his delegation’s abstention, said that China had followed the situation in Darfur closely and supported a political solution. Like the rest of the international community, China deplored deeply the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law and believed that the perpetrators must be brought to justice. The question before the Council was what was the most appropriate way to do so. While ensuring justice, it was important to sustain the hard-won gains of the North-South peace process.

He said his country would have preferred that the perpetrators stand trial in Sudanese courts, which had recently taken action against people involved in human rights violations in Darfur. China did not favour the referral to the International Criminal Court without the consent of the Sudanese Government. In addition, China, which was not a party to the Rome Statute, had major reservations regarding some of its provisions and had found it difficult to endorse the Council authorization of that referral.

ELLEN MARGRETHE LØJ (Denmark) said that it had been two months since the Council had received the report of the Commission of Inquiry, which had strongly recommended referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC. The Court had the mandate, capacity and funding necessary to ensure swift and effective prosecution. She was encouraged that the Council had voted to adopt a resolution to bring an internationally recognized follow-up to the crimes in Darfur. She recognized the difficulty of some delegations to accept the text and appreciated the flexibility shown.

Denmark had only been able to support the text after some alterations were made, she said. Regarding the formulation on existing agreements referred to in article 98-2 of the Rome Statute, she noted that that reference was purely factual and referred to the existence of such agreements. Thus, the reference was in no way impinging on the Rome Statute. The result was a valid compromise leading to the first referral of a situation to the ICC. She looked forward to the Court taking the first steps to ending the culture of impunity in Darfur.

LAURO BAJA (Philippines) noted that today’s was the third resolution borne out of the Council’s consideration of Darfur. He had voted for the resolution in response to the urgency and gravity of the crimes, which the Council and the international community were obliged to address. Any failure of action two months after the presentation of the report would have reduced the Council to irrelevance in ending impunity and protecting human rights and international humanitarian law.

He shared the concerns of some regarding the manner in which the resolution was arrived at. Once again, veto threats prevented the expression of a clear and robust signal from the Council. That was why calls for Council reform were growing louder with each passing day. He also believed that the ICC was a fatality in the resolution. Did the Council have the prerogative to mandate the jurisdiction of the Court?

KENZO OSHIMA (Japan) said he had voted in favour of the resolution because impunity for serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity must not be allowed. Japan supported in principle the referral to the International Criminal Court within the appropriate time-frame, although it was not a party to the Rome Statute and would have much preferred more agreement among Council members.

EMYR JONES PARRY (United Kingdom) said that by tonight’s vote the Council had acted to ensure accountability for the crimes committed in Darfur. The United Kingdom hoped to send a salutary warning to other parties who may be tempted to commit similar human rights violations. The United Kingdom welcomed the adoption of the two other resolutions on the Sudan this week and called for a redoubling of efforts on behalf of peace and justice for the people of Darfur, and the Sudan as a whole, who had suffered enough. The three resolutions were a substantial contribution towards that end.

CÉSAR MAYORAL (Argentina) said he had voted in support of the resolution on the basis of the report to the Council by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who stated clearly what had been crimes against humanity in Darfur. The legal context for dealing with such violations was the ICC. He understood that the ICC would be the proper place to combat impunity. The resolution gave strong support to the Court and demonstrated significant progress within the United Nations to ensure the functioning of an international system for human rights, for which the Court was an essential tool.

He noted that it was the first time the Council had referred to the Court a situation involving crimes over which the Court had jurisdiction. It was a crucial precedent. The letter and spirit of the Rome Statute must be respected, taking into account the legitimate concerns of States. Accordingly, he regretted that the Council had to adopt a text that provided an exemption to the Court, and hoped that that would not become normal practice. The exemption referred to in operative paragraph 6 only applied to those States not party to the Rome Statute.

JEAN-MARC DE LA SABLIERE (France) said the events in Darfur were deeply troubling, and the greatest concern was the plight of the people there. The Secretary-General’s reports had provided a detailed picture of those atrocities. The Council had a duty to take action. Its policy must include three elements. The first was the need to assist the African Union to strengthen its mandate for protection and monitoring. The Council had done that by adopting resolution 1590 last week. Then, there was the need to exert pressure on the warring parties to fulfil their obligations and achieve a political settlement. The Council did that by adopting resolution 1591 a few days ago. Finally, it was necessary to put an end to impunity. That was what the Council had done today.

The Commission’s report recommended the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC, he said. The Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights had asked the Council to urgently provide a positive outcome following that recommendation. Referring the issue to the ICC was the only solution. It was necessary to do right by the victims, and doing so would prevent those violations from continuing. That was why France had been the initiator of the resolution and voted in its favour. He was gratified by the adoption of this historic resolution, by which the Council, for the first time, referred a situation to the ICC.

Thus, the Council had sent a strong message to all those in Darfur who had committed or were tempted to commit atrocious crimes, and to the victims. The international community would not allow those crimes to remain unpunished. It also marked a turning point and sent a message farther than Darfur. His delegation had been ready to acknowledge immunity from the ICC for nationals from States not party to the Rome Statute. He reaffirmed his confidence in the ICC and hoped that those clauses concerning immunity from the Court would be dropped very soon.

ADAMANTIOS TH. VASSILAKIS (Greece) stressed that impunity must not be allowed to go unpunished and that was why his country had turned to the International Criminal Court. It would have preferred a text that did not make exceptions, but it was better than one that allowed violations to go unpunished. The text strengthened the Council’s authority, as well as that of the International Criminal Court, which would have the possibility of showing its competence. The three recently adopted resolutions on Darfur would assist in restoring peace in the Sudan.

AUGUSTINE MAHIGA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that every new delay in the adoption of the resolution represented a failure to serve the interests of justice, and his delegation regretted that the text took on matters that did not concern the Council. It did not permit any avoidance of the International Criminal Court’s authority, and the United Republic of Tanzania hoped that the international community would not abandon the people of the Sudan, particularly those of Darfur.

MIHNEA IOAN MOTOC (Romania) said that text spoke for itself in showing the way the Council could come together to address serious issues. The adoption of resolution 1593 was a stand against impunity and an expression of confidence in the ICC to handle complex cases, like the one the Council was referring to it today. At the end of the day, the Council had sent a message that there was no way that anyone anywhere could get away without retribution for grave crimes. By deciding to refer Darfur to the ICC, the Council had enhanced its conflict prevention and resolution capabilities. Upholding the ICC by adopting the resolution would be to no avail unless States remained supportive of the Court as it exercised its prerogatives.

ANDREY DENISOV (Russian Federation) said that Council members had reaffirmed that the struggle against impunity was one of the elements of long-term stability in Darfur. All those responsible for grave crimes must be punished, as pointed out in the report of the Commission of Inquiry. The resolution adopted today would promote an effective solution to the fight against impunity.

JOEL ADECHI (Benin) said the vote was a major event in the context of the international community’s attempts to ensure there was no impunity for violations of international humanitarian law in the past decade. Benin had voted in favour of the resolution because it was party to the Rome Statute and also because the worsening of the situation in Darfur meant that the Council must take action to end the suffering of the civilians, ending impunity by providing impartial justice. Benin had also voted in favour out of respect for human dignity and the right to life. The African Union recognized that the international community had a responsibility to protect civilians when they were not protected by their own governments. The resolution must help them to achieve their legitimate dream of an end to their suffering and enable them to look ahead to the future with serenity.

Council President RONALDO MOTA SARDENBERG (Brazil), speaking in his national capacity, said his country was in favour of the resolution, but had been unable to join those who had voted in favour. However, Brazil was ready to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court whenever necessary. The Court provided all the necessary checks and balances to prevent politically motivated prosecutions, and any fears to the contrary were both unwarranted and unhelpful.

However, there were limits to the responsibilities of the Council vis-à-vis international instruments, and Brazil had consistently maintained that position since the negotiations on the Rome Statute. But the Court remained the only suitable institution to deal with the violations in the Sudan. Brazil had been unable to support operative paragraph 6, which recognized exclusive jurisdiction. It would not strengthen the role of the International Criminal Court.

ELFATIH MOHAMED AHMED ERWA (Sudan) said that, once more, the Council had persisted in adopting unwise decisions against his country, which only served to further complicate the situation on the ground. The positions over the ICC were well known. The Darfur question had been exploited in light of those positions. It was a paradox that the language in which the resolution was negotiated was the same language that had buffeted the Council before on another African question. The resolution adopted was full of exemptions. He reminded the Council that the Sudan was also not party to the ICC, making implementation of the resolution fraught with procedural impediments. As long as the Council believed that the scales of justice were based on exceptions and exploitation of crises in developing countries and bargaining among major Powers, it did not settle the question of accountability in Darfur, but exposed the fact that the ICC was intended for developing and weak countries and was a tool to exercise cultural superiority.

The Council, by adopting the resolution, had once again ridden roughshod over the African position, he said. The initiative by Nigeria, as chair of the African Union, had not even been the subject of consideration. Also, the Council had adopted the resolution at a time when the Sudanese judiciary had gone a long way in holding trials, and was capable of ensuring accountability. Some here wanted to activate the ICC and exploit the situation in Darfur. Accountability was a long process that could not be achieved overnight. The Council was continuing to use a policy of double standards, and sending the message that exemptions were only for major Powers. The resolution would only serve to weaken prospects for settlement and further complicate the already complex situation.

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5153rd meeting, on 29 March 2005

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 1547 (2004) of 11 June 2004, 1556 (2004) of 30 July 2004, 1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004, 1574 (2004) of 19 November 2004, 1585
(2005) of 10 March 2005, 1588 (2005) of 17 March 2005, and 1590 of 24 March 2005, and statements of its President concerning Sudan,
Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan, and recalling the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,
Recalling the commitments made by the parties in the 8 April N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Humanitarian and Security Protocols between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and recalling the commitments made in the Joint Communique of 3 July 2004 between the Government of Sudan and the Secretary-General,
Welcoming the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army(SPLM/A) in Nairobi, Kenya on 9 January 2005,
Recognizing that the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement must build on the Agreement to bring peace and stability to the entire country, and calling on all Sudanese parties, in particular those party to the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, to take immediate steps to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur and to take all necessary action to prevent further violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and to put an end to impunity, including in the Darfur region,
Expressing its utmost concern over the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population in the Darfur region as well as throughout Sudan, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons,
Considering that the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons will be a critical factor for the consolidation of the
peace process,

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Expressing also its deep concern for the security of humanitarian workers and their access to populations in need, including refugees, internally displaced persons and other war-affected populations,
Condemning the continued violations of the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 and the Abuja Protocols of 9 November 2004 by all sides in Darfur and the deterioration of the security situation and negative impact this has had on humanitarian assistance efforts,
Strongly condemning all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Darfur region, in particular the continuation of violence
against civilians and sexual violence against women and girls since the adoption of resolution 1574 (2004), urging all parties to take necessary steps to prevent further violations, and expressing its determination to ensure that those responsible for all such violations are identified and brought to justice without delay,
Recognizing that international support for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is critically important to its success, emphasizing
that progress towards resolution of the conflict in Darfur would create conditions conducive for delivery of such assistance, and alarmed that the violence in Darfur nonetheless continues,
Recalling the demands, in resolutions 1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), and 1574 (2004), that all parties to the conflict in Darfur refrain from any violence
against civilians and cooperate fully with the African Union Mission in Darfur,
Welcoming the 16 February 2005 N’djamena Summit on Darfur and the continued commitment of the African Union to play a key role in facilitating a resolution to the conflict in Darfur in all respects, and the announcement by the Government of Sudan on 16 February 2005 that it would take immediate steps, including withdrawal of its forces from Labado, Qarifa, and Marla in Darfur, and the withdrawal of its Antonov aircraft from Darfur,
Commending the efforts of the African Union, in particular its Chairman,acknowledging the progress made by the African Union in the deployment of an international protection force, police, and military observers, and calling on all member states to contribute generously and urgently to the African Union Mission in Darfur,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security, 1379 (2001) and 1460 (2003) on children in armed conflicts, as well as resolutions
1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts and resolution 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and UN personnel,
Taking note of the Secretary-General’s reports of 31 January 2005 (S/2005/57 and Add.1), 3 December 2004 (S/2004/947), 4 February 2005 (S/2005/68), and
4 March 2005 (S/2005/140), as well as the report of 25 January 2005 of the International Commission of Inquiry (S/2005/60),
Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Deplores strongly that the Government of Sudan and rebel forces and all
other armed groups in Darfur have failed to comply fully with their commitments
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and the demands of the Council referred to in resolutions 1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), and 1574 (2004), condemns the continued violations of the 8 April 2004 N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Protocols, including air strikes by the Government of Sudan in December 2004 and January 2005 and rebel attacks on Darfur villages in January 2005, and the failure of the Government of Sudan to disarm Janjaweed militiamen and apprehend and bring to justice
Janajaweed leaders and their associates who have carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities, and demands that all parties take immediate steps to fulfil all their commitments to respect the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the Abuja Protocols, including notification of force positions, to facilitate humanitarian assistance, and to cooperate fully with the African Union Mission;
2. Emphasizes that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur, and calls upon the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups, particularly
the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army to resume the Abuja talks rapidly without preconditions and negotiate in good faith to speedily reach agreement, and urges the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to play an active and constructive role in support of the Abuja talks and take immediate steps to support a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur;
3. Decides, in light of the failure of all parties to the conflict in Darfur to fulfil their commitments,
(a) to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the
Council (herein “the Committee”), to undertake to following tasks:
i. to monitor implementation of the measures referred to in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of this paragraph and paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004),
and paragraph 7 below;
ii. to designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by subparagraphs (d) and (e) of this paragraph and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with subparagraphs (f) and (g);
iii. to establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by subparagraphs (d) and (e);
iv. to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work;
v. to consider requests from and, as appropriate, provide prior approval to the Government of Sudan for the movement of military equipment and supplies into the Darfur region in accordance with paragraph 7 below;
vi. to assess reports from the Panel of Experts established under subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, and Member States, in particular those in the region, on specific steps they are taking to implement the measures imposed by subparagraphs (d) and (e) and paragraph 7 below;
vii. to encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of
such States to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;
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(b) to request the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, to appoint for a period of six months, within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, a Panel of Experts comprised of four members and based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to travel regularly to El-Fasher, Sudan and other locations in Sudan, and to operate under the direction of the Committee to undertake the following tasks:
i. to assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the measures in subparagraphs (d) and (e),paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), and paragraph 7 of this resolution, and to make recommendations to the Committee on actions the Council may want to consider;
ii. to provide a mid-term briefing on its work to the Committee, and an interim report no later than 90 days after adoption of this resolution, and a final report no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate to the Council through the Committee with its findings and recommendations; and
iii. to coordinate its activities as appropriate with ongoing operations of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS);
(c) that those individuals, as designated by the Committee established by subparagraph (a) above, based on the information provided by Member States, the
Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights or the Panel of Experts established under subparagraph (b) of this paragraph above, and other
relevant sources, who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004) and paragraph 7 of this resolution as implemented by a state, or are responsible for offensive military
overflights described in paragraph 6 of this resolution, shall be subject to the measures identified in subparagraphs (d) and (e) below;
(d) that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent entry into or transit through their territories of all persons as designated by the Committee pursuant to subparagraph (c) above, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall obligate a State to refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals;
(e) that all States shall freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources that are on their territories on the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the
persons designated by the Committee pursuant to subparagraph (c) above, or that are held by entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and decides further that all States
shall ensure that no funds, financial assets or economic resources are made available by their nationals or by any persons within their territories to or for the benefit of such persons or entities;
(f) that the measures imposed by subparagraph (d) above shall not apply
where the Committee established by subparagraph (a) above determines on a case by case basis that such travel is justified on the ground of humanitarian need,
including religious obligation, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the Council’s resolutions for the creation of peace and stability in Sudan and the region;
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(g) that the measures imposed by subparagraph (e) of this resolution do notapply to funds, other financial assets and economic resources that:
i. have been determined by relevant States to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and
medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance
of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets and economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within two working days of such notification;
ii. have been determined by relevant States to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee, or
iii. have been determined by relevant States to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, or other
financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated by the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
4. Decides that the measures referred to in subparagraphs 3 (d) and (e) shall enter into force 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution, unless the Security Council determines before then that the parties to the conflict in Darfur have complied with all the commitments and demands referred to in paragraph 1 above and paragraph 6 below;
5. Expresses its readiness to consider the modification or termination of the measures under paragraph 3, on the recommendation of the Committee or at the end of a period of 12 months from the date of adoption of this resolution, or earlier if the
Security Council determines before then that the parties to the conflict in Darfur have complied with all the commitments and demands referred to in paragraph 1 above and paragraph 6 below;
6. Demands that the Government of Sudan, in accordance with its commitments under the 8 April 2004 N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Security Protocol, immediately cease conducting offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region, and invites the African Union Ceasefire Commission to share pertinent information as appropriate in this regard with the Secretary-General, the Committee, or the Panel of Experts established
under paragraph 3 (b);
7. Reaffirms the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), and decides that these measures shall immediately upon adoption of
this resolution, also apply to all the parties to the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur; decides that these measures shall not apply to the supplies and related technical training and assistance listed in paragraph 9 of resolution 1556 (2004);
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decides that these measures shall not apply with respect to assistance and supplies provided in support of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
further decides that these measures shall not apply to movements of military equipment and supplies into the Darfur region that are approved in advance by the
Committee established under paragraph 3 (a) upon a request by the Government of Sudan; and invites the African Union Ceasefire Commission to share pertinent
information as appropriate in this regard with the Secretary-General, the Committee, or the Panel of Experts established under paragraph 3 (b);
8. Reiterates that, in the event the parties fail to fulfil their commitments and demands as outlined in paragraphs 1 and 6, and the situation in Darfur continues to deteriorate, the Council will consider further measures as provided for in Article
41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

The United States is pleased to announce a contribution of $17.85 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to continue to provide assistance and protection for over 200,000 Sudanese who have sought refuge in Chad as a result of the continuing conflict and deprivation in Darfur. The United States has provided nearly $100 million towards appeals from UNHCR, the World Food Program, and partner international and non-governmental organizations to support the Sudanese refugees in Chad since the beginning of the crisis in 2003. The humanitarian situation on both sides of the border remains fragile and additional donor support for the international relief effort is needed. The United States calls on other donors to respond with similar generosity.
2005/328
Released on March 16, 2005

Darfur Humanitarian Emergency
Total FY 2005 USG Humanitarian Assistance for the Darfur Emergency (to date): $344,944,264
Total FY 2003 – 2005 USG Humanitarian Assistance for the Darfur Emergency: $603,389,944

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Current Humanitarian Situation
USG Humanitarian Assistance
On March 27, a USAID/OFDA flight carrying 20,005 blankets arrived in Nyala, South Darfur. An additional USAID/OFDA flight containing 630 rolls of plastic sheeting arrived in Nyala on March 29. The total value of the commodities including transport was $388,230. Three additional USAID/OFDA shipments are scheduled to arrive in Darfur in the coming week, transporting a total of 1,890 rolls of plastic sheeting and 20,020 blankets, valued at more than $601,170, including transport. To date, USAID has delivered 78 airlifts with 535,540 blankets, 52,100 water containers, and enough plastic sheeting to provide emergency shelter for nearly 1.3 million displaced people.
Assessment in North Darfur
From March 20 to 23, the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID/DART) North Darfur Field Officer participated in an interagency assessment of Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)-held areas near Dar Zegawa in North Darfur. Dar Zegawa is a remote area of North Darfur that currently receives little humanitarian assistance due to insecurity and lack of access.
The assessment concluded that traditional coping mechanisms are being depleted for both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities as a result of ongoing conflict. In addition, conflict has eroded much of the population’s livelihoods through the looting of animals, inaccessibility of migratory routes for pasture and water, and distance from markets for the sale of livestock and purchase of grains/cereals. Furthermore, insecurity has reduced the number of accessible water sources, at the same time that accessible water sources are becoming more scarce from declining water tables, slow recharge rates, and lack of maintenance for wells and pumps.
The USAID/DART identified the need for expanded temporary emergency food distribution and water sector programs in the near term to prevent further population displacement in Dar Zegawa.
USAID/OFDA Director Visit
Between March 24 and 29, the USAID/OFDA Director traveled to Sudan to meet with the USAID/DART, the U.S. Embassy, U.N. and NGO partners, the AU, and representatives of the Government of Sudan (GOS) to discuss security, protection, food assistance, and programmatic issues in Sudan. According to the USAID/DART, the humanitarian community in South Darfurcontinues to emphasize that insecurity is likely to have an impact on humanitarian access in South Darfur, and thus humanitarian relief efforts, over the coming months.
Food Security
Despite an additional $8 million contribution currently in the under negotiation from USAID’s Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP), WFP reported to the USAID/DART on March 29 that WFP is resorting to unusual measures to purchase non-cereal commodities in advance of pipeline breaks in August. Using a new system called the Business Process Review, WFP will borrow against anticipated cash contributions from other donors to fast-track non-cereals procurements. Depending on the procurement turnaround, however, WFP may need to resort to half-rations for non-cereals in June and July in order to “extend the riskâ€? of pipeline breaks and give more time for expected cash contributions to be confirmed. WFP noted that if the expected cash contributions are not confirmed by the end of April, the food operation will face significant risks.
During the month of March, WFP moved a record 50,000 metric tons (MT) of commodities to the three state capitals of Darfur. Actual distributions, however, are likely to fall short of planned targets due to the rise in security incidents in West and South Darfur during March. WFP currently has slightly more than a one-month stock of food in storage and plans to pre-position two months of food in West Darfur prior to the onset of the rainy season in May/June.
According to the USAID/DART, IDPs in Zam Zam camp, North Darfur, are growing vegetables using wastewater from nearby water points, on their own initiative. USAID/OFDA partner CHF International plans to re-organize the gardens at water points, provide inputs and extension support, and implement water-saving technologies.
Security
On March 28, the Office of the U.N. Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) reported that the Nyala-Kass route was still declared “no go” following the shooting that seriously injured a USAID/DART member on March 22.
On March 25, OCHA reported that unknown perpetrators broke into the WFP compound in Geneina, West Darfur, and vandalized WFP communications equipment, but stole nothing. In response, the U.N. is augmenting security at the WFP compound, and local police are increasing patrols.
According to international media sources, on March 29, unidentified perpetrators fired upon an African Union (AU) convoy, wounding two AU peacekeepers and a Sudanese translator near the town of Niteaga, 50 km northwest of Nyala, South Darfur. All three are reportedly in stable condition, including one of the AU monitors who was shot in the neck and required surgery. Currently, a 2,000 member AU peacekeeping force is responsible for monitoring the April 2004 ceasefire agreement between the GOS and opposition groups in Darfur.
Drought Task Force
According to OCHA, preliminary findings from the Interagency North Darfur Drought Task Force indicate that 316,000 people in 220 villages are affected by drought in North Darfur. OCHA stressed the importance of providing food assistance before people begin migrating in search of food, resulting in further displacement.
U.N. Security Council Action
On March 29, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1591 imposing sanctions on individuals who commit atrocities or violate cease-fire agreements in Darfur. The measure, drafted by the U.S. Government, bans travel by individuals deemed guilty of offenses and freezes their assets. The resolution also forbids the GOS from conducting offensive military flights into Darfur and from sending military equipment without first notifying the U.N. Security Council. The sanctions are scheduled to come into effect in 30 days to allow a U.N. Security Council committee to draft a list of offenders.
On March 31, the U.N. Security Council voted to refer war crimes cases in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC).